Three papers on the Development and Contribution of Ideational Frameworks in Russian Politics, 1917-1934 and 1991-2008 by Bevan, Oliver Craig
 Three papers on the Development and Contribution of Ideational
Frameworks in Russian Politics, 1917-1934 and 1991-2008
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation No citation.
Accessed February 19, 2015 1:27:10 PM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:11181220
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#LAA

This page intentionally left blank
Three papers on the Development and Contribution of Ideational Frameworks in Russian
Politics, 1917-1934 and 1991-2008
A dissertation presented
by
Oliver Craig Bevan
to
The Department of Government
in partial fulﬁllment of the requirements
for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in the subject of
Political Science
Harvard University,
Cambridge, Massachusetts
July 2013
c©2013. Oliver Craig Bevan
All rights reserved.
Dissertation Advisor: Timothy Colton Oliver Bevan
Three papers on the Development and Contribution of Ideational
Frameworks in Russian Politics, 1917-1934 and 1991-2008
Abstract
The central contention of this dissertation is that political scientists have largely ignored
the importance of ideational frameworks for resolving problems of policy-making in times of
signiﬁcant upheaval. In order to illustrate the genesis and contribution of these frameworks,
the three papers in my dissertation focus on a diachronic comparison of two moments in
Russian history that encapsulate maximal uncertainty, covering the aftermath of the imperial
collapses in 1917 and 1991. The ﬁrst paper focuses on state- and nation-building in the North
Caucasus, arguing that the debates between the Bolsheviks and other members of the Second
International, particularly Otto Bauer, provided the Bolsheviks with a coherent platform that
could largely stem the ﬁssiparous tendencies of the region in a way that Boris Yeltsin and
his teams were unable to do in the early 1990s. The second paper examines economic policy
and ﬁnds the reverse to be true: the economic debates of the Second International largely
ignored the problem of the peasantry and the exiled status of many of the leading Bolsheviks
meant they were unable to articulate a suﬃciently detailed policy to apply to the Russian
case. The post-communists under the leadership of Yegor Gaidar, were able to draw on
decades of economic research, particularly the Chicago and Virginia Schools, that provided
the intellectual rationale for dismembering the Communist command-system, but equally
important was the years that Gaidar and his team spent developing an alternative in the
twilight years of communism. The ﬁnal paper considers the legacy of ideational frameworks
by considering the rule of Stalin and Putin, arguing that the tasks left unfulﬁlled provide a
basis for regime consolidation by subsequent rulers.
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Chapter 1
Overview
0Thanks to Peter Hall for providing insightful comments on an early draft of this chapter.
1.1 Setting the Scene
Periods following the collapse of empires tend to be bedevilled with diﬃculty, confusion and
violence1. The end of the Roman Empire resulted in tremendous upheaval and ushered in
the Dark Ages in Europe2, while the twilight of the great European empires of the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries generated countless conﬂicts and devastation throughout the globe
(Hobsbawn, 1987). This is hardly surprising: anyone with even a passing knowledge of recent
history would expect the elimination of central authority over large swathes of territory to
give rise to serious problems of governance and governability. Moreover, we would also
expect contagious levels of violence, as the many suitors for control over the contested land
do battle with one another and seek to assert their pre-eminence, often leading to appalling
privations for the aﬀected civilian populations. However, while the above sentences highlight
the perils of such transitions, there is also near-unmitigated potential for dramatic alterations
to the political and social fabric. If these serious problems can be managed, such situations
provide an extraordinary opportunity for the new leadership to remake the polity and enact
extraordinarily far-reaching reforms in the ﬁrst years after taking power. Many newly-elected
governments talk of mandates or political capital to drive through sweeping changes, but
few have the beneﬁts of such a complete tabula rasa as those inheriting the now-atomised
fragments of empire.
Overcoming these challenges is, of course, a mighty task and one that the vast major-
ity of state- and nation-builders ﬁnd insuperable. From the post-colonial travails of Africa
and Latin America3 to the sustained chaos that faced Central and Eastern Europe in the
1See Alexander Motyl's work for a fascinating look at the dynamics of imperial rise, decline and ultimate
collapse (Motyl, 2002).
2Edward Gibbon's monumental work, while surpassed in terms of the rigours of modern scholarship, has
yet to be bettered in its account of the chaos and confusion surrounding the collapse of Rome (Gibbon,
1974).
3The explosion of recent interest in Africa is to be much welcomed and has ﬁnally started to help advance
our understanding of the continent; see Reno (2000) for a relatively recent look at the problems facing
many of the states in terms of building basic capabilities. Centeno (2002) is of great utility in terms of
understanding similar dynamics in Latin America.
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aftermath of the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire4, many new countries are riven by
factionalism and inﬁghting, ethnic conﬂict and external interference. These combined diﬃ-
culties make the crafting of eﬀective policy near-impossible, leading to civil wars, plunging
levels of social welfare and prolonged instability. Given the gravity of such situations and
the exceptionally high stakes, it is rather surprising that as a discipline political science has
generally failed to investigate what separates the successes from the failures. To be more
speciﬁc, the central question facing us when considering this problem is what unites those
groups of leaders who have managed to navigate the Scylla of disintegration and the Charyb-
dis of dangerous overcentralisation to found an enduring state5? Even those governments
that manage to navigate the troubled initial waters often fall at a subsequent hurdle, the fer-
vour and determination of the revolutionary period subsiding to a Thermidorean exhaustion
that exposes the fragility of the initial gains and leads to retrenchment and collapse.
My dissertation seeks to develop a response to these questions that marries a marked
theoretical advance on the existing literature with substantial empirical ﬁndings from a
series of paired comparisons in Russian history. The former contribution consists in the
development of the concept of `ideational frameworks'; these take us beyond the relatively
hackneyed ﬁeld of ideology, orienting our thinking towards how policies are formulated and
implemented in environments exhibiting the characteristic of near-complete chaos. We shall
develop a useful means for distinguishing between helpful and unhelpful frameworks across
two dimensions of strength and ﬂexibility and outline what exactly it means to be `successful'
in these terms as well as suggesting critical background conditions for generating better
frameworks. Much of the existing literature is either devoted to working within the conﬁnes
4See Sked (2001) for a most readable account of these events and the problems unleashed in Europe as a
result.
5This is a greatly-oversimpliﬁed dichotomy, since there are many more dimensions to this problem than
merely that of disintegration or overcentralisation. It does not, for example, address the problem of external
interference, which is often critical in such moments, nor the question of how to manage the previous regime.
Nevertheless, for our purposes it is the most useful lens with which to view these questions and many of
the central policy problems can, I argue in the subsequent papers, be reduced to this basic decision without
suﬀering too great a loss of critical detail.
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of orthodox methodological strictures or engaging in compelling but rather loose speculations
on the impact of ideas on policy; I hope to navigate between these extremes and provide
a reasoned and convincing demonstration of how we really can utilise non-tangible factors
as explanans. While these discussions are somewhat oversimpliﬁed, they provide the basic
roadmap for what follows and the only genuine test of the value of said frameworks consists
in their empirical applications, which takes place in the three papers that follow.
I acknowledge from the outset that these are complicated and potentially confusing issues
and do not seem particularly amenable to resolution by the standard regression analyses
that dominate the methodological canons of political science. Indeed, there is good reason
to suspect that the appeal to purely material factors is liable to be of only limited utility
in attempting to uncover satisfactory answers to questions that are essentially rooted in
examining the making of policy given conditions of serious and sustained uncertainty. While
not seeking to contest the claim that conditions on the ground exert a strong pull over the
direction of particular governmental decisions, an account that focused solely on such factors
would be intellectually unsatisfying because current material circumstances are not eo ipso
suﬃcient to explain the programmatic platforms (or absence of such) that provide answers
to the questions posed in the opening paragraph. One compelling alternative is to conduct
deep historical investigations that interrogate previous trajectories to try and identify path
dependencies that make certain outcomes more likely than others6. While this generally
generates revealing and subtle hypotheses, for the questions posed above such an approach
is ﬂawed due to the fundamental break with the past given the nature of the imperial collapses
in 1917 and 1991. This is not to rule out the importance of legacies, merely to argue that
they are perhaps not the driving factor behind subsequent decisions of governance. It is
my contention that if we are to provide compelling answers to the questions outlined above,
we need to consider other factors and approaches that are somewhat at odds with standard
research in contemporary social science.
6See Paul Pierson's work for a compelling account of how to do just this (Pierson, 2004).
4
As stressed above, my dissertation is an attempt to explore just one such alternative
factor, namely the role of ideas. As I shall argue at greater length subsequently (and seek
to demonstrate in the three papers that constitute this dissertation), focusing on how ideas
inﬂuence policy outcomes has major methodological and epistemological beneﬁts in politi-
cal science. Studying ideational debates between the central policy players provides critical
information on how and why decisions were made and why certain policies were accepted
or rejected. Often, as we shall see, the evidence utilised is indeed that these ideas are more
consonant with expectations of future material developments, but this is far from always the
case, especially in revolutionary periods where ideological perspectives are accorded signif-
icant weight. At a deeper level, preexisting ideas help to shape perceptions of reality and
can lead to markedly diﬀering assessments of current conditions (we see this especially in
debates over early Soviet economic policy). Finally, under conditions of radical uncertainty
(such as we see during the periods immediately following imperial collapse) those with pre-
conceived notions of how to navigate particular diﬃculties are often the ones who are able
to exploit and reshape the political and social environment, leaving the pragmatists in their
wake. This is especially the case when the policy proposals could be strongly linked to an
underlying philosophy of rule, such as the connecting of local development with Leninist
anti-imperialism, or neoliberal policies with Yeltsin's putative democratic streak and shift
away from the communist past.
Much of the theory will be elaborated in the three papers, below, since I am aware
this is rather intangible and will only become clearer once we add some empirical clout to
these speculations. However, it is important to say something here in order to illustrate the
theoretical foundation on which all is constructed. The ﬁrst question revolves around the
type of framework which proves helpful in resolving the chaotic periods following imperial
collapse (or, we may reasonably expect, periods of great crisis in general). We shall see
in our papers that the truly compelling frameworks must strike a balance between being
overly ﬂexible in their application and resulting recommendations and becoming so ﬁxed
5
that they approach the status of dogma. While there is clearly a spectrum here, for ease of
tractability we can identify these two types as pernicious, while (to invoke Aristotle's golden
mean) the powerful frameworks have enough rigidity to guide proponents through the initial
dark and uncertain nights whilst possessing suﬃcient ﬂexibility to allow for some degree of
modiﬁcation as material circumstances become clearer.
In order to facilitate empirical and conceptual tractability, my project focuses its attention
on three diachronic comparisons from a single geographical location. While I believe there
is tremendous potential for extending the scope of this work, it seems sensible to devote
energy primarily to outlining and testing the main theoretical propositions at this initial
stage. Each comparison constitutes a single paper and consists in contrasting the early years
of the Soviet Union with the initial period of postcommunist Russia in order to understand
how and why leaderships respond well or poorly to a tripartite challenge of governance. The
ﬁrst two components of this examine how new leaders address the issues of statehood and
root-and-branch economic reform, while the third considers how they work to consolidate
these gains in the post-revolutionary period. I dedicate a paper to each of these three topics,
demonstrating how they help us to understand and further our knowledge in relation to the
overarching issues outlined in the opening two paragraphs here. The beneﬁts of these series
of diachronic comparisons allow me to hold constant many factors and variables that could
potentially muddy the analytical waters, enabling me to focus on constructing a compelling
theory that can be tested in other locales by future scholars.
The ﬁrst of these papers focuses on questions pertaining to state- and nation-building in
the ﬁssiparous region of the North Caucasus. The central question is why the Bolsheviks
were largely able to resolve the basic problems of order in the region while the post-Soviet
government of Boris Yeltsin failed to impose any kind of coherent policy, leading to war and
widespread instability. We shall ﬁnd that the debates between leading Bolsheviks (particu-
larly Stalin and Lenin) and members of the Second International (particularly Otto Bauer)
prove instrumental in helping the Bolsheviks to develop a relatively coherent platform cen-
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tred on support for local development in the conﬁnes of Soviet power. Yeltsin's team had no
such framework and made a series of compromises that would prove self-defeating and inter-
nally contradictory, generating the First Chechen War and stunting the limited prospects for
economic development in the region. In the second paper, I direct my attention to the craft-
ing of economic policy in the initial years following the assumption of power in the aftermath
of imperial collapse and we ﬁnd a marked switch in the aptitude of the two governments.
In particular, I ask why was the economic policy of the Bolsheviks, whose Marxist ideology
was predicated on the assumption of the overweening importance of the realm of economics,
so riddled with uncertainty in the years immediately following their usurpation of power.
By way of contrast, why was the ﬁrst post-Soviet government of Boris Yeltsin so committed
to a particular neoliberal policy programme given the pragmatism evident in many other
areas of arguably no-lesser importance (such as foreign policy and statebuilding)? The ﬁnal
topic I address relates to consolidation and compromise, contrasting the industrial develop-
ment encapsulated by Stalin's `socialism in one country' with the Putin government's focus
on etatisation as a solution to all the woes facing the modern Russian state. The central
argument in this paper is that the tasks left unﬁnished by the ﬁrst generation often provide
critical ideational leverage for those that follow, meaning that we must pay great attention
to the weaknesses and lacunae of any given ideational framework in order to assess its long-
term impact. I outline each of the three papers in more depth in the concluding section of
this introductory chapter.
This precis of the dissertation is structured in the following fashion. The ﬁrst section
provides a broad overview of the recent literature on ideas in political science, emphasising
the extent to which works on non-material factors either deviate from accepted models of ex-
planation or draw extensively on rational-choice logic to further the analysis. In highlighting
this unfortunate trend, I hope to outline the need for a more comprehensive understanding
of how ideational factors impact policy. The second section outlines the foundational theory
that underlies the three papers, considering the wide variety of work on ideas in politics and
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seeking to generate a common rubric that can be used in subsequent analysis through the
elaboration of `ideational frameworks'. The ﬁnal section provides an overview of the three
papers that constitute the dissertation, walking through their major claims and what they
contribute to the overall project.
1.2 Ideas in Politics
The primary theoretical contribution of my thesis is to provide greater structure to the form
in which political scientists generally conceptualise the impact of ideas on social and political
outcomes. The means by which I hope to achieve this are contained in a later section, where
I turn to the concept of ideational frameworks. I claim that these provide a more concrete
form for these discussions than has generally been the case and, perhaps most importantly,
generates a basis for evaluating the relative prospects of leading ideas in an ex ante fashion.
For the moment, however, we turn our attention to the uneven literature on non-material
factors in political science. As we shall see in this section, while there has recently been a
minor resurgence of works devoted to demonstrating the value of such factors as explanans in
political science, these typically seek to shoehorn ideational factors into pre-existing method-
ological schemata, through a dependence on either causal or rationalist logic. This blunts
the worth of such enquiries, for ideas are notoriously hard to measure and their impact chal-
lenging in extremis to demonstrate when attempting to adhere to standard methodological
strictures. The upshot of these attempts is a curtailment in the kinds of questions we can
seek to ask and a corresponding drop in the level of creativity in the discipline. While I think
the move to greater epistemological pluralism in political science is something that should
be unreservedly welcomed, the lack of a corresponding methodological pluralism threatens
to undermine these protean advances and reduce this style of explanation to very much a
second-tier alternative. The implication is that ideational factors are something to which one
turns when the standard empirical approaches are unsatisfying, unconvincing or unusable.
8
Needless to say, my project is predicated on a rejection of this proposition, but we should
explicate it more fully before turning to my proposed remedy.
In broad terms, it is fair to say that political science as a discipline has evinced a great deal
of scepticism toward the explanatory validity of ideational factors7. In part, I suspect this is
a legacy of the behaviouralist revolution and the general distrust of explanans that could not
be clearly linked to empirically-veriﬁable phenomena. This attitude towards the importance
of empirical referents has a distinguished pedigree and was a core principle of the `Logical
Positivist' school, which is often seen as one of the main origins of behaviouralism (Smith,
1986)8. Its historical roots date to Auguste Comte's belief that the French Revolution was
perverted by the ﬁrst generation's obsession with ideas rather than practical science (Comte,
1998), but it received perhaps its most famous articulation in Karl Popper's notion of the
necessity for acceptable theories to be empirically falsiﬁable (Popper, 1965). However, this
focus on behaviouralism and the reliance on a particular method is not an entirely satisfying
account of the problem at hand both because it ignores the extent of contestation around
the suitability of behaviouralism in the social sciences9, but more importantly because it
denies agency to those seeking to articulate the value of non-material factors and casts them
as tied to the mast of their colleagues' past methodological choices.
Before delving further into this point, we need to consider what ideational arguments
can add to our understanding of socio-political processes and events. If we cannot provide a
prima facie defence of these kind of factors and highlight their independent value, then the
adherents to orthodox methodological postulates will be entirely correct in their insistence of
the value of focusing on more standard empirical analyses and will have no case to answer.
7Political science is certainly not alone among the social sciences in harbouring this methodological
antagonism directed against non-material factors. The second paper in this dissertation will demonstrate
that economics is also similarly disinclined to consider such explanations.
8The logical positivists displayed heroic intellectual integrity by disbanding themselves upon realising that
the core proposition governing their activities, that all meaningful statements must be empirically testable,
was impossible to demonstrate using their accepted standard of proof.
9See Rosenberg (1995) for an overview of contemporary debates on this topic. For a demonstration of the
fact that behaviouralism is still very much alive and continuing to exert a strong inﬂuence on recent social
science research, see Niedenzu, Meleghy and Meyer (2008).
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Happily for our present endeavour, this is not the case. In fact, we can identify three
means by which ideas can be utilised to advance our understanding; while all are (almost of
necessity) closely related, they are analytically distinct and each provides a critical means of
investigating matters that are poorly treated by standard empirical models. In the course
of outlining the three contributions, I shall draw on existing literatures that illustrate the
central points at issue; we shall have course to return to certain parts of this literature when
we discuss in more detail the response to the methodological objections.
The ﬁrst of these contributions is perhaps the broadest and most ill-deﬁned and for that
reason it thus provides relatively little ballast against the charges of mainstream methodol-
ogists. Nevertheless, it has generated important and fascinating insights into the nature of
socio-political processes and deserves recognition here. Generally speaking, the work that
falls under this category highlights the relationship between regime and society and identi-
ﬁes critical points of tension and modes of control that go far beyond the simple reliance on
coercion on which classic studies of autocracy tended to rely10 Although this is a particularly
underdeveloped and neglected area of research in evaluating state actions (and arguably in
political science more broadly), recent years have seen scholars working in empirical political
science attempt to engage seriously with these kind of questions. Lisa Wedeen's work on
the strange cult of personality of Bashar al-Assad in authoritarian Syria provides perhaps
the best example of a modern study that seeks to utilise such an approach. In this case,
Assad's cult does not seem to generate legitimacy in the classic sense of people subscrib-
ing to the message the cult promulgates and evincing genuine belief/faith, but generates
`symbolic power' that transmits speciﬁc messages about the latent coercive capacity of the
regime by forcing people to engage in bizarre rituals, stabilising and reinforcing the regime
10Merle Fainsod's study of the Stalinist system is perhaps the most famous in this style (Fainsod, 1963),
although it is by no means exceptional and there is much of value in this work in terms of its detailed
attention to the basic mechanics of rule. Sheila Fitzpatrick's semi-autobiographical piece attempting to ﬁght
against this general tendency in Russian studies is perhaps the best introduction to the historiographical
struggles that pertain to this point (Fitzpatrick, 2008).
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(Wedeen, 1999)11. The other prominent strand of literature that falls under this general
heading relates to ideas concerning national identity, brought most ﬁrmly into the political
science cannon by Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson (Gellner, 1983; Anderson, 1991).
Gellner and Anderson certainly invoked material factors (such as the development of the
printing press) in their work, but it proved impossible to discuss in entirely non-ideational
terms while doing justice to the complexity of the underlying process. Laura Adams' recent
work on Uzbekistan demonstrates the value of integrating an understanding of nationalism
with support for an authoritarian regime (Adams, 2010).
The second ﬁeld in which non-material factors can prove their independent worth pertains
to questions of the transmission of inﬂuential movements in either a geographic or temporal
sense. This is typiﬁed by the work on `waves' and diﬀusion in terms of the promotion
and promulgation of common reactions to diverse events in a variety of settings. The most
common application of this is in the ﬁeld of revolution, be it Kurt Weyland's pioneering
study of the events of 1848 and the Arab Spring (Weyland, 2009, 2012), or Mark Beissinger's
work on the rise of nationalism during the twilight years of the Soviet Union and the Colour
Revolutions of the mid-2000s (Beissinger, 2002, 2009). The underlying thesis of these type of
diﬀusion arguments is that it is impossible to explain the patterns of behaviour by appeal to
purely material factors12. Perhaps the most coherent programme that has sought to explicate
this phenomenon is that work on epistemic communities in the ﬁeld of international relations,
pioneered by Peter Haas and his group of scholars (Haas, 1992)13. Epistemic communities
focuses on understanding the dynamics of international policy cooperation and coordination
by seeking to identify shared characteristics between leading bureaucrats, including such
seemingly abstract notions as a common understanding of the nature of causation. This has
11Given recent events in the Arab world, it is becoming increasingly clear that Assad's ruling strategy was
not invulnerable. However, it remains that case that it was remarkably eﬀective for a number of years.
12For an attempt to do just this in the Colour Revolutions, see Way (2008), who argues that it was more
a case of authoritarian weakness in all of the relevant countries than the diﬀusion of a central idea.
13The journal issue featuring this article by Haas was devoted entirely to epistemic communities and
eﬀectively launched the research programme.
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typically lent itself to applications in rather technical areas14, but the potential for advancing
our understanding of the dynamics of policy formulation oﬀered by such an approach is much
greater than if we rely purely on standard material explanations.
The ﬁnal area in which ideational factors oﬀer a marked improvement over purely ma-
terialist explanations is in aiding our understanding of the selection of policies during times
of great uncertainty. As this is so close to my interest and is the area in which I shall focus
on making a theoretical contribution, I shall save serious elaboration of these points for the
next section. However, it is perhaps not surprising that a considerable amount of recent
work has been devoted to this topic. Thus, Sheri Berman's investigation of early twentieth-
century European socialist parties as generators and propagators of social democracy is an
excellent example of how to integrate a ﬁne analysis of ideas with a demonstration of their
real-world impact during intensely troubled times (Berman, 2006). In terms of analysing
events in the postcommunist space, Keith Darden and Stephen Hanson have been vocal
advocates for assigning greater prominence to the role of ideational factors in inﬂuencing
outcomes during periods of signiﬁcant instability. Hanson has written two monographs on
this subject, the ﬁrst detailing the importance of the debates over Marxism with regards to
institutional design in the Soviet Union (Hanson, 1997), the second arguing that the absence
of a coherent ideology in postcommunist Russia explains the failure to develop strong parties
in that country (Hanson, 2010). Building on the excellent foundations erected by Peter Hall
(Hall, 1993), Keith Darden's work continues and contributes to a long and well-established
literature on the role economic ideas play with regard to political decisions, albeit applying
them in a new setting to explain the diﬀerent choices regarding international institutions
made by the post-Soviet states (Darden, 2009). This is an area in which purely materialist
explanations struggle due to their inherent equiﬁnality15 and the implicit determinism that
most statistical approaches impose on events post hoc, notwithstanding the standard error
14See Irvine, Cooper and Moerman (2011) and Salvador and Ramio (2011) for recent examples.
15This was ﬁrst articulated by Charles Ragin (Ragin, 1987), but has been further developed by Stryker
(1996) and Braumoeller (2003).
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included in most estimates16.
We could spend more time elaborating these points, but my hope is that the above
paragraphs have at least convinced the reader that there is a case to be put in defence
of non-material factors contributing to our discussion and investigation of many questions
in political science. We can now proceed to outline the methodological case for why it is
rather diﬃcult to conduct research using these as genuine explanatory factors. After this,
we shall launch our counterargument and then proceed, in the next section, to my project's
contribution.
Speaking in general terms on the topic of non-material explanans, it seems fair to argue
that in political science most scholars seem to follow the analogous advice of Samuel Hunt-
ington with regards to legitimacy when he notes that it is `a mushy concept that political
analysts do well to avoid' (Huntington, 1991, 46)17. The intellectual position of denigrating
the independent importance of ideational factors has great historical pedigree; Marx ad-
vanced a particularly succinct version of the materialist critique of the role of ideas in The
Communist Manifesto when he claimed that, `The ruling ideas of each age have ever been the
ideas of its ruling class', which are in turn determined by control of the means of production
and their economic interests (Marx and Engels, 1967, 102)18. Even those sympathetic to the
importance of ideational factors in inﬂuencing outcomes acknowledge that their signiﬁcance
is likely to vary across historical periods. Mark Blyth provides an excellent example of this
perspective in claiming that economic ideas inﬂuence institutional change through two mech-
anisms: they are both important for understanding how agents form and understand their
interests in periods of radical `Knightian' uncertainty (where uncertainty cannot be reduced
16Bayesian techniques oﬀer a compelling alternative to the more standard frequentist approach but are
rather slow in gaining adherents. Simon Jackman and Andrew Gelman are the leading exponents of this
technique in political science.
17The irony of this statement is that Huntington then uses the collapsing legitimacy of authoritarian
regimes as one of the ﬁve central explanatory variables driving the third wave of democratisation.
18For my project, Marx's dismissal of the independent impact of ideas is somewhat disheartening since
I want to argue that Marxism did play an important role in guiding Soviet state-building and economic
policies, but I think there is suﬃcient evidence to cast doubt on the veracity of his claim.
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to risk) and crisis and, more importantly, for conceptualising the very nature of a crisis.
However, in periods of stability, the prominence of ideational factors recede and alternative
features tend to dominate our explanations of political outcomes (Blyth, 2002). We shall
have more to say on this point when developing the concept of ideational frameworks.
The position that there is one primary appropriate means of knowledge creation in polit-
ical science generates an unfortunate schism in terms of the kinds of research that are lauded
or rejected. It encourages us to ignore important ﬁndings in anthropology and history and
pushes us to embrace experimental work in psychology and economics, or advances in sta-
tistical methods that enable us to do ever more with our existing data19, stripping away
the methodological pluralism that generated the most compelling work of the 1950s and
1960s20. There are authors working on the intersection of disciplines, such as Lisa Wedeen
and Laura Adams (and, before his death, the rejector of disciplines par excellence, Charles
Tilly), but they are rare and given the increasing specialisation inherent in the production
of academic knowledge, this is an unpromising path for future scholars to attempt to follow.
It would thus be markedly preferable to launch a defence of methodological pluralism within
the conﬁnes of political science and demonstrate that we can generate ﬁndings of interest
without bowing to the supervenience of methodology on epistemology. We must ﬁrst grasp
the nature of the mainstream position on this question.
In order to understand the general tenor of the orthodox critique, we turn to perhaps
the most inﬂuential work on political-science methodology of the past thirty years, King,
Keonhane and Verba's Designing Social Enquiry. This work was an attempt to ensure that
19This is not to deny the importance of these results; Rose McDermott in particular has demonstrated
how helpful psychological research can be for those working in international relations (McDermott, 2004).
The point is rather that this should not be privileged to the extent it has been of late but rather viewed as
one of many potentially fruitful avenues for research.
20Barrington Moore's study remains the sine qua non in this regard (Moore Jr., 1966). Recent work in
the discipline has been more willing to accept the importance of genuine historical work, as catalogued in
McDonald (1996). Putnam's classic study of the development of civic culture in Italy reveals the gains that
can follow from this kind of investigation (Putnam, 1993), while Ziblatt gleaned new insights concerning
federalism based on his historical knowledge of German and Italian uniﬁcation in the nineteenth century
(Ziblatt, 2006).
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both qualitative and quantitative work in the discipline used similar standards of proof
and argumentation and thus to raise the general calibre of argument. This broad aim was
undeniably welcome, but the central contention of the work was that the only acceptable
means for advancing explanations was through a rather narrow concept of causality that was
undeniably more suited to frequentist statistics than qualitative research21, relying as it did
on the notion of replicability. King et al. sum up the problems facing the scholar seeking
to make a causal claim with regard to ideational factors, as viewed through the standard
methodological lens: `The most diﬃcult methodological task in studying the impact of ideas
on policy is compensating for the closely related problems of omitted variable bias and
endogeneity as they aﬀect a given research problem' (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994, 191).
Both of these methodological concerns arise from the temporal proximity of ideas to events
themselves: ideas could be reﬂections of underlying material/structural factors (which would
also be the Marxist position that the base determines the superstructure), or they could be
post-hoc rationalisations of decisions made on other (usually material) grounds. King et al.
argue that in order to establish a causal claim, we need a well-posed counterfactual22 in which
relevant individuals held diﬀerent ideas and we can trace the inﬂuence of these ideational
factors to diﬀerences in the dependent variable. This is the tenor of the general critique of
those who seek to use non-material factors as explanatory tools in their understanding of
political outcomes and while somewhat simpliﬁed, it provides the outline of the challenge
for scholars working with ideational factors.
There are three principal responses to this basic problem that have been embraced by
scholars examining the workings of non-material factors. Two are inherently problematic, for
reasons that should be immediately apparent from their descriptions; one ignores the problem
completely while the other cedes too much ground to the critic. The ﬁnal alternative is the
one I propose to use in this dissertation and requires us to accept that causal claims (so
21For a critical response to this general position, see Brady and Collier (2004).
22For a discussion of the importance of counterfactuals in qualitative research that is much more general,
see Fearon (1991).
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narrowly construed) are not the sole basis for knowledge generation in the form standardly
understood in political science. But ﬁrst we consider the options.
The ﬁrst of these is to relinquish much hope of providing a convincing connection between
ideational factors and socio-political outcomes and err on the side either of description or
broad generalities with limited empirical support. This is arguably the approach of Samuel
Huntington with regard to his civilisational thesis and also Gabriel Almond and Sidney
Verba's discussion of the `civic culture' (Huntington, 1996; Almond and Verba, 1963). The
implication is that non-material factors belong to a rather diﬀerent realm of analysis than
the more generally accepted forms of empirical data in political science. This amounts to
accepting defeat and forgoing the goal of utilising ideational factors as a powerful explanatory
tool and is clearly unsuitable for any serious practitioner of social science who works in this
realm23. It would prevent a continuation of the any of the literatures outlined in our defence
of the worth of non-material explanations and is therefore a distinctly unpromising response
to the conundrum outlined above.
The second stance is to accept the methodological hegemony of causal analysis and
attempt to ﬁt the analysis of ideational factors into this narrow rubric. Because this is
the dominant trend in recent work in this area, we shall devote more space to this than
to the ﬁrst or third of our alternatives. This approach has received its fullest defence in
the work of Craig Parsons, who has devoted much energy to demonstrating precisely how
ideational variables can be shoehorned into orthodox causal accounts (Parsons, 2002, 2007).
In a recent paper, Parsons has attempted to demonstrate how debates among central policy-
makers in the countries that would form the core of the European Union resulted in the
latter organisation's development (Parsons, 2002). This style of analysis ﬁts closely with
the epistemic communities literature outlined above, in that it attempts to ﬁnd common
(non-material) factors among central actors and demonstrates how they decisively aﬀected
23The obvious exceptions are works of intellectual history, whose mode of explanation is generally (though
not exclusively) divorced from empirical concerns. When these are part of political science, they usually
belong more correctly to the realm of political theory and shall not detain us further.
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outcomes. It thus seeks to provide a convincing response to King et al.'s two principal
challenges concerning omitted-variable bias and endogeneity by attempting to hold constant
a number of extraneous factors and clarifying the causal chain connecting ideas and outcomes.
The dominant methodological choice for those engaged in this kind of methodological
enterprise is undoubtedly process tracing. Although there are some debates as to what ex-
actly constitutes process tracing, the basic idea has been well-expressed by James Mahoney
when he describes it as `the eﬀort to infer causality through the identiﬁcation of causal
mechanisms' (Mahoney, 2000, 412), or as Sydney Tarrow has stated, a technique that allows
scholars to `identify the reasons for the emergence of a particular decision through the dy-
namic of events' (Tarrow, 1995, 472). Although this may seem unhelpfully abstract, the basic
approach is not dissimilar from standard statistical approaches: we make predictions based
on theoretical expectations of how individuals should behave, we gather data that pertains
to this behaviour24 and we check whether our predictions are conﬁrmed25. Nathaniel Beck
was caustically (and justiﬁably) critical of this particular method, arguing that it is sim-
ply unable to distinguish between alternative hypotheses, which must be one of the central
strengths of any credible technique for social science (Beck, 2006). Peter Hall attempted to
respond to this type of criticism by developing `systematic process analysis', drawing on the
ideas of Imre Lakatos that any serious empirical study must be an assessment of how two
competing theories can account for the relevant data (Hall, 2008), representing an impor-
tant development and forcing qualitative scholars to think much more carefully about the
relationship between their own and rival accounts of political phenomena.
Alternatively, scholars seeking to adhere to orthodox methodological strictures can turn
to game-theoretic logic to illuminate the beneﬁts of non-material factors in crafting expla-
nations. Actual practitioners of game theory usually view such features of the political
24This data is often of the form of speeches or diary entries that reﬂect how individuals are fram-
ing/justifying their actions.
25For two examples of this, see John Owen's work on how beliefs in liberal democracy promote peace and
Keith Darden and Anna Grzyma la-Busse's analysis of how literacy contributed to the collapse of communism
in countries due to its contribution to nationalism (Owen, 1994; Darden and Grzyma la-Busse, 2006).
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environment as little more than `cheap talk' with no genuine bearing on any determinants
of the outcome of interest. This position entails that unless there are material factors un-
derlying the more abstract propositions, they are not to be taken seriously in terms of their
inﬂuence on decision-making or political outcomes more generally. I set aside the meta-
theoretical point that underlying game theory is a particular view of human nature revolving
around rationality26. This hardly seems promising territory for launching an investigation
with non-material factors as one of the critical components of an explanation, but somewhat
surprisingly, scholars have indeed pursued this. Stephen Hanson provides the most recent
example; in his work on post-imperial democracies he claims that the main beneﬁt of pow-
erful ideas is to extend the time-horizons of the relevant players, making them far less likely
to bring down the party system due to expectations of delayed beneﬁts (Hanson, 2010).
This is very similar to the logic of Beatriz Magaloni's work on the hegemony of the PRI in
twentieth-century Mexico (Magaloni, 2006). While such works are partially convincing, the
decision to use such rationalist logic means that this approach entails a similar trap to the
one explicated above. In particular, it greatly blunts the breadth and type of explanations
we can oﬀer, because we must always seek to understand how ideas aﬀect the relevant play-
ers' evaluation of outcomes. But there are a multitude of potential factors that inﬂuence
this judgement, meaning that ideas are but one of a smorgasbord of options when we look
to interrogate these kind of questions.
The ﬁnal approach is the most promising in terms of generating an independent method-
ological justiﬁcation for focusing on non-material factors as viable explanators. The basis
for this position consists in an epistemological stance derived from the Weberian `verstehen'
school that identifying causal mechanisms is a separate enterprise from explanation, and one
that has independent value27. I eschew Parsons' attempts to demonstrate causal validity, as
I believe these implicate the proponents of ideational factors in an epistemological trap that
26For a critique of this see Sen (1977), among others.
27See Bunge (1997) for a more detailed explanation of this point.
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is wholly unsuited to their core concerns. Parsons' concern is solely focused on linking ideas
with concrete outcomes (in particular, with speciﬁc decisions made), but this is only one
of the means by which ideas can inﬂuence empirical outcomes, and by no means the most
interesting when we think of their ability to resolve crises. As we have already outlined, the
problems facing leadership in this dissertation go far deeper than debates over a single policy
or concerns over a simple decision. By focusing on situations that are characterised by an
extreme form of `Knightian' uncertainty (more on this in the next section), we enter a sphere
of analysis that places an entirely diﬀerent set of demands on both the actors involved and
the types of questions we can ask of them. Indeed, it is hard to overstate the manner in
which this concept forces a re-evaluation of the standard rational model inherent in much
political analysis. This takes us beyond existing modiﬁcations of rational choice, such as
bounded rationality theory or important work on the consequence of imperfect information
on decision-making, to a fundamental consideration of how to make coherent choices when
we are unsure of not only the link between our decisions and payoﬀs but what the actual
set of potential outcomes contains. It thus also demands more of our explanations than that
they simply fold into a rationalist framework, which was our critique of the work of Stephen
Hanson and those who seek to restrict themselves to this tradition.
This also forces us to reconsider the standard of empirical proof that is appropriate,
since (and here we depart from Parsons' claims) it should be clear that a breakdown of the
necessary components for causal reasoning supervenes on our ability to assess them using
standard causal analysis. Rather than look for evidence of ideas causally impacting the
external surroundings of the major actors, we are concerned with how frameworks structure
their thinking and inﬂuence the formulation and crafting of policy. The link is internal and
yet, much like Immanuel Kant's response to Hume's puzzle of causation, it is both interesting
and extremely important. For that reason, our primary evidence will be on debates, speeches,
writings and the professed prior justiﬁcations for policy (to avoid post-hoc rationalisation,
as much as is possible), rather than seeking to engage in the kind of analysis that Parsons
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argues is necessary to prove causation. We are not seeking to divorce our analysis from the
material realm, but merely illustrate that impact can be demonstrated in more than one
fashion.
Having walked through the somewhat tangled mess of the literature on non-material
factors and the debate over their acceptability (or otherwise) as explanans, we are now in a
position to advance the central theory of the dissertation.
1.3 Ideational Frameworks
Having referred to the primary theoretical innovation of the dissertation throughout this pa-
per, it is now time to delve further into what exactly we mean by `ideational frameworks' and
how they contribute to advancing the basis upon which we can make non-material explana-
tions. The most basic deﬁnitional issue obviously involves `idea', or `ideational framework',
a term that is at the heart of this project. As with most abstract notions, this has a wide
range of meanings, from a purely ephemeral thought to a developed and elaborate schemata.
In order to conduct the type of analysis required given our methodological position outlined
above, we must focus on more developed and elaborate conceptualisations that are subject to
debate and contestation and that provide a framework for utilising and organising informa-
tion, especially given our concern with crises. From a practical perspective, it is extremely
diﬃcult to investigate the impact of ﬂeeting discussions or thoughts as the sources of these
are prone to be either unreliable or rather scanty28.
Ideational frameworks undeniably bear a resemblance to ideology, in that they are a
developed system that their proponents use to understand and simplify the complexities of
socio-political reality. There is, however, a critical diﬀerence between ideational frameworks
and ideology. The latter presupposes a rather ﬁxed and ossiﬁed lens through which events are
28This is one of the more compelling arguments against launching a scholarly enquiry investigating the
role of pragmatic thought. It is near-impossible to gather the necessary information to make a developed
argument that `muddling through' a crisis is what the relevant policy-makers were doing, notwithstanding
the recent best eﬀorts of the assembled leadership of the European Union.
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interpreted and is frequently linked to markedly abstract debates and byzantine arguments
over matters of seemingly little consequence for the uninitiated. Ideational frameworks, by
contrast, are geared primarily towards formulating policies and designing means for their
implementation. As we shall see, extended debates are critical for developing successful
frameworks, for this marks them as distinct from the pragmatic techniques used by many
politicians in times of crisis. But they must also have a degree of ﬂexibility and local
applicability that is foreign to our standard notions of ideology; this practical aspect is an
essential component of understanding why certain frameworks enjoy success while others
fail.
This draws us into a discussion of the nature of success and how we evaluate this with
regard such frameworks. As I outlined in the introductory part of this paper, my attention
in this project is focused on times of severe crisis, characterised by absolute chaos. To be
more speciﬁc, for our purposes the situation must involve `Knightian uncertainty', a concept
invoked by Mark Blyth in his study of economic policy but that draws on the work of Frank
Knight, the famous Chicago economist to whose work we shall have cause to return in the
paper on economic policy. As Blyth elegantly summarises, the central distinction between
Knightian and more standard forms of uncertainty lies in the fact that in the former agents
can have no conception as to what possible outcomes are likely, and hence what their interests
in such a situation in fact are (Blyth, 2002, 32). This is a radical departure from the
standard behaviouralist conception of how individuals act because in this case, the simple
causal story we can usually construct connecting preferences with outcomes via revealed
preference theory is unavailable; the inherent uncertainty over outcomes makes it even more
obvious that backwards induction from outcome to preference is a logical fallacy that violates
basic rules of temporal logic.
In these kind of situations, what agents must do to resolve this uncertainty is rely on a
non-material form of motivation due to the eﬀective breakdown in the standard model of
incentivisation that connects actions with material outcomes. In my dissertation, as I hope
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is clear by this juncture, I argue strongly that ideas are the most compelling alternative since
they provide a means of creating order that is not purely outcome-driven. This is a direct
counterargument to both the materialist ontology that is pre-eminent in much of the social
sciences and the causal claims that are parasitic on such an understanding. I further claim
that periods of imperial collapse are excellent examples of Knightian uncertainty and that
those leaders with a compelling ideational framework heading into the collapse are in a far
stronger position to develop coherent responses that can navigate such a period.
This has a direct bearing on our notion of success and failure. Given our focus on crises,
it would be anachronistic to consider the situation in a country many years after the period
in question and use that to evaluate the initial decisions made. For example, the fact that
nationalist mobilisation was arguably central to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991
has no real implications for our judgement on the decisions made by Lenin and Stalin in
the initial years after the November Revolution. What is more sensible is to determine
whether at the time of the enacting of the relevant policy, it displayed the characteristics
of coherence and, perhaps most importantly, was a justiﬁed response to the complexities of
the situation at hand. This means that the evidence we use should be the debates between
leading ﬁgures and the questions over implementation, rather than utilising subsequent data
that was unavailable at the time. This latter approach ﬁts with the standard orthodoxy in
terms of its methodological approach but fails to grasp the nature of Knightian uncertainty
and thus greatly impoverishes our understanding of such situations by lending them a clarity
that is only apparent post hoc.
There are three core objectives for my project regarding the central theoretical contri-
bution. The ﬁrst is to provide a mechanism for identifying the sorts of frameworks that
prove useful in times of crisis. We should certainly not expect that any and all ideational
frameworks are of equal utility, for this is so evidently problematic that an empirical refuta-
tion is barely needed. The second, no less important, step is to understand how these ideas
are developed and what kind of processes help turn poorly formulated notions into robust
22
frameworks able to consistently help navigate periods of dramatic uncertainty. The ﬁnal goal
is to provide a discussion of how to identify weaknesses in the frameworks, for as we shall
see in the papers, neither the Bolsheviks nor their successors were able to develop frame-
works suﬃciently comprehensive to overcome all the challenges of post-imperial transition.
However, at a very basic level we must also rebut the charge that this central contention of
this project is so obvious that it reduces to a mere triviality. It is hardly surprising that
groups with a well-deﬁned ideational framework are better equipped to navigate conditions
of extreme uncertainty, so what are we really trying to demonstrate here?
There are two possible responses to the suggestion that the central contention of this
project is blindingly obvious. The ﬁrst is to challenge the claim prima facie, which would
involve demonstrating that in certain types of crises, situational creativity is preferable to
reliance on a committed doctrine. At its most abstract, this reduces to the debate between
system builders and pragmatists, which found its classical expression in Nietzsche's dismissal
of Spinoza, although John Dewey's work is the most intellectually satisfying account of the
merits of pragmatism. Proponents of this argument would have to demonstrate that there
are speciﬁc cases of response to a crisis that rely on ad-hoc actions, not simply replacing
an inherited system of thought with an alternative that is equally well developed. This is
a demanding requirement in cases of policy formulation, since we usually assume that the
niceties of policy demand careful planning and a certain level of consistency that is most
eﬀectively underwritten by something approaching an ideology and cases of genuine ad-hoc
invention are conspicuous by their absence. There is scope for investigating this in greater
detail, since the essence of crises is to force reevaluations of very basic assumptions that may
prompt inventiveness and unorthodox solutions that deviate from acknowledged pathways.
This is not, however, the direction in which my dissertation will proceed, although the process
of thinking through the types of circumstances in which established ideas can be beneﬁcial
or harmful is an important aspect of the theoretical foundations of my project.
Instead, I choose to pursue the second avenue, which is to accept the broad claim outlined
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above but argue that it is so general as to be unhelpful. Telling us that frameworks in
general are helpful in formulating policy is such a contentless assertion that it approaches
meaninglessness. My dissertation is interested in uncovering which kinds of ideas are useful,
what are the origins of these ideas (or more precisely, how they developed) and when these
ideas are likely to be perverted or distorted to the point when they impede policy making
in times of crisis, generating answers that are either infeasible or morally problematic. It is
only by investigating the details of these questions that we can hope to arrive at satisfactory
answers that will inform our responses to the three questions outlined above.
Thus, as the ﬁrst two papers will demonstrate, certain frameworks are well positioned
to resolve speciﬁc problems, meaning that we should not expect any one framework to be
able to move elegantly and easily through all the policy challenges that are immanent in
the immediate post-imperial period. The Bolsheviks' heated pre-revolutionary debates over
nationalities meant they responded well to the challenges of state-building on the fractious
periphery while the post-communists, who had nothing of the sort, ﬂoundered. However, the
roles are reversed when it comes to questions of economic policy - here the post-communists
were able to draw on the emergence of neoliberalism as a near-hegemonic doctrine to inaugu-
rate dramatic capitalist reforms while the Bolsheviks were somewhat paralysed by inheriting
an underindustrialised country on its knees following World War One. The jumble of poli-
cies that resulted, from War Communism to the New Economic Policy and ﬁnally full-scale
centralisation, is thus hardly surprising, but one that is best understood through the lens of
ideational frameworks.
The ﬁrst and second papers identify two necessary conditions for a framework to succeed
in resolving the problems of a particular policy area. The ﬁrst of these is that the framework
must be suﬃciently well developed to generate coherent and consistent responses to the
problem at hand. Boris Yeltsin's pragmatic approach to state-building in the 1990s, for
example, generated a confusing melange of policies that lacked a solid underlying logic and
thus multiplied, rather than resolved, the problems of governance in the North Caucasus.
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This dimension of clarity stems from debates over central questions, which was highlighted
in the above paragraph. The second critical component is one of ﬂexibility, which we take
here to mean the ability to adjust an existing framework to local conditions. The most
obvious contrast here is between the early Bolsheviks and the early post-communists in the
realm of economics. We have seen above that the Bolsheviks were unprepared to assume
the reins of the economy in 1917 and in the second paper I demonstrate that this was
in large part because the theoretical ediﬁce of Marxism (even as adjusted by Lenin and
Bukharin) left them unprepared to manage an overwhelmingly rural economy where the
peasantry remained a powerful social group. I argue this situation arose both because of
the inﬂexibility of Marxism on the question of economic management and because leading
Bolsheviks spent the years leading up to the November Revolution in exile and were not
forced to confront the realities of the situation in Russia until it was too late. By way of
contrast, Yegor Gaidar and his team were able to devote many months to studying how
the Soviet economy should be reformed prior to the collapse in 1991. While neoliberalism
provided an invaluable framework, their knowledge of the speciﬁcs of the Soviet economy
and the situation in Russia in the aftermath of the collapse allowed them to tailor their
recommendations and design a more bespoke reform strategy that maximised the chances of
success.
The second motivating problem is understanding how vague ideas become ideational
frameworks. All frameworks begin as poorly articulated, narrow answers to a speciﬁc prob-
lem. The roots of Marxism lie in a series of abstruse debates between the Young Hegelians,
while the origins of neoliberalism lie in an equally esoteric argument concerning the point
at which the Phillips curve, measuring the trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and unemployment,
becomes vertical, resulting in ineﬀective government manipulation of the economy. There are
countless other ideas of equal pedigree responding to seemingly arcane matters of scholarly
debate that do little more than accumulate dust on the pages of long-forgotten journals,
so how can we understand how a small number of these develop into coherent organising
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heuristics that solve fundamental problems of policy making? Again, the answer to this
will be better elaborated in the papers that constitute this dissertation, but there are two
necessary conditions that prove jointly suﬃcient. The ﬁrst is that the leading advocates of
the central ideas must be able to link their claims with a matter of great public importance.
Marx was writing at a period when the iniquities of capitalism were rampant, allowing Lenin
to develop his theories to form an understanding of the nature of imperialism that would
result in the ability to redress the severe problems facing the peripheral peoples of Russia.
Neoliberalism fed into the dominant narrative in the late 1970s concerning the rejection of
Keynesian economics and shift towards a more laissez-faire approach that happened to ﬁnd
advocates in powerful countries who both implemented these ideas and provided support
for the next generation. There is, it is true, a large degree of good fortune inherent in the
selection of which ideas develop into frameworks, but this should not denigrate the work
performed by the minds of brilliant scholars who happen to have been working on the most
vexing questions of their time.
The second condition, and one implicitly outlined above, is for these ideas to ﬁnd support
among a fringe group that subsequently seizes power in the post-imperial period. There are
diﬀerent routes to power, as we shall see in the papers, but what is essential is that the ideas
be well-enough developed to provide speciﬁc guidance to these groups in the struggle29. Lenin
and the Bolsheviks were able to outmanoeuvre the Whites at least in part because their anti-
imperialist policies bought valuable support among some key allies in the Russian periphery.
Gaidar and his team of young reformers were able to convince Yeltsin of the wisdom of their
shock therapy both because he found their arguments compelling and because they enjoyed
signiﬁcant international support from powerful backers. At the point at which the ideas
have been accepted, ﬂeshed out by followers and implemented, the central question is to
29As Lenin wrote in late 1901, `The ideologist is worthy of the name only when he precedes the sponta-
neous movement, points out the road, and is able ahead of all others to solve all the theoretical, political,
tactical, and organisational questions which the material elements of the movement encounter (Lenin,
1961, 316; emphasis in original).
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what extent the ideas are self-reinforcing and generate new adherents, which is the topic of
the ﬁnal paper.
This last sentence relates to the ﬁnal issue I address in my dissertation, relating to how we
can identify weaknesses of the ideational frameworks. There are two major types of weakness
I examine, intrinsic and legacy. The set of intrinsic weaknesses is broad and I shall break
them down more convincingly in the ﬁrst two papers. These primarily relate to problems
in the formulation of policy and to blindspots. Blindspots result from the framework's
inability to grasp some fundamental feature of social reality (Yeltsin and statebuilding)
while problems with policy formation result from poor assumptions about the nature of
material circumstances (in this case, the problem has usually been identiﬁed correctly but
the framework leaves advocates in a poor position to process material information). Both
are common, but the former can be existentially threatening for the leadership while the
latter creates problems further on.
It is thus related to, but analytically distinct, from the second series of weaknesses re-
volving around the legacy of the frameworks. Legacy here encapsulates much more than
simply the trajectory of policies, although this is important. It also refers to the extent to
which the frameworks are self-sustaining, capable of reproducing themselves through contin-
ued support in the next generation. As we shall see, both the initial Bolshevik framework
and Yeltsin's patchwork quilt experienced severe problems consolidating the successes and
emending the failures after a decade, with Stalin and Putin pursuing markedly diﬀerent
paths. The purpose of the ﬁnal paper of the dissertation is to understand why and how this
happened, and why certain aspects of the original frameworks persisted while others faded
completely.
Having outlined the general theory of the dissertation in some detail, we can now move
to the ﬁnal two parts of this opening chapter, namely justifying the selection of Russia as
the central case and outlining the speciﬁcs of the three papers.
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1.4 Case selection
Having established the theoretical position that informs this dissertation and outlined the
main argument that runs through the three papers, we must now move to considerations of
why the primary geographical focus should be on the territory of Russia. Given the non-
material basis of the principal explanans under investigation, a case could certainly be made
that the precise location is irrelevant and all that should interest us is the prominence of grand
ideas. There are certainly some great works that follow such a model in terms of intellectual
history. Marshall Berman's extraordinary study of modernity or Daniel Rodgers' excavations
of the problems of laissez-faire capitalism are two works that largely forgo concerns over
territory, spanning thousands of miles and many decades in their studies of these issues
(Berman, 1988; Rodgers, 1998).
Yet what unites these kind of works is a fascination with the archaeology of a particular
idea (or set of ideas that make up a particular concept), rather than a focus on the application
of ideational factors to questions concerning the formulation of policy in explicit times of
crisis. We do have a few individual studies of the latter phenomenon, with the work of Mark
Blyth, Stephen Hanson and Keith Darden the most important recent examples (Blyth, 2002;
Hanson, 2010; Darden, 2009). What we currently lack, however, is a study that seeks to
compare multiple points of crisis within a single geographical area and which can therefore
control for some of the immutable factors that bedevil much of the research in comparative
politics. In large part this is because it is rare to ﬁnd multiple outbreaks of systemic crisis
in a circumscribed region, meaning that the authors of similar works either focus on a single
crisis in a large region (as with Darden), or focus on a number of distinct crises across a
more limited set of cases (as with Blyth and Hanson). In either case there is an inevitable
leeching of explanatory power that results from the broadening of the central enquiry. By
choosing to focus on a single case across two time periods, I seek to limit the problems of
inference, which is particularly important given the more measured standard of proof I am
suggesting we need when we consider ideational factors.
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Thus, the speciﬁc beneﬁt of this geographical focus is the presence of two imperial col-
lapses, in 1917 and 1991, with such markedly diﬀering leaderships assuming power in the
aftermath of each. Critically, not only is there signiﬁcant variation between the two cases in
terms of the attitude of leading ﬁgures to ideational frameworks, but also within case. As
we have seen, the performance of the Bolsheviks was strong on state-building but weak on
the economy, while the post-communists present us with the reverse scenario. The legacy
implications of each regime are also distinct, allowing for a fascinating tracing of the rise to
power of Stalin and Putin and how they exploited the weaknesses of the ﬁrst generation.
This permits my dissertation to engage in three diachronic comparisons that cast an illumi-
nating light on the questions surrounding the genesis, implementation and legacies of two
of the most compelling ideational frameworks (Marxism and democratic capitalism) of the
past century. While it is not entirely accurate to say that the collapse of the Russian and
Soviet Empires left a clean canvas on which the successors could paint their idealised polity,
the complete vacuum of central authority presented similar challenges in both cases, making
the comparisons logically sensible.
The subsequent papers will elaborate in greater detail on the major diﬀerences between
the two periods, as well as highlighting commonalities. But I wish to stress that we are not
as concerned with material problems as with the power of ideational frameworks to assist
or obstruct central policymakers in these times of great uncertainty. The focus will be on
central actors, as these as the individuals who participated in debates and were responsible
for the crafting and implementation of policy. I do not wish to denigrate the importance of
local analysis, and there is certainly scope for subsequent research investigating the extent
to which centrally-held ideas were transmitted to the local administrations30. Here I suspect
the Soviets were much better than the post-communists, at least in the early years. But for
now, there is so little research performed on the questions that energise me that a focus on
30Indeed the ﬁrst paper draws extensively on data collected on the North Caucasus republics and reports
of local party committees for the Soviet period.
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a limited number of actors and locations seems justiﬁed. If the results bear further detailed
analysis, I shall hope to continue my studies on this question at a later time.
1.5 First paper: Ideas and state-building
The ﬁrst paper in my dissertation considers the role of ideational frameworks in helping
statebuilders overcome crises of authority in the aftermath of imperial collapse. As empha-
sised above, perhaps the most general and dramatic consequence of the enervation of central
authority that results from the disintegration of once-powerful imperial states is the unique
opportunity it aﬀords fractious peoples to launch secession or independence drives. At best,
these lead to new settlements and the peaceful recognition of the autonomy of peoples who
have long chafed under the yoke of empire. However, this is rarely the case and what is far
more common is the looming spectre of civil war, ethnic cleansing and the kind of violence
that can only emerge in the absence of a respected authority with the ability to enforce
law. Understanding how ideational frameworks can thus help to avoid such an outcome,
with its deeply pernicious impact on social welfare, is both important and highly valuable
for political science and it is precisely this goal that my paper attempts to achieve.
It does so by focusing on a comparison of actions and policies of the Bolsheviks in the
period following the dissolution of the Russian Empire in 1917 and the ﬁrst postcommunist
government under Boris Yeltsin with a particular geographical concentration on the territory
of the North Caucasus. The North Caucasus is an ideal site to investigate the issue of the
reestablishment of authority; in the years immediately following both episodes of collapse,
there were instances of independence movements, violence and signiﬁcant ethnic conﬂict that
posed a serious threat to the integrity of the newly-formed states. By focusing on a single
territory we can further hold constant other potentially confounding variables and isolate the
importance of frameworks in guiding actions to restore an element of central legitimacy. As
we shall see, there were marked diﬀerences in the capability of the two leaderships to achieve
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a lasting settlement, with signiﬁcant implications for future trajectories of state development.
Drawing on the theoretical framework I developed in an earlier section of this introduc-
tion, the primary argument I advance in this paper is that the years of debates between the
Bolsheviks over the nationalities question prior to their seizing power aﬀorded them with a
clear perspective on how to build and develop the hold of Moscow over the North Caucasus,
notwithstanding signiﬁcant local resistance and severe paucity of resources. The Bolsheviks
beneﬁted particularly from the work of Otto Bauer, whose studies of the Austro-Hungarian
Empire and arguments concerning the importance of national and cultural autonomy would
frame the works of Lenin and Stalin and provide them with an extremely important an-
tagonist. By way of contrast, leading ﬁgures in the post-Soviet government had devoted
little time or thought to resolving problems of governance within the Russian Federation,
generating a profusion of confusing decrees and double standards and ultimately to two ex-
tremely violent internal conﬂicts in Chechnya as well as a widespread Islamist insurgency
and multiple and prolonged cases of ethnic tension between the peoples of the region.
As we shall see, it is far to simple to state that the Bolsheviks enjoyed unparalleled suc-
cess in achieving quiescence in the North Caucasus while the post-communist governments
were utterly feckless in their attempts to reestablish authority. The Bolsheviks did face re-
sistance; there were a series of rebellions in Chechnya in the mid-1920s and their attempts
to develop a core local intelligentsia that could administer the republics had (at best) mixed
success. Meanwhile the North Caucasus remains part of the Russian Federation, which is no
small achievement given the chaos of the 1990s. However, I think there is a clear case to be
made that the Bolsheviks were able to exploit the inadequacies and inequities of the Russian
Imperial administration of the provinces and identiﬁed concrete policies that were important
in both improving the lives of the indigenous population and acquiring local support. The
post-communists, by way of contrast, had no clear understanding of how to manage the
North Caucasus or respond to the needs of its people, electing to expend its severely circum-
scribed governing capital on other concerns. This absence of an understanding of both the
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importance of state-building and the challenges of rebuilding fealty among populations who
had suﬀered signiﬁcantly under the previous regime was a deadly combination that merely
stored problems for the future.
1.6 Second paper: Ideas and economic policy
The second paper focuses on the contributions that possession of a clear framework for direct-
ing economic development can play in emerging from the inevitable and sustained economic
malaise of empire. By its very nature, imperial collapse is an extraordinary shock to the
economy of the constituent units, as the authority underlying the common currency, trading
laws and all other manner of economic and ﬁnancial regulations eﬀectively disappears. In
the case of the two transitions that form the crux of this paper, there is an additional com-
plication to add to all this: the move to an entirely diﬀerent system of economic structure.
From a heady feudal/proto-capitalism to communism, in the ﬁrst, and then away from com-
munism to market capitalism, in the second. Neither of these transitions were achieved with
much elan, as is perhaps inevitable, but there is a surprising element that emerges from the
comparison.
In essence, the roles in the second paper are reversed, as I seek to pinpoint why the
Bolsheviks' economic policy immediately after taking power was a confusing amalgam of
compromises whereas the Yeltsin government was committed to a ﬁrm neoliberal line. This
is a particularly perplexing matter given that economic matters were central to the Marxist
thought that was at the foundation of Bolshevik thinking, with everything else proceed-
ing from that core assumption. Furthermore, the government of Boris Yeltsin has typically
been characterised as pursuing a generally pragmatic line in the majority of policy areas
that hewed to popular opinion, yet under the aegis of Yegor Gaidar and his team of `New
Reformers', the government was committed to voucher privatisation, macroeconomic liberal-
isation and a wide range of other orthodox economic policies that were electorally disastrous
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but arguably critical for the stabilisation of capitalism in the country.
It may seem at ﬁrst glance that this contradicts our underlying theory, since in the previ-
ous paper we had argued the exact reverse in terms of the felicity of the Bolshevik ideational
framework in comparison with the chaotic approach of the immediate post-communist ad-
ministration of Boris Yeltsin. However, referring back to our underlying theory, we can see
that this is perhaps not as confusing as it may appear on the surface. This is because the
weaknesses inherent in any given conceptual framework mean that while it may be well-suited
to dealing with a given policy area, it will not be as eﬀective in others. The exact location
of the lacunae will vary from framework to framework, but we can say with a good deal of
conﬁdence that there will be at least one component of the social and political environment
with which an ideologically-committed leadership is ill-equipped to grapple. The fundamen-
tal point, to reiterate, is that coherent frameworks provide the incoming authorities with
the tools to overcome at least some of the diﬃculties of remaking a state, whereas those
attempting to operate without them are likely to be overwhelmed by systemic uncertainty.
The weakness that this paper illuminates centres on the importance of ﬂexibility. While
the ﬁrst paper highlighted the basic contrast between pragmatism and a more coherent
ideational framework, the second will oﬀer a more subtle examination of the problems that
aict even seemingly well-developed plans. We shall see that both the Bolsheviks and the
post-Communists had frameworks, but that the former was based on an overly-rigid under-
standing of economic development that ignored the importance of agricultural development
and the class of the peasantry. As these were central problems facing the Bolsheviks after
November 1917, it entailed that they were poorly equipped to cope with the challenges of
reforming an underindustrialised and largely rural economy, a problem exacerbated by the
fact that many of the leading Bolsheviks had spent the years preceding the revolution in
exile in Europe. By contrast, Gaidar and his team used the years preceding the collapse of
the Soviet Union to develop a coherent transition plan that built on the thinking of West-
ern economists but tailored it to the Russian experience, as was typiﬁed by the decision to
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press ahead with voucher privatisation rather than insisting on completing macroeconomic
stabilisation ﬁrst. The ability of Gaidar and his team to adjust the recommendations of
the Virginia and Chicago Schools to Russia was essential to ensuring the implementation of
neoliberal reforms and preventing widespread reversion to a more moderate reform plan.
This is not to say that there is no puzzle here. It does seem strange that the economically-
driven Bolsheviks were so lost when it came to crafting sustainable economic policy, moving
from the extreme centralisation of War Communism to the proto-capitalist New Economic
Policy before ultimate centralisation of nearly all means of production (including home-
steads) under Stalin, who overcame protests from both the right and left of the Bolshevik
party in the process. Meanwhile the pragmatic Boris Yeltsin, who seemed somewhat bereft
of motivating ideas following the collapse of the Soviet Union, was persuaded of the wisdom
of implementing a demanding series of neoliberal reforms that eﬀectively made a return to
communism and central planning impossible. To explain this divergence, I look at debates
between the Bolsheviks in the years leading up to 1917 and contrast it with the develop-
ment of neoliberalism from the 1950s onwards through the Chicago and Virginia schools.
The basic point is that Marxism left the Bolsheviks unprepared to deal with an economy
that was a world away from the advanced economy envisioned as the starting point by Karl
Marx. Furthermore, there was a distinct lack of focus on practical economic solutions to the
problems of industrialisation in a country that had a severe paucity of resources, which was
the situation in which Russia found itself in 1917. Meanwhile, the development of neoliber-
alism, burnished by the relative economic success of the Chilean experiment under General
Pinochet, provided the new generation of Russian economists with both detailed policy pro-
posals and a group of international economists who had changed the international system
and inaugurated the Washington Consensus, providing important international legitimacy
for the reforms.
As with the ﬁrst paper, it is too simple to claim that one set of leaders had all the right
answers while the other ﬂoundered. The Gaidar government that enacted reforms was a
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self-styled `kamikaze' administration that was well aware of the high cost of macroeconomic
stabilisation and it is certainly the case that international prescriptions were not well adjusted
to ﬁt the realities of the Russian environment. Meanwhile the New Economic Policy, for all
its theoretical and practical shortcomings, allowed the Bolsheviks to navigate the extreme
turbulence of the post-imperial environment. While we shall devote some attention to these
complicating factors, the basic story is that the post-communists had a coherent plan for
restructuring the economy that was broadly lacking for the Soviets. These decisions had
signiﬁcant ramiﬁcations for the consolidation period, which is the subject of the third paper.
1.7 Third paper: Ideas, consolidation and compromise
As outlined in the opening paragraphs of the introduction, the ﬁnal paper moves away from
the focus on the initial years of imperial collapse to consider the processes of consolidation
and compromise that characterised the Soviet Union and Russian Federation after the initial
ten years, which mark the exit of the vast majority of actors involved with the initial drive to
overthrow the previous regime (Joseph Stalin being the most glaring exception). The speciﬁc
goal of this paper is to understand how the initial choices made in the period following
imperial collapse inﬂuence subsequent trajectories, ﬂeshing out our understanding of the
inﬂuence and importance of ideational frameworks when the Knightian uncertainty has been
replaced by more predictable periods where the links between decisions and outcomes return
to sharp focus.
As we saw in the theoretical section, good frameworks must strike a careful balance
between being so unsubstantial as to be of severely limited utility and being so dogmatic
and rigid that they are incapable of adapting to the nuances of policy-making and the
revelation of new and important information about material circumstances. We see in the
ﬁrst two papers, as well as the overarching theoretical argument, that testing and proving
conjectures through rigorous and sustained debate is critical for ensuring the frameworks
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are suﬃciently well established at the moment of opportunity, allowing the leaderships to
take the chance to refashion the policy environment in a manner guided by their insights
and understandings. Where this can be combined with previous empirical experience, as in
the case of neoliberalism, this is a potent combination (though it also carries the drawback
of potential over-reliance on past experience in a diﬀerent environment, which is another
tradeoﬀ). While there is a clear disjuncture between the initial years and subsequent periods,
understanding how regimes manage to transition from a reliance on revolutionary ideology
(or lack of, depending on the particular issue under investigation) to focus on the practical
tasks of governing is a matter of no less importance for my project. While it is no small
feat to navigate the extreme challenges in all policy areas following the dismantling of an
empire, even acknowledging there will be signiﬁcant unevenness across these, this is all for
naught if the revolution's children eat their parents and abandon the initial precedents. Such
situations usher in further periods of instability and chaos and are a direct indictment of the
failure of an ideational framework to foster adherents and adapt to new realities.
In this closing paper, in place of a strict contrast between the Bolsheviks and post-
communists, we see a striking similarity in terms of the relationship between the successes
and failures of the opening years and the means of consolidation by the second generation.
Our primary focus in this paper is on the policies enacted under Joseph Stalin and Vladimir
Lenin; two men who dominated the second generation following the overthrow of the previous
imperial regime. We track their policies in both state- and nation-building and the economic
realm, continuing the threads of the two previous papers and focusing speciﬁcally on the
implications of the failures the ﬁrst generations faced in each of these areas.
The principal ﬁnding of this ﬁnal paper is that the tasks left incomplete by the ﬁrst
generation provide a strong basis for the subsequent rulers to consolidate their claims to
power and can be used to substantially remake the original settlement. Thus we see that
Stalin focused primarily on the realm of economics, slowing dismantling the New Economic
Policy and pushing through a radical policy of industrialisation that sought to end the dis-
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tinction between the rural and urban proletariat. In the process of this transformation of
the countryside, Stalin moved away from the policy of korenizatsiia in the North Caucasus
(and more generally) and began to view the non-Russian ethnicities with great suspicion,
holding them responsible for the many delays and imperfections of collectivisation. Vladimir
Putin utilised the other of our two core policies to consolidate his rule, focusing on recentral-
ising state power and undoing many of the compromises Yeltsin had struck with the regions.
Putin used the reviviﬁcation of state power to remake economic policy, encouraging the
renationalisation of key strategic industries and undoing a core plank of the Gaidar reforms.
I close the third paper by considering whether the eﬀective replacement of frameworks
is inevitable, arguing that democratic capitalism, notwithstanding some serious problems
relating to statebuilding, has the internal conditions required to prolong itself indeﬁnitely.
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Chapter 2
Framework for Success: A comparison of
Soviet and post-Soviet state-building
policies
0Thanks to participants in the 2011 Post-Communist Workshop on Politics and Economics and to my
fellow panellists at the 2012 ASN Conference for valuable comments on a very early version of this paper. I
also thank Gwyn Bevan for extensive comments, encouragement and suggestions.
Introduction
State-building in the aftermath of imperial collapse is perhaps the most demanding challenge
for newly-formed governments seeking to establish their authority over the independent
lands that now notionally fall under their dominion. The composite territories of empire
are often beset by separatist claims and subsequent outbreaks of violence between various
ethnic groups competing for the division of central spoils threaten to sever the nascent
chains of control tying them to the new governors. Many of these territories objected to
the original imposition of suzerainty by the imperial rulers and thus seize on the chaos of
the empire's dissolution to reclaim or assert their sovereignty, necessitating the imposition of
force by leaders of the new states to quell such ﬁssiparous tendencies and prevent the total
dismemberment of their country1. Compounding these existential threats is the fact that
the existing bureaucratic apparatus is often not ﬁt for purpose, having either been eﬀectively
dissolved along with the former empire or become so highly factionalised that large parts
of it are unwilling to subject themselves to new political masters. This litany of problems
is exacerbated in peripheral regions, where the outlying territories have a much weaker link
with the centre and feelings of loyalty tend to be attenuated. Even in the cases where
local leaders choose not to launch a secessionist threat, developing means of managing and
pacifying them is a daunting proposition and rarely accomplished with much success. This
is deeply deleterious to these societies across any given dimension of welfare measurement:
frayed ties of legitimacy contribute to a general sense of lawlessness and disorder that impedes
the development of public good provision, which is of particular signiﬁcance in the far-ﬂung
regions of empire that tend to have suﬀered historical deprivation due to their distance from
the metropole.
Even if the new rulers are able to address these most pressing issues, there is a signiﬁcant
temporal dimension to these diﬃculties, with a staggered series of essential tasks that further
1Philip Roeder has written a fascinating modern history of such cases as part of his explanation for how
new states are formed (Roeder, 2007).
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complexify the role of the statebuilder. Evidently the primary objective is to protect the
territorial integrity of the new state; the severity of this will depend on the extent of separatist
sympathies and the institutional conﬁguration of the now-defunct imperial administration,
and also potential threats from neighbouring states. If the new governors can secure their
borders, the second desideratum is to begin the process of reestablishing formal authority over
the domain, which in post-imperial environments hinges on forging a common understanding
of belonging to a new state and articulating a common purpose that binds the diﬀerent
peoples together. Approaches to address this multifaceted problem range from brute force
to softer means linked to economic and social development that seek to redress the perceived
neglect suﬀered under the previous regime and typically a balance must be struck between
these extremes.
Given this extraordinary degree of complexity, understanding the markedly varied per-
formance of governments in the initial years after the dissolution of an empire is a valuable
and important undertaking with signiﬁcant social welfare implications. The `age of empire'
may have passed (Hobsbawn, 1987), but controversy still rages over how to build states and
design institutions in multinational countries. Indeed, one of the more contentious debates
in comparative political science2 concerns precisely this issue and it is and one with great
contemporary relevance given ongoing struggles in Afghanistan and Iraq. Therefore if we
can identify factors that have helped governments to address and alleviate the systemic dif-
ﬁculties of state-building, we shall have helped lend much-needed clarity to a contested and
divided area with immediate policy applications in an area that is a particular weakness in
contemporary democratic theory.
This paper considers and contrasts two periods of post-imperial state-building3 in the
2See the debate on the wisdom of consociationalism between Arend Lijphart and Donald Horowitz and
the vast literature it spawned for an insight into the details of one area of this discussion. For their takes on
the debate, see their contributions to (Reynolds, 2002).
3There is an ongoing and serious debate as to whether the Soviet Union should be considered an empire,
or whether it is better to conceptualise it as a state (Martin, 2001; Hirsch, 2005). For the purposes of our
paper, we'll put it in the imperial column. This has little more than rhetorical value, since we are not
addressing the theory of empire in any detail here.
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peripheral region of the North Caucasus4 in an attempt to explain the variations in the
consistency and success of policy pursued by the two regimes. The ﬁrst of these considers
the aftermath of the November Revolution5 in Russia, covering the years from 1917-1925.
This period covers the turbulent period of the Civil War and the few years of peace after it,
ceasing at the point at which Stalin had largely managed to consolidate power in the Central
Committee and inaugurated a sweeping change in nationalities policy following his drive for
industrialisation and the launching of the Five-Year Plans. The second examines the post-
Soviet period from 1991-1999, covering the entirety of Boris Yeltsin's administration of the
Russian Federation but stopping before we reach Vladimir Putin and his dramatic remaking
of the relationship between the localities and Moscow. The nationalities policies of Stalin
and Putin will be covered in the third paper of this dissertation as part of the consideration
of consolidation and the long-term impact of frameworks.
The North Caucasus posed similar challenges in both periods, with serious breakaway
movements launched in the twilight of two Empires (the Russian and Soviet) and a similar
paucity in material resources available to the incoming governments. However, there was
a marked diﬀerence in the state- and nation-building policies chosen and the extent these
were successfully implemented in the region. The Soviets managed (for the most part)
to build local administrations and largely end the crushing poverty and illiteracy of these
territories, which had suﬀered from Russian Imperial policies of wilful neglect and deliberate
maltreatment since falling under the sway of the Empire in the mid-19th century6. This was
4The North Caucasus region of Russia is in the south west of the country and lies between the Black
and Caspian seas. It is constituted by seven ethnic republics: from west to east they are Adygea, Karachai-
Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria, North Ossetia, Ingushetia, Chechnya and Dagestan. The precise institu-
tional form has varied over the past century but the territorial area has been fairly constant. See the appendix
on page 46 for a map of the region with contemporary boundaries and some detail on the extent of ethnic
fragmentation.
5Russia underwent a shift from the Julian calendar to the Gregorian calendar on the 1st of February, 1918.
The Julian calendar is thirteen days behind the Gregorian. Dates in this paper will follow the Gregorian
calendar unless explicitly marked otherwise; thus the second revolution that occurred in 1917 will be known as
the `November Revolution' throughout the paper, even though in contemporary time it occurred in October.
6As we shall see, there was important variation between the territories of the North Caucasus in terms
of the attitude of the Russian Empire to their development, with North Ossetia and the Kuban region in
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Figure 2.1: Map of the ethnic republics in the North Caucasus. Source: O'Loughlin et al.
(2007).
in large part thanks to the Soviet's ﬁrmly-held belief in the primacy of local organisations
and the detailed thought given to how to resolve the nationalities question in the years
before the November Revolution. The Bolsheviks were forced to make many compromises
and deviate from their theoretical ideals, but the framework they hammered out in the
years preceding 1917 enabled them to understand the costs of these concessions and prevent
them from becoming too expensive and thus dragging down the entire ediﬁce of etatisation.
Yeltsin's governments were calamitous on this score: there were two serious internal conﬂicts
in the region (the First Chechen War and the Prigorodnyi conﬂict); spiralling levels of
unemployment and poverty; and the growth of an Islamist insurgency that continues to
particular receiving far greater leniency. Nevertheless, the general picture outlined above is an accurate
one for the other major ethnicities. Even where the Russian Empire was interested in developing regions,
the beneﬁciaries were often either major Russian industrialists or foreign investors, rather than the local
populations.
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represent a major threat to peace in the region. Notwithstanding some vague desire to avoid
the Bolshevik path, Yeltsin and his governments evinced little desire to engage with debates
over nation-building and the political aspect of governing a new country (besides a vague
commitment to democracy). Instead the focus was ﬁrmly on economic reforms (the topic of
the second paper in this dissertation).
On the basis of a comparison of these two cases, the primary claim advanced in this
paper is that when central policymakers have an existing and informed understanding of the
core elements of a given policy (in this case state- and nation-building), they are much more
able to articulate and implement coherent plans than governments proceeding pragmatically
on an ad-hoc basis. Having a pre-existing conception is no guarantor of success, but it
does ensure that there is a coherence and consistency that enables the government to make
sense of the oft-contradictory ﬂows of information and respond adequately to the deluge of
requests from all areas to a new government. All governments are faced with unforeseen
diﬃculties in such periods, but successful frameworks provide structure to the inevitable
compromises, helping the central administrators understand which decisions are consonant
with their overall vision of the new state and which help to foster the nascent sense of
national identity that is a core part of building legitimacy. The absence of such a framework
makes it extraordinarily challenging to grasp when compromises risk undermining the state-
and nation-building project or when a series of bargains with localities is liable to generate
sustained long-term problems due to the emergence of beggar-thy-neighbour strategies on
the provincial level.
We shall see that the series of Marxist-Leninist debates relating to the dangers of imperi-
alism equipped the Bolsheviks with a broad framework for resolving many of the challenges
of the North Caucasus. This is not to say they had a perfect record; the long-running up-
risings in Chechnya and Dagestan are but one indication that not all was smooth in the
early years of Bolshevik rule. In particular, the work of Otto Bauer would challenge the
leading Bolsheviks to reﬁne their thought and demonstrate precisely why his proposed solu-
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tions were impracticable for the Russian case. Lenin's belief in the importance of eradicating
`Great Russian Chauvinism' along with Stalin's emphasis on the importance of protecting
and fostering national cultures and developing the oppressed peoples of the former Russian
Empire (which included nearly all non-ethnic Russian residents of the North Caucasus with
the exception of the Cossacks) provided a platform for understanding how to respond to the
immediate demands of local leaders while further integrating them into the nascent Soviet
state. The policy of korenizatsiia, which was aimed at developing local cultures and fos-
tering local leadership, helped oﬀset many concerns in the localities that they had merely
exchanged one form of imperialism for another by privileging local elites for administrative
positions. We also see the extent to which the Bolsheviks were able and willing to alter their
original policies in the face of countervailing evidence. Stalin originally advanced a policy
of raionirovanie, which stated that territories should be organised on a purely regional ba-
sis with no account taken of ethnicity, but decided to modify this to take into account the
complexity of ethnic heterogeneity in the North Caucasus. This provided a vital platform
for conducting the necessary formal reorganisation of the constituent units that was one of
the most problematic tsarist legacies.
The Bolshevik administration made clear errors in their governance of the North Cauca-
sus. Their initial weakness in the region, where the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries
enjoyed far higher levels of support, meant that they started with an over-reliance on local
cadres who proved incapable or unwilling of adapting to the new political and economic
realities, necessitating purges of the local party organisation. The forced resettlement of the
Cossacks in the region stored resentment and build unnecessary opposition to the Bolshevik
regime. There were serious challenges to the imposition of Soviet central authority and a
number of uprisings in the North Caucasus, as well as a widespread emergence of `greens' in
the Civil War who fought against both White and Red, destroying supply lines and greatly
hampering the consolidation of Bolshevik power. Despite this, in large part the early So-
viets achieved major gains for the regime, establishing legitimate rule over these fractious
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territories, encouraging much-needed economic development and increasing educational and
cultural attainment in a region that had previously lacked all three.
Boris Yeltsin started his campaign for President of the Russian Federation (a move that
would lay the foundations for his leadership of the newly-formed Russian Federation) in a
manner broadly similar to the Bolsheviks, proclaiming the importance of independence for
the regions and positioning himself against a totalising imperial power that had trampled
on local rights and ignored important demands for social welfare. However, the trajectories
of the state-building policies of Yeltsin and the Bolsheviks dramatically diverge after this
initial step. Although Yeltsin's bold proclamations to the regions promised democracy and
autonomy, his policies were not focused on making good on these promises. There was a
confusing melange of policies, compromises and backroom deals that caused tremendous
problems for the nascent Russian Federation and were unresolved by the time of Vladimir
Putin's ascension to power in 1999.
Yeltsin's policy for the North Caucasus largely took the form of a laissez-faire pragma-
tism. He supported the emergence of local strongmen to rule the region and took little
interest in questions of development beyond authorising federal budgetary support and pro-
mulgating bizarre free trade zones with limited coherence. This may have held the Russian
Federation together, but the degree of oﬃcial corruption and sustained unemployment ar-
guably did long-term damage for the relationship between the republics of the North Cau-
casus and the central government. The marked exception to this was the case of Chechnya,
where Yeltsin launched an avoidable and largely unnecessary war that had limited prospects
of success and served primarily to undermine alternatives to peaceful cooperation.
I argue that Yeltsin's failure to articulate a clear vision of state-building in a multinational
federation highlights one of the major deﬁcits of contemporary democratic theory and that
much can be learned from the initial years of the Bolshevik approach to this issue. The
original team assembled by Yeltsin was relatively liberal in terms of its attitude to the North
Caucasus, attempting to articulate a political framework that could foster development and
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improve federal-regional relations. However, this framework was largely unconvincing and
was dominated by pragmatic compromises that meant they were unable to oﬀer a convincing
counterargument to the hardline team in the power ministries, demanding a ﬁrmer line on
Chechnya and paying little heed to the needs for development in the region.
This paper ﬁts with a number of recent projects that have attempted to give greater pri-
ority to the role of ideas in politics, strongly suggesting that purely materialistic explanations
exclude important and oft-overlooked components of social and political realities (Parsons,
2002; Hanson, 2010; Darden, 2009). This paper's explicit goal is to encourage analysts of
state-building to understand the contribution of developed frameworks and, by implication,
to call on democratic theorists to provide a better vision of how to resolve signiﬁcant problems
in multinational states, acknowledging the implicit tension between re-establishing authority
and respecting autonomy.
The paper proceeds in the following fashion. The following section provides an overview
of the literature on ideas and nation- and state-building, suggesting that while ideational
factors are slowly gaining prominence, they remain under-appreciated in terms of their po-
tential impact on crafting consistent policies that help resolve centre-periphery tensions. The
following section oﬀers a justiﬁcation of both the temporal comparison and the choice of the
North Caucasus, arguing that both provide the potential for illuminating insights into these
matters. Next I consider the dynamic of events in the relevant periods and the ﬁnal section
concludes with a consideration of the implications of my argument for both the state-building
literature and democratic theory.
2.1 Ideational Factors in State and Nation-building dis-
course
In the overview piece that accompanies this dissertation I have already covered the founda-
tional theory that underlies and unites all three papers. In this section I consider the speciﬁc
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literature on state- and nation-building and how this interacts with my central claims. The
basic point I shall make in this section is that neither literature deals particularly well with
ideational factors: state-building is almost solely focused on material aspects as driving
successes and failures, while the nation-building literature has recently been swamped by a
rather primitive constructivism that assumes appeals to co-ethnicity are somehow enough
to trump other, more serious claims. As we shall see in the empirical section, this naked
constructivism does a great disservice to the complexity of various advances that can be
made by central authorities in times of crisis and is unhelpful in aiding our understanding
of how to resolve basic questions of nation-building.
2.1.1 A Typology of Failure
The literatures on state- and nation-building are vast and we cannot hope to cover even
a fraction of it for in this paper. We shall argue in a moment that there is signiﬁcant
and important overlap between the two and this is the basis for much of the empirical and
theoretical analysis that will follow. For the moment, we note simply that the point of
departure of this paper is that analyses of state-building focus primarily on the development
of core competencies of the state relating to administrative and functional capacity, whereas
analyses of nation-building are more concerned with the evolution of mentalities and the
formation of more-or-less coherent ideas about nation, of the successful resolution of Ernst
Renan's `daily plebiscite'.
Attempts to keep these developmental processes distinct and analyse them individually
are ultimately unsatisfactory. As a classic example, Eugen Weber's remarkable book on
the development of the French nation in the nineteenth century draws extensively on the
process of administrative reforms in rural France, an inarguable core component of state-
building, that created a common experience (Weber, 1976). Similarly, many of the classics
on state-building are, as we shall see a little more below, riddled with claims about legitimacy
and other factors that are hard to reduce to purely material or administrative factors. To
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take a recent case, Daniel Ziblatt's compelling comparison of the uniﬁcations of Germany
and Italy, which explicitly relies on the relative institutional strength of the constituent
units as the driver for whether a federal or unitary system is adopted, is still riddled with
ideologically-motivated claims from various local and national leaders that pertain to the
rightful nature of the Italian or German `nation' (or subparts thereof) (Ziblatt, 2006). I
am not seeking to conﬂate the two processes entirely, for there are undoubtedly important
social and political diﬀerences between building administrative capacity in a territory and
engaging in the sort of historical and emotional appeals that are intrinsically tied to creating
a sense of common nationhood that can overcome long-held family and tribal ties. This
distinction is of particular utility for those scholars, like Charles Tilly, who study the long arc
of macrohistorical development in countries and have a suﬃciently broad temporal campus
to allow for some degree of separation between the two (Tilly, 1990).
Nevertheless, for those who study periods of imperial collapse, maintaining even a nom-
inal division between the two is often simply impossible. This is due to the peculiar nature
of empires, which span multi-ethnic communities and vast territory and thus face unique
state- and nation-building problems of their own. Their collapse, from the Roman to the
British, presents local elites with the dual challenge of establishing both the basic adminis-
trative responsibilities of the new state and a sense of fealty among the inhabitants of this
newly-demarcated territory (Gibbon, 1983). Moreover, these two must often be achieved
simultaneously, for a failure on either dimension is liable to prove fatal for both the putative
new government and its chosen people7. If it does not lead to the complete collapse of the
nascent state, at the very least it generates severe and sustained problems of public order,
as was the case in Yeltsin's Russia, something we shall study in more depth in a subsequent
section. While Yeltsin did not necessarily `fail' on both dimensions, we should place him at
least partway in the upper-left quadrant of the table since as we shall see, his state- and
7Stein Rokkan made a very similar point concerning the later European states and the necessity of
navigating numerous challenges simultaneously, whereas the earlier European states had centuries to resolve
these problems (Rokkan, 1975).
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nation-building policies in the North Caucasus can hardly be described as achieving even
relatively minimal goals beyond preventing outright secession. In table 2.1 we have a highly
stylised account of various outcomes that result from diﬀering combinations of success and
failure across the two dimensions. In reality there is a spectrum of possible outcomes relative
to success and failure, but for our purposes this parsimonious dichotomisation will serve.
Table 2.1: Simpliﬁed range of state- and nation-building outcomes.
State-building
Failure Success
Nation-building
Failure Anarchy Internal violence / ethnic
cleansing
Success Criminal disorder Success
As we see from the above table, failure on either dimension has inimical consequences for
the new state (it goes without saying that failure on both dimensions is disastrous and leads
to some form of warlordism or outright and prolonged civil war). Building administrative
capacity without common fealty almost inevitably leads to sporadic outbursts of violence
between diﬀerent communities, squabbling over resources that the central authorities have
been unable to frame as common heritage. At its worst, this generates ethnic cleansing,
which was particularly virulent in the post-Yugoslav states (Crnobrjna, 1994). The most
severe cases of ethnic cleansing occur when an ethnicity dominates the state's coercive ap-
paratus and is able to use this to subjugate other groups; its most extreme form, genocide,
is near-impossible to achieve without signiﬁcant central organisation (Mann, N.d.; Snyder,
2010; Straus, 2007). Even in mono-ethnic states, the failure to craft a sense of community
among the citizens of a new state through nation-building can generate frightening levels
of internal violence and withdrawal from the state (Scott, 2009). The various peasant re-
volts that recurred in Medieval Europe are a compelling example of the sort of class-based
alternative to ethnic violence that can be provoked by a failure of nation-building; the fact
these were typically swiftly quashed speaks to the relative eﬀectiveness of the state-builders'
role (Fletcher, 2008); the continuing peasant protests in Western China provide a modern
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analogue to this (Becker, 2012). Note that unlike the criminal disorder we shall discuss in
the next paragraph, these uprisings were in response to perceived distributional injustices
and failures to look after all parts of the body politic8.
The converse failure, where there is a common sense of identity but stunted growth of legal
institutions, generates a form of damaging lawlessness, with debates over property rights and
contracts that further undermines the legitimacy of putative central and local government
actors. Unlike the internal violence that results from stunted or failed nation-building, the
type of disorder that results from state-building failure is typically devoid of distributional
claims. Those participating in this form of violence do not feel excluded from the state
or slighted by perceived injustice, but are rather exploiting the weakness of administrators
and other bureaucrats when it comes to impartial and eﬀective implementation of a legal
framework. The Maﬁa is perhaps the most obvious example of organised crime, but this is
complicated by the entanglement and implicit approval of state oﬃcials (Hess, 1998). The
street gangs in Latin America are perhaps closer to what we have in mind; these groups are
not motivated by a sense of resentment towards authorities stemming from distributional
diﬀerences, but are exploiting the situation on the ground that has resulted from a failure
to build strong states in many of these countries (Cruz, 2007).
Evidently this table has identiﬁed ideal types and there is often blurring between the
two, with complex causal pathways connecting outcomes. For example, criminal gangs often
do take advantage of the violence and disorder implicit in the kind of internal violence that
stems from a failure of nation-building; Nicholas Sambanis' research highlights particularly
troubling examples of this phenomenon during periods of civil war (Sambanis, 2002). Per-
vasive criminality, meanwhile, can shred the carefully-developed fabric of a nation if left
unresolved (as the current drug wars in Mexico seem to threaten to do). However, this does
seem a helpful starting point as we think about the pathologies that result from failures
8See Hill (1972) for a particularly compelling discussion of this phenomenon during the English Civil
War.
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to state- and nation-build eﬀectively and consider that identifying how to do both success-
fully, especially if faced with the demanding situation of doing both simultaneously, has
huge social-welfare implications. The very recent examples of Iraq and Afghanistan provide
compelling testimony, if further were needed, of the cost of failure from a humanitarian
perspective (Diamond, 2005; Jalalzai and Jeﬀeress, 2011).
For our purposes, we can assume that many new states in the aftermath of imperial
collapse are typically in some anarchic state (i.e. in the top left quadrant), facing severe
challenges of state- and nation-building. States that are not in this position, enjoying either
a well-functioning bureaucracy and administrative apparatus or a stable political community
as their imperial legacy, are more fortunate and perhaps the urgency of responding to these
diﬃculties is less severe (though I still think the following remarks bear on their situation).
However, it is the former state, lacking such a beneﬁcent inheritance, that is of interest to us
here, since it is both the more pressing case with regard to social welfare implications and
more accurately characterises the situation in Russia in 1917 and 1991. It is to this issue we
now turn as we conduct a formal review of the existing literature.
2.1.2 Ideational Frameworks in the Literature
The central question facing us at this juncture is how we can relate these outcomes to
our overarching claims concerning the value of ideational frameworks. More speciﬁcally,
do successful ideational frameworks help to move leaders of governments in post-imperial
moments along the diagonal that runs from the worst-case outcome in the top left of our
typology, representative of internecine anarchy, to the best case in the bottom-right? And if
they do, which is the major contention of this paper, how exactly do they manage to achieve
this? Again, the major contention here is that they assist in two major ways: ﬁrstly, by
providing leaders with a framework to make sense of the oft-conﬂicting demands of state-
and nation-building and thus to facilitate prioritisation of tasks. Secondly, they help central
administrators make sense of the ﬂood of information arriving from the localities and go
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some way to ensuring there is consistency in both the crafting and implementation of local
policy that helps stymie claims of unjust treatment from competing groups. This provides
much-needed structure to the inevitable compromises that are necessary throughout the
process of establishing a new state.
However, in order to answer these questions in a satisfactory manner, we need to move
to consider how ideational frameworks have been used and abused in the state- and nation-
building literatures to this point. Notwithstanding my scepticism concerning the false exact-
ness that arises from the division of the two in post-imperial landscapes, for the most part
there are distinct literatures addressed to each topic and it seems most sensible to proceed
with a separate discussion of each, referring to the Russian case where appropriate. The
next sections, which constitute the detailed look at the Russian cases, will provide the basis
for justifying the answers concerning the value of ideational frameworks.
We begin with the state-building literature. Given that this is primarily focused on
practical questions of how to generate organisations that approximate Max Weber's famous
dictum concerning acquiring the monopoly on the legitimate use of force over a territory, it
is perhaps unsurprising that the role of ideational frameworks typically takes a backseat to
research on more concrete, material matters. This is not always the case, for a few scholars do
take seriously the importance of Weber's `legitimate' in the above formulation, but typically
the development of the administrative and logistical underpinnings of the coercive component
of the state is the focus.
This is most famously exempliﬁed in the extraordinary works of Charles Tilly, for whom
the relationship between war-making (the coercive activity par excellence) and state-making
was inextricably linked (Tilly, 1975, 1990) throughout the vast canvas of European history
under his interrogative eye. Successful state-builders were those who were able to extract
greater resources from their subjects to fuel their ever-expansive aims. Thus, state-building
in the Middle Ages was driven by rulers' ever-increasing resource demands as the price of
international conﬂict soared, [p]reparation for war has been the great state-building activity.
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The process has been going on more or less continuously for at least ﬁve hundred years
(Tilly, 1975, 74). The price for the increasingly well-developed taxation structures to fund
this monarchical adventurism was the corresponding delivery of basic social services to the
population, of which the most fundamental was some guarantee of law and order to replace
the crumbling feudal arrangements. State-building was thus a form of grand bargain between
the monarchs and the aristocracy, with the monarch extracting much-needed resources and
the aristocracy slowly gaining privileges and a loosening of their role as the protectors of the
countryside to allow them to pursue more proﬁtable enterprises.
Mancur Olson's characterisation of the state as a `stationary bandit' coheres well with
Tilly's overall argument; Olson argues from a rationalist perspective that early state-builders
induced that it was more proﬁtable to remain in one spot and tax a local population, rather
than living a nomadic existence that was parasitic on the ability to pillage (Olson, 2000).
While it is certainly possible to graft ideational frameworks onto Tilly and Olson, these
would be post hoc justiﬁcations by monarchs and state-builders designed to foment a form
of false-consciousness among their subjects and citizens, rather than a core belief that helps
these central actors navigate diﬃculties. The theory of divine right may have been helpful
in justifying the pre-eminence of a certain individual in the kingdom by tracing hereditary
back to the earliest days of Christianity, but it was almost entirely mute when it came to
the rather more mundane tasks of developing kingdoms and the minutiae of administration
(Figgis, 1914). Instead, when we consider the state-building enterprise of the great European
administrators, such as Wolsey and Colbert, we look to their pragmatism and ingenuity,
rather than their underlying understanding of governance (Murat, 1984; Ertman, 1997).
Recent studies have both extended and questioned the relevance of Tilly for modern
states, but have not signiﬁcantly altered the explanatory workload between ideational and
material factors. Miguel Centeno, for example, noted that Latin America had not endured
the centuries of war that were the birthplace of Tilly's states, which accounts for the diﬀerent
developmental trajectories (Centeno, 2002). Jeﬀrey Herbst argues that in Africa the leaders
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were often satisﬁed not to push for further territorial gains, as these had been reiﬁed by
the international process of decolonisation, but were rather content to secure power in the
capitals and exploit natural resources with no pretence of building administrative capacity
(Herbst, 2000). Eva Bellin has made a similar argument about the Middle East concerning
the ability of autocratic regimes to function as virtual kleptocracies, siphoning oﬀ material
wealth and thus breaking the virtuous state-building cycle of mutual dependency between
ruler and ruled identiﬁed by Tilly (Bellin, 2004).
Uniting these recent twists and revisions of Tilly is the focus on material explanans. For
Tilly, as we have seen, war is the principal driver that triggers a series of bargains between
ruler and ruled. For the recent crop of authors, war has been replaced by varying degrees
of corruption, exploitation and dependence on foreign actors to explain the distorted state-
building we have seen. What is notably absent from all of these accounts is an underlying
philosophy of rule; leaders are focused on personal or club enrichment in a rather base fashion,
with little interest in true public-good provision. Leslie Holmes, surveying the postcommunist
landscape, coined the term `rotten states' to describe this sort of outcome, and it seems to
have wide validity in the contemporary world (Holmes, 2006). The major exception to this
generalisation is the extraordinary two-volume work by Michael Mann, where ideological
legitimacy is accorded a prominent place (along with three other drivers) in his historical
account of state-building, though it is closely tied to the growth of Christianity and thus
ﬁnds common cause with Max Weber's account of the relationship between Calvinism and
the capitalist ethic (Mann, 1986; Weber, 2011 (1905). However, Mann's account is suﬃciently
intricate as to make distinguishing the true importance of the ideological explanatory factors
extremely diﬃcult; I hope to build on his foundation whilst reducing the necessary steps we
need to take to build a convincing non-material explanation for the importance of frameworks
in fostering successful state-building projects.
Having considered the literature on state-building, we can move to the second dimension
of our table, namely a the literature on nation-building. As should be clear from the preceding
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paragraphs, this is of limited importance for the medieval and ancient state-builders, since for
the most part the political community was identiﬁed with a singular ﬁgure (or at the most, a
group of notables) and the remaining subjects were expected to bow to the demands of this
personage. This is not to claim that the ruler had no responsibility towards the ruled, since
even theories of Divine Right typically saw the subjects as childlike, needing protection from
the wielder of divine power (Figgis, 1914). It is more that articulating an alternative basis
for rule was near-impossible; one could appeal to a foreign power, but fomenting insurrection
on the basis of injustice or an absence of belonging was, save for a very few extraordinary
individuals, inconceivable. While there is a long and rich history of individuals who elect to
ﬂee the conﬁnes of the state (Scott, 2009), prior to the late-eighteenth century there were
limited debates about the nature and extent of the political community, which meant that
ideational factors were mostly excluded from political discourse (and thus from our analysis
of these periods).
At this point we see the epochal events that would fundamentally alter the discourse over
the nature of the political community and, more speciﬁcally, the nature of citizenship. The
American and French Revolutions9 fundamentally challenged the nature of exclusion, placing
under great scrutiny the relationship between ruled and ruler(s) and how the former could
actively participate in the governing of their country (Waldinger, Dawson and Woloch, 1993;
Bradburn, 2009). These represented a qualitative change in how Western societies viewed
the political community: this was not simply a case of the populace highlighting speciﬁc
failures of governance or weaknesses of the state, but rather a challenge to the ediﬁce on
which the notion of rule had been constructed. Insodoing, these revolutions ushered in the
nineteenth century in more than simply a temporal sense, clearing the decks for the rise of
perhaps the most prominent ideational factor in mainstream social-science discourse, namely
9Interestingly, the leaders of the Provisional Government from February to November of 1917 saw them-
selves in the mode of the French revolutionaries of 1789, although as Figes makes clear, this was a fantastical
claim and betrayed their failure to diagnose the dire state of the social situation in Russia (Figes, 1996,
355ﬀ).
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nationalism: the belief that the nation and the territorial state should be perfectly aligned.
Given the prominence of nationalism and its clear links with problems of nation-building,
we should ex ante expect that this literature is far more helpful in terms of framing debates
concerning the value of ideational frameworks for resolving the latter issue. However, when
we begin looking in more depth at scholarly contributions, we again ﬁnd limited help. The
scepticism of Ernest Gellner on the contribution of ideology to nationalism10 is justly famous,
and for Gellner the main means for defeating the perils of rabid nationalism is economic
growth and an increasing shift to egalitarianism (Gellner, 1983). In some important ways,
Gellner is the analogue to Tilly in the nation-building literature, viewing developments over
the longue duree and charting the rise of nationalism with the birth pangs of industrial
society (Benedict Anderson, whose concern with nationalism is slightly diﬀerent, also ﬁts in
this mode of analysis (Anderson, 1991)11).
We shall have reason to question Gellner's overly reductive account of the connection
between ideas and nationalism in the empirical segment of this paper that follows, but it
should be clear that these perspectives are of little help when considering the immediacy of
nation-building in the aftermath of imperial collapse. The long-term limitation of material
diﬀerence is an appropriate goal for most governments, but not for those struggling to keep
together a newly-formed state. Perhaps this is somewhat unfair, for although nationalism
and nation-building are intertwined, they are not synonymous. Indeed, both Yeltsin and the
Bolsheviks attempted with limited success to create a civic identity that was independent of
ethnicity and nationalism as part of their eﬀorts to build the Soviet and post-Soviet state12
and there is another literature that should prove more valuable, namely the one that deals
10Gellner basically dismisses the role of ideas as of having much at all to contribute in his path-breaking
study of nationalism, writing that `[T]hese thinkers did not really make much diﬀerence...[N]ationalist ide-
ology suﬀers from pervasive false consciousness' (Gellner, 1983, 124).
11Anderson sees nationalism as the outgrowth of the emergence of capitalism, the print revolution and the
development of the vernacular and argues that leaders initially sought to use nationalism `as a means for
combining naturalization with retention of dynastic power' (Anderson, 1991, 86).
12Oxana Shevel has written a fantastic piece on the strategies of nation-building in post-Soviet Russia
looking at diﬀerent strategies (Shevel, 2011).
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with ethnic conﬂict.
This is one of the most prominent recent ﬁelds in political science, and I simply don't
have space to do it justice (especially as this section is already overlong). The central
point is that, yet again, this literature has ignored the prominence of ideational factors
as a potential resolution of a problem that continues to plague multinational states. We
have already noted that scholars have started to work on the relationship between state-
building and ethnic conﬂict, noting that true genocide requires an eﬀective state (Mann,
N.d.; Straus, 2007). Fortunately, genocide is not the only manifestation of ethnic conﬂict,
which frequently focuses on the division of resources rather than outright violence. The land
shortages in the North Caucasus make this a particularly useful discussion for understanding
the genesis of conﬂict, although the constructivist school, led by the work of Robert Bates, is
far too reductionist in terms of seeing appeals to ethnicity as one more leadership strategy for
limiting the distribution of scarce resources (Bates, 1983). In particular, what is missing from
Bates' work is an appreciation of the context in which such appeals are likely to be eﬀective,
since they are largely predicated on some central failure to resolve ethnic problems, creating
lingering resentments that can be exploited by appropriate individuals. This happened in
both the Soviet and post-Soviet case13, but in the former the central authorities managed to
forge compromises between groups that helped to assuage grievances (especially relating to
improving the quality of life through the provision of basic institutions).
When we consider strategies for the resolution of ethnic conﬂict, which should be central
for any would-be nation-builder, Arend Lijphart's consociationalism is arguably the most
well-known. Consociationalism is a purely institutional remedy that is in principle universally
applicable (Lijphart, 1977), but has come under pressure both for reifying ethnic cleavages
and because it seems largely applicable to institutional engineering in developed democracies
(Horowitz, 1985; Seaver, 2000). Ideas have no role in Lijphart's framework. Recent research
13Figes demonstrates how the nationalities question was integral in the collapse of the Russian Empire
(Figes, 1996), while Beissinger performs a similar analytic role for the Soviet Union (Beissinger, 2002).
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has started to explore the relationship between group psychology and nationalism (Hale,
2008), but the ﬁeld is largely bereft of an understanding of how ideational frameworks can
be utilised to manage nationalist and ethnic conﬂict in times of crises. I claim in the next
section that in large part this represents a deep ambivalence in contemporary liberal political
thought with regard to precisely this topic and that this contrasts sharply with the Bolshevik
stance in the early twentieth century.
2.1.3 Problems with Twentieth-Century Liberal Thought
The general absence of ideological approaches to state- and nation-building is unfortunate
and has, I think, led to neglect of a major potential explanation for the various pathologies
that have marked the twentieth century. Again, merely having an abstract ideational frame-
work is not suﬃcient: it must be tempered by debate and suﬃciently ﬂexible to respond to
unexpected contingencies14. Moreover, material circumstances do have a direct impact on
the chance of success of these frameworks, although the extraordinarily unpromising situa-
tion in which the Bolsheviks found themselves is compelling testimony to the fact that very
few situations are completely hopeless. Nonetheless, as we shall see in the empirical sec-
tions the follow, when we turn our attention to the dramatic diﬀerences in problem-solving
techniques and the sustainability of these solutions between the Soviets and post-Soviets, it
seems hard to ignore the positive impact of ideational factors. This makes their absence from
existing debates seriously problematic and suggests a major lacuna in current scholarship.
However, it is not completely fair to blame the empirical scholars, nor should it be overly
surprising that it is Mann, with his theoretical predilections taking him well beyond the
twentieth century, who identiﬁes the driving importance of Christianity's ability to solve the
initial dilemmas facing the imperial state-builders of the early Middle Ages (Mann, 1986, Ch.
10). This is because the twentieth century, and most certainly the post-1945 environment
14We shall see in the ﬁnal paper the result of inﬂexibility of these frameworks when we consider Putin and
Stalin.
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that is the provenance of the vast majority of social scientists, marks a dramatic loss of
surety in liberal countries concerning their ability to create lasting and durable administrative
apparatuses beyond their borders.
There were no such doubts during the long nineteenth century, with entrenched belief
in the mission civilisatrice as the duty of the more advanced imperial powers to help their
less developed subjects (Pitts, 2005). Indeed, John Stuart Mill was far from a lone voice in
advocating a `benevolent despotism' in governing the barbaric peoples of the British Empire,
at least until the stage at which they could govern themselves (Sullivan, 1983, 606).
The cracks in this conﬁdence of the supremacy of the Western powers and their ability
to resolve problems in the developing world started to become more prominent during the
late nineteenth century as the major countries began to experience severe diﬃculties in
imposing their rule (as for example, with the Boer War (Parkenham, 1991)). However, the
crisis can really be traced to the start of the First World War, with the collapse of the
Austro-Hungarian Empire and the dramatic weakening of the British and French imperial
apparatuses, along with the increasing isolationism of the United States. This loss of status
for the major powers was combined with a crisis in liberal theory, as the realism of historical
scholars such as E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau competed with the challenging markedly
anti-democratic arguments of Friedrich Nietzsche and Carl Schmitt. The new `science' of
eugenics allowed for the dismissive attitude of the nineteenth century to non-Western races to
be given greater credibility but also stripped away the sense of obligation towards developing
the `backward' races (Schiller, 1926).
The defeat of Nazism during the Second World War forced a re-evaluation of this general
trend and the subsequent decolonisation ended the naked exploitation of the third world by
the ﬁrst world. However, it further severed the links of liberal obligation that had existed
during the nineteenth century during the apogee of enlightened imperialism and both ideo-
logical and practical restraints on intervention ﬂourished in the postwar period (Ferguson,
2004). The end of the Cold War may have been cited by Samuel Huntington as a central
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driver of the `third wave' of democratisation (Huntington, 1991), but for the most part, the
democracies it produced have been somewhat feckless; weak and subject to relapses to au-
thoritarianism (the countries of Eastern Europe have proven the major exception, but the
promise of European Union membership is a major cause of their persistence (Vachudova,
2005)).
Notwithstanding the triumphalism at the end of the ColdWar in liberal theory (Fukuyama,
1992), the mainstream of democratic political philosophy had embraced the doctrine of lib-
eral neutrality, which prioritises individual rights15. This core belief dovetailed with the
principle of non-intervention in international aﬀairs since, as Michael Sandel has argued,
proponents of liberal neutrality are unable to mount a defence of liberal principles due to
their deep commitment to respecting all other views (Sandel, 1996). I argue that this crisis
in liberal theory exerted a pull over the Yeltsin government, since there were eﬀectively no
portable models for his government to use that adequately merged propagation of democracy
with nation- and state-building. This was in sharp distinction to the neoliberal economic
models that the Gaidar government used to craft the program of radical economic reforms,
a topic we shall address in the second paper of this dissertation. Given this absence of
models, the only alternative path for successfully navigating these challenges was for Yeltsin
(or someone on his team) to have developed a framework to use in the years preceding the
collapse of the Soviet Union. As we shall see, this was not something that had been done.
This has generated an insular liberalism focused on protection of a core set of notionally-
universal human rights, sharply limiting the potential role of the state. While this approach
may be helpful and useful in the advanced democracies, with their limited problems of public
order16, in new states this attitude generates two serious problems.
The ﬁrst of these is that this is rather thin gruel on which to attempt to rebuild states,
15See, for example, John Rawls' claims concerning the absolute priority of liberty over concerns pertaining
to distribution in his two principles of justice (Rawls, 1971).
16Although this is certainly debatable and there is a strong argument to be made that such an approach
has generated a hollowing out of states and widespread delegitimation in the eyes of certain communities
(Sandel, 1996).
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especially those facing crises of legitimacy due to the problematic legacy of the preceding
regime. Pledging fealty to an abstract conceptualisation of rights may avoid the problems
that are inherent in new governments adopting positions on deeply politicised issues, but it
also circumvents any genuine attempt to build a political community that is representative
of local concerns. Will Kymlicka has attempted to overcome these diﬃculties in his work on
citizenship, but there is a sense his answers are not completely convincing and they certainly
do not lend themselves to elegant policy-making, representing an uneasy compromise between
upholding liberal goals and respecting the rights of local communities (Kymlicka, 1998). The
Yeltsin period provides a graphic illustration of the cost that can result from such insecure
positioning in terms of the marked swings in policy from one extreme to the other, both over
time and between the diﬀerent republics in the North Caucasus.
However, the more serious problem is that this is a serious case of putting the cart before
the horse. Encouraging governments navigating the extraordinary diﬃculties of post-imperial
collapse to focus on developing protection of ill-deﬁned legal and constitutional rights or
criticising it for failing to uphold these rights before it has established legal authority over
the relevant territory is politically and morally problematic. This was recognised relatively
early in the Russian experience by Stephen Holmes (Holmes, 1997), but as we shall see, the
failure to articulate a framework that recognised the imperative of some degree of tradeoﬀ
between respecting rights and building a state capable of acting in a coherent fashion.
The central point for the purposes of our paper is that liberalism failed to generate
a coherent model that could help the governments of new putatively democratic states to
resolve the series of interlinked problems relating to the re-establishment of central authority.
Unlike the economic sphere, where the post-Soviet practitioners could invoke policies culled
from the neoliberal canon, those working on nationalities issues had no such articulated
framework they could utilise to impose consistency on their attempts to gain legitimacy in
the North Caucasus. It is thus hardly surprising that the absence of a pre-existing model,
combined with Yeltsin's loosely articulated thoughts on the matter, generated a confusing
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succession of policies with little connecting them temporally or regionally beyond a reliance
on local authorities to deal with the serious disorder and poverty in the regions.
2.2 Case Selection
We have now completed a suﬃciently thorough review of the state- and nation-building
literature for our purposes and have seen how neither has really evinced much conviction
with regard to the role of ideational factors in resolving these severe problems of order. I
have claimed that this reﬂects a discomfort in contemporary democratic theory relating to
the trade-oﬀ between rights and authority and that the chastening collapse of the European
empires inculcated a general atmosphere of nonintervention that has extended to an unwill-
ingness to prescribe solutions to these problems in foreign countries. The demonstration of
this is centred in the Russian case, but it seems appropriate to spend a little time outlining
the selection of the periods and the location I've chosen for this paper.
2.2.1 The Beneﬁt of Intertemporal Comparison
This paper seeks to make the argument concerning the importance of ideational factors in
virtue of a paired temporal comparison of the same area under two diﬀerent regime types: the
North Caucasus region of Russia. While there are well-remarked methodological drawbacks
from investigating a single geographical case in terms of the generalisability of the ﬁndings,
there are distinct advantages aﬀorded by this approach. The beneﬁts of analysing the North
Caucasus as a region given the variation among the republics and the strategies adopted by
the two regimes is discussed in greater detail in the following section; the purpose of this is to
argue that there are distinct advantages to holding constant the general area and comparing
two distinct periods.
The ﬁrst, and perhaps most important, of these is that we can hold constant many
potentially confounding variables. Notwithstanding the Soviet project to fundamentally
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restructure the region, in keeping with the general trend of Soviet transformation, the culture
and geography of the North Caucasus remained largely constant over the seventy years of
communist rule. While levels of education and wealth rose under the Soviets, at the fall of the
Soviet Union the republics remained among the poorest and least developed in the Russian
Federation and the grievances against the Soviets after a legacy of population deportation and
consistent purges was arguably comparable to those raised against the Russian Empire. This
is not to say that there are not important diﬀerences between the republics and we should
certainly be wary of generalising too broadly, but there are clear methodological advantages
that can be leveraged from the analysis of a single region across two time periods.
Given this relative constancy of material factors, if we ﬁnd variation in the strategies
of the governments across time in the absence of signiﬁcant changes in conditions on the
ground, we have a reasonable basis for the argument that this variation can only be ex-
plained by a diﬀerence in the perspective of the central authorities. This change could arise
from alterations in the pattern of available information, a diﬀerent understanding of what
constitutes success or an alternative approach to policy-making. I wish to argue explicitly
that it is the latter since the other two did not vary in a fashion that would suﬃce to explain
the divergences in strategy between the Bolsheviks and the post-Soviets.
This does not mean that material factors were irrelevant. For example, Chechnya's
declaration of sovereignty in 1991 undoubtedly put Yeltsin and his ﬁrst government in a
supremely uncomfortable position following the assumption of power and the demise of the
Soviet Union. Similarly, the problematic legacy of Cossack settlements in the North Caucasus
created a genuine problem for the Bolsheviks that was largely without comparison in the
post-Soviet setting. Both governments were forced to make signiﬁcant compromises to deal
with a region that was largely beyond their control for the ﬁrst few years and the nature of
these agreements with local actors was strongly inﬂuenced by conditions on the ground.
But the argument in the paper makes a claim that goes beyond understanding speciﬁc
compromises and, in that sense, is an important shift from works that (as we shall see) claim
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the Bolsheviks nationalities policy was a product of on-the-hoof decision making without
structure. It is only in comparison with the Yeltsin period that we can gain an understanding
of the extent to which the Soviets had an articulated ideational framework that placed
signiﬁcant limitations on the kinds of compromises they were willing to make and that
facilitated the articulation of a coherent policy in the North Caucasus. Without this temporal
dimension, we lack the perspective to advance such a judgement.
Equally as important is that at this stage of the research programme, discussions over
the impact and worth of ideational factors remain at a disappointingly low level of salience
and theoretical development. The review of the literature in both state- and nation-building
that I conducted in the previous section shows that while there is a mild movement towards
taking non-material factors more seriously as potential explanans, this remains rare and even
recent studies are still in thrall to a reductive materialism. Thus, at this stage we are very
much in the realm of developing and articulating theory and there is a strong argument in
favour of a greater reliance on in-depth qualitative studies of limited areas to identify and
specify these theoretical connections (Mahoney, 2007; Brady and Collier, 2004).
However, arguments over ideational factors demand temporal perspective if they are not
to be disappointingly ﬂat. In this paper, for example, I track the develop of nationalities
debates in the early twentieth century among the chief Marxist thinkers, arguing that this
strongly inﬂuenced Lenin and Stalin's decisions following the seizure of power by the Bolshe-
viks. In the following paper, I track a similar trajectory for neoliberalism and the architects
of shock therapy in post-Soviet Russia. But in both cases, it is only through a comparison
with a case with a similar set of circumstances but entirely diﬀerent ideational resources
that we see the eﬀectiveness of ideational frameworks. This is not, I freely admit, a perfect
counterfactual (Fearon, 1991), but it allows us to get much closer to this than would be the
case were to attempt to evaluate the impact of ideational factors in a single point in time.
As I included much of the relevant argument concerning temporal comparison in the
introductory chapter that connects the three papers, it seems sensible at this stage to move
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to a fuller exploration of the North Caucasus before proceeding with the formal empirical
sections.
2.2.2 The North Caucasus
The ﬁnal part of justifying the set-up of the paper is to consider the geographical focus of this
paper. The North Caucasus, as mentioned, is a peripheral region in the Russian Federation,
lying at the southwest expanse of the state and bordering the Georgia and Azerbaijan to
the south. In its current incarnation (for our purposes17) the region is constituted by seven
ethnic republics18 and one krai. Running west to east, these are Krasnodar krai, Adigeya,
Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachai-Cherkessia, North Ossetia-Alania, Ingushetia, Chechnya and
Dagestan (see the map on page 46 for more details) and as of 2012, these territories had
a population of around 12.5 million people. As we shall see, levels of development in the
region remain extremely low and there are continuing problems of disorder that have been
largely unresolved since the tsarist authorities ﬁrst completed their conquering of the region
in 1864.
The North Caucasus is an understudied area in political science (and in general, regard-
less of ﬁeld), although there are signs that this may now be changing (Lyall, 2008, 2009;
Zhukov, 2010). In large part this is due to the complexity of the region: in one republic
alone, Dagestan, 81 languages are spoken and the complexity of the ethnic groupings in this
region is equally forbidding19. Moreover, the governing structures have changed regularly
throughout the region's history, necessitating a willingness to engage in historical research
17Medvedev, in creating the North Caucasus Federal'nyi Okrug in January, 2010, excluded Krasnodar and
Adigeya and included Stavropol krai, but we shall include Krasnodar and Adigeya and exclude Stavropol
because the former historically had more in common with the other ethnic communities.
18The form of federalism in Russia is asymmetric, allowing for various levels of autonomy of the constituent
units. Republic is the designation with the highest status, although the distinctiveness of the republics have
been reduced under Putin (see the third paper for more on this).
19There is some debate as to how exactly to divide Dagestan's ethnicities; the Soviets recognised 14, but
this certainly understates the matter and in this part of the country, ethnicity and language are by no means
synonymous (Ware and Kisriev, 2010, 39).
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to understand the complexities of the current situation. Of the works that have been pub-
lished since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the vast majority concern the wars between
Russia and Chechnya: these have been used as the basis for books and articles concerning
the development and growth of Islam in the region (Hahn, 2007; Hughes, 2007), the eﬀec-
tiveness of counterinsurgency strategy (Lyall, 2008), and the foreign policy of Russia in the
aftermath of the attacks on September 11th 2001 (Lieven, 2002), among others. This is
understandable, as the Chechen war is the only conﬂict in which the Russian state has con-
sistently deployed military force against its own civilians, is the site of numerous atrocities
(see Politkovskaya (2003, 2007)), and is riddled with fascinating and contradictory personal-
ities that contributed signiﬁcantly to the failure to ﬁnd a peaceful settlement (Hughes, 2007)
(for an excellent journalistic account involving most of the major Chechen players, see Smith
(2006). For the Russian side, see Colton (2008, Ch. 11)).
Nevertheless, this focus on a highly speciﬁc aspect of relations between the federal and
local administrations in the North Caucasus blinds us to the extraordinary range of outcomes
that we see when we extend our focus beyond the conﬁnes of Chechnya. This region should
be of particular interest to scholars of state- and nation-building; the tsarist empire was more
or less content to leave the region underdeveloped20, ignoring problems of crushing poverty,
overpopulation and widespread illiteracy among the indigenous populations (Mastyugina
and Perepelkin, 1996), with the exception of the Ossetians, who were the sole signiﬁcant
indigenous group in the North Caucasus to convert to the Orthodox Church and were thus
endowed with special protection by the tsarist authorities (Hagendoorn, Linssen and Tu-
manov, 2001). The Soviets made it a central part of their policies to attempt to develop
the region and enjoyed moderate success (from a very low base), while the post-Soviet gov-
ernments have largely struggled to articulate a compelling vision for how to transform the
20The discovery of oil around Grozny at the end of the nineteenth century caused a slight revision to this
general plan, but development did not extend beyond the city limits (Marshall, 2010). This largely explains
why Grozny was given independent status as a city in the early years of Bolshevik rule, only later being
incorporated into Chechnya.
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problems that continue to bedevil the societies located there.
Using the North Caucasus as the basis for an analysis of state- and nation-building
may seem a rather ambitious undertaking given the wide diﬀerences between the various
republics/territories. For example, Krasnodar is and always has been (for the purposes of
this paper) dominated by Cossacks and ethnic Russians and relatively well developed, while
the indigenous people of Ingushetia profess Islam and have had virtually no local industries
to speak of. However, the fact that there are seven (non-independent) cases allows for a
much wider appreciation of the state-building strategies of the two regimes and provides
signiﬁcant scope for contemplating the existence or absence of an overarching framework
for expanding and fortifying central power in such localities. While we cannot hope to
cover all seven republics in a relatively short paper, understanding how and why policy was
varied by the two regimes across the republics provides us with important and valuable
information concerning the degree of underlying coherence (or otherwise) of said policies is
thus illustrative of the core concepts at the hear of this paper.
The crucial fact that underlies the comparison is that both the Bolsheviks and the post-
Soviets faced serious problems of order in the North Caucasus, with multiple liberation
movements and uprisings against central authority. Furthermore, in both cases, the gov-
ernments sought to leverage the support of the regions against the previous regime; the
Bolsheviks adopted a policy of encouraging far greater autonomy (stopping short of full in-
dependence once they realised they would struggle to control essential material resources),
while Yeltsin's administration similarly used the promise of greater local freedoms to leverage
support among the republics against the rapidly declining Soviet government.
Perhaps the most critical problem in the North Caucasus is the extremely circumscribed
amount of usable territory. The Caucasus mountains shape the region, making large parts of
the land eﬀectively unusable for modern intensive agriculture. These mountains also divide
many of the territories, facilitating the persistence of ethnic identity that is the hallmark of
the region (see the map in the appendix for a graphic illustration of this). This problem was
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exacerbated by the tsarist authorities following the ﬁnal capture of the region in 1864 as they
sought to settle ethnic Russians and Cossacks in order to help pacify and dilute the inﬂuence
of the indigenous peoples, who were largely hostile to imperial rule (Gammer, 1994; Seely,
2001). What little economic development the region saw in the period prior to the November
Revolution was largely driven by ethnic Russians, meaning that the indigenous populations
remained marginalised, poor and illiterate. Berbekov, for example, has estimated that prior
to the November Revolution, around 2% of Kabards were literate and less than 1% of Balkars,
with just 37 schools and around 3,500 students in the entire oblast of Kabardino-Balkaria
(Áåðáåêîâ, 1958, 10).
To take but one example, Dagestan is an extremely complex multi-ethnic amalgamation of
territory that constitutes the eastern-most point of the North Caucasus. It fell to the tsarist
empire in 1813 as a result of the Gulitsan Treaty with the Persian Empire; prior to this the
absence of centralisation signiﬁcantly retarded economic development (Îñìàíîâ, 1984; Ware
and Kisriev, 2010)21. While tsarist administration helped foster economic development, the
gains from this were extremely narrowly distributed and Osmanov writes that 70% of the
population were in the mountainous areas with around .25 hectares per capita for crop-
growing and other essential subsistence agriculture (Îñìàíîâ, 1984). The extent to which
Dagestan remained an agricultural society with extremely limited development is evidenced
by the fact that in 1913 fully 89% of the population were involved in agriculture and on the
eve of the November revolution, there were a mere 134 industries in Dagestan employing just
under 5,000 individuals, although the vast majority of these were ethnic Russians (Îñìàíîâ,
1984).
This area was thus an ideal testing group for Lenin's developing theses about nationality
policy and experiments in building of central administrative capacity through local cadres.
As we shall see below, the performance was uneven, but compared to the decades of imperial
neglect under the tsarist regime, the dramatic advances in literacy and cultural development
21See Ware and Kisriev (2010) for more detail on pre-tsarist Dagestan.
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were quite extraordinary. Yeltsin, by way of contrast, had only vague beliefs in how to
instantiate democracy and how this related to relations with the localities of the nascent
Russian Federation and, as we shall see, this was the source of tremendous diﬃculty in the
North Caucasus.
Having justiﬁed the methodological approach and geographical location of my analysis
in this paper, we can now move to a focus on the evidence in support of the major claims.
I wish to emphasise at this point that I am not making the claim that the Bolsheviks had
a completely consistent plan for implementing state- and nation-building, nor that material
factors (such as the development of local cadres) were completely irrelevant.
2.3 The North Caucasus and the Early Soviets (1917-
1927)
We can now turn to the empirical meat of the paper, which consists in arguing that the
ideology of the Bolsheviks furnished them with a much more coherent approach to state-
building in the North Caucasus than was the case with the post-communist administration of
Boris Yeltsin. I wish to emphasise that this does not entail an absence of retrenchments and
uncertainty on the part of the Bolsheviks; as we shall see below, there were many missteps
and compromises that were an integral part of their attempts to build a functional state in
the North Caucasus, as well as ensure the loyalty of the indigenous peoples to the new Soviet
state. The point is rather that the ideational frameworks that emerged from early twentieth
century debates in Marxism relating to questions about the appropriate relationship between
the socialist state and diﬀerent nationalities strongly inﬂuenced both Lenin and Stalin and
provided structure that helped delimit the forms of acceptable compromise. This was of
particular value in the North Caucasus due to the plethora of demands on the central state
from the many ethnic groups, ranging from demands for education development, to greater
autonomy, to deportation of the Cossacks who had been settled in certain places as part of
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the imperial expansion.
The ﬁrst half of this section will present an overview of the Marxist debates over nation-
ality and how this inﬂuenced and shaped Lenin and Stalin's thinking on the matter. We
shall see that Lenin originally had little to say about the nationalities question in the So-
viet Union, viewing this as largely subservient to the importance of developing the working
classes. However, internal conﬂicts between the Armenian Social-Democrats and the Jewish
Bund in Russia forced him to begin to confront this question and it became increasingly
important for him from 1913 onwards (in large part due to the work of Otto Bauer and
Lenin's discomfort with his arguments). 1913 was, not coincidentally, the year in which
Joseph Stalin was tasked to write his extremely important work On the Nationalities Ques-
tion; this diﬀered in important respects from Lenin's preferred conceptions but would come
to be broadly accepted as the Bolshevik doctrine and would strongly inﬂuence decisions in
the North Caucasus until Stalin's sharp divergence in the late 1920s (a topic for the ﬁnal
paper).
We shall not have a great deal to say about the debates over state-building among the
Bolsheviks in this section. This is primarily because neither Lenin nor Stalin had too much
to say about the state in the period prior to 1917 beyond that contained in the debates over
nationality. They were largely content to leave the administration to local cadres and Soviets
(at least until it became clear that following this policy was exacerbating local conﬂicts in
the North Caucasus). It is wholly in keeping with the argument of this paper that the
limited conceptions of how to manage a state would cause problems in the administration of
the North Caucasus although, as we shall see, the ﬂexibility that resulted from the years of
arguments over nationalities policy helped greatly in ameliorating this situation.
The second half will focus on events in the North Caucasus and how these challenged
and reﬁned the Bolshevik arguments about nationality. We shall see that Lenin and Stalin
were forced to compromise on the notion of national self-determination and that the themes
of economic development and national culture came to be increasingly interlinked. How-
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ever, the early debates and the insistence on developing local cadres enabled the Bolsheviks
to overcome widespread initial resistance following the ending of the Civil War and begin
building the Soviet state in the region.
2.3.1 Marxist debates over nationality
We begin with an overview of the debates over nationality that were of crucial importance in
helping the Bolsheviks navigate these periods of extreme uncertainty and that helped them
defeat the supporters of tsarism in the Civil War. As Hel ene d'Encausse notes in her excellent
treatment of the early debates over nationalities in Russia, the origins of this question can
be traced back at least to the Decembrists and questions over federalism (d'Encausse, 1991).
However, for the purposes of this paper we shall start our analysis with the interactions
between Vladimir Lenin and leading European Marxists in the early twentieth century, since
it is a core component of our thesis that Lenin's understanding of the resolution of the nation-
building question in the early Soviet Union was informed and reﬁned by this process22.
This is certainly not the view of all historians who have studied this period. Terry
Martin, who authored the magisterial The Aﬃrmative Action Empire, argues that in 1917
the Bolsheviks `did not yet possess a coherent nationalities policy'; they underestimated
the strength of nationalism in the Russian Empire and their initial commitment to self-
determination was a pragmatic gamble to win support against the Whites' (Martin, 2001,
2). There is abundant evidence that Martin is at least partially correct and it is certainly
the case that the Bolsheviks did make a number of compromises to ensure their rule would
persist through the Civil War and in the years beyond23.
Francine Hirsch, who is Terry Martin's most vocal opponent24, adopts a more moderate
22This is undeniably true, even if Lenin's attitude to his interlocutors was dismissive and mean-spirited,
as Figes reports (Figes, 1996, 391).
23Richard Pipes is also highly sceptical of the notion that the Bolsheviks had any coherent approach to
governing in 1917 (Pipes, 1990).
24She argues that the shift in policy in the early 1930s was the logical development of the move towards
the socialist future, rather than a dramatic break with the previous model as Martin claims (Hirsch, 2005).
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position concerning the role and value of ideology for the early Bolsheviks. She argues that
it is impossible to understand the development of nationality policy without taking on board
the central role of Marxism (Hirsch, 2005, 6), but agrees with Martin that the decision of
the Soviets to abandon the full-throated call for national self-determination was rooted in
pragmatism since the Bolsheviks were concerned that `it would not be possible for Soviet
Russia to survive without the cotton of Turkestan and the oil of the Caucasus' (Hirsch, 2005,
5).
Hirsch and Martin's points are well taken and as two of the authorities in Soviet nation-
alities policy, they command respect. However, I I want to argue here that Martin unjustly
ignores the years of debates that had preceded the revolution and that, contrary to his per-
spective, the nature of compromises and concessions was determined in large part by the
developed nationality policy articulated by Lenin and Stalin in the preceding period. The
reality is that the Bolsheviks did have a consistent nationality policy that emerged in 1918
and through which we can understand the seemingly contradictory mess of compromises and
concessions; the sole purpose of these was to `preserve for the present and the future of the
power of the working class by subordinating or joining it to the rights of nations' (d'Encausse,
1991, 98). While I agree with Hirsch that the Bolsheviks were forced to compromise on cer-
tain topics due to the importance of material circumstances, these compromises were not
actually central to their ideational framework. As we shall see, Lenin was always leery of
full national self-determination and, for Stalin, only nations with particular characteristics
should be granted self-determination. For the most part, the ethnicities in the North Cauca-
sus simply did not meet these but they were still deserving of protection of speciﬁc cultural
components (such as the development and protection of indigenous languages).
In order to demonstrate this point, we must conduct a survey of the thinking of European
Marxists and how this inﬂuenced Lenin and Stalin. While the focus will primarily be on the
latter two thinkers (and especially Lenin), we will make reference to others where appropri-
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ate25. The evidence we shall use is taken from the collected writings of Lenin and Stalin up
to 1917, since we are primarily interested in how the ideational framework developed prior
to the November Revolution; after that the focus of this paper shifts to how this related to
the policies enacted in the region for the ﬁrst few years of Bolshevik power.
At the turn of the century, the nationalities question was largely ignored in Marxist and
socialist thought (at least until Otto Bauer's tremendously inﬂuential work; more on this
below). However, due to the activities of the Armenian Dashnaks and the Jewish Bund
in the Russian socialist debates, Lenin and Stalin were forced to confront this issue much
earlier than most. Both the Dashnaks and the leaders of the Bund sought to prioritise
national issues alongside class-based debates in order to redress the oppression facing the
Armenians and Jews26 respectively; both explicitly mentioned the possibility of national
self-determination as a means for resolving these problems. This solution was anathema to
Lenin, who was concerned that not only would this distract the socialists from pressing for
the proletarian revolution, but that it may lead to alliances between the bourgeoisie and
proletariat along national lines, making agitation much more diﬃcult. Stalin, as we shall
see, was born and raised in the Caucasus and was thus somewhat more sympathetic to calls
for national self-determination, though he still hewed to Marxist orthodoxy in the early years
of the twentieth century.
25There is not space here to consider the role of other Bolshevik thinkers, though a full list would include
Plekhanov, Bukharin and Zinoviev in the ﬁrst order. For a fuller survey, d'Encausse is an excellent source
(d'Encausse, 1991).
26There was no little substance behind the claims that the Jews faced unusual amounts of repression. They
were mostly forced to reside in the Pale of Settlement, with severe restrictions on their ability to purchase
land, and were unable to attain the rank of full Professor in the Imperial academy and there were many
restrictions on their access to political power. In the interpellations (basically interrogations held by the
First Duma) held in the aftermath of the 1905 Revolution Pyotr Stolypin, the Minister of Internal Aﬀairs,
was forced to respond to charges that the government had been actively promoting anti-Jewish pogroms
over the preceding few months (Ascher, 2001). Many in Russia blamed the 1905 Revolution on Jewish
revolutionaries; the same charge would be levelled against the leaders of the November 1917 revolution.
Moreover, the Duma under Nicholas II was powerless to prevent the funding of extremist organisations and
newspapers by the chief of the secret police, P.G. Kurlov, that explicitly encouraged pogroms, undermining
any hopes the Jewish groups may have harboured the 1905 Revolution would lead to a material change in
their circumstances (Figes, 1996). We should also not forget the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, one of the
most famous forgeries made by the tsarist police in 1902.
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Thus Lenin in 1903, writing in response to the Manifesto of the Armenian Social-
Democrats, decries the principle of national self-determination, arguing that support for
national autonomy `may become necessary...only in isolated and exceptional cases' (Lenin,
1961b, 329); the focus is rather on `the self-determination of the proletariat in each nation-
ality rather than with self-determination of peoples or nations' (ibid)27. Similarly, Stalin,
inﬂuenced by his reading of Georgian history, argued in October 1904 that diﬀerent classes
have diﬀerent views of the national question and that the Georgian National Democrats were
making nationalist appeals with the sole aim of winning over the proletariat in opposition
to the Social Democrats (of whom Stalin was himself a member) (Stalin, 1952). Stalin fur-
ther argues that the national question of the proletariat must be subsumed to class interests
(similar to Lenin's position at this juncture) and is strongly critical of the proposals of the
Armenian Social Democrats (and also of the Jewish Bund) (Stalin, 1952, 38-39).
At this stage, the Russian Social Democrats were confronting the same problem that
all Marxists in multi-national countries faced at this time concerning the tensions between
the desire to support oppressed groups without creating obstructions to the overall goal of
unifying the international proletariat. Lenin and the Social Democrats in 1903 committed
themselves to supporting the right of nations to self-determination, without supporting any
concrete demand of a nation for self-determination28 (Lenin, 1961a, 455). The point Lenin is
trying to make, rather unconvincingly it must be said, is that the Social Democrats will not
support unconditional demands for self-determination, but will do so only when it beneﬁts
the proletariat as a whole (Stalin argued exactly this position in 1904; it corresponded to
Clause 9 of the Social Democrats programme (Stalin, 1952)). Lenin attempted to clarify this
27This is largely consonant with the position of the Second International, although as Hel ene d'Encausse
argues, Lenin's position would start to diverge rapidly and resemble in some aspects that advanced by Otto
Bauer concerning the importance of nationality (d'Encausse, 1991, 12). Lenin would then break from this
position in 1913 (see below).
28This was not dissimilar in some respects to Yeltsin's position in the early 1990s. As we shall see below,
Yeltsin strongly encouraged the various regions of the Russian Federation to embrace sovereignty without
evincing any understanding of what this entailed for the nascent Russian state, causing serious problems and
arguably contributing to the war in Chechnya in 1994.
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in May 1905 in a preface written to accompany the Yiddish version of the Report on the
Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., arguing that, notwithstanding the `economic and political
oppression' suﬀered especially by the non-Russian nationalities, the only real solution was `for
the closest possible unity among the proletarians of the diﬀerent nationalities' to overthrow
the tsarist yoke (Lenin, 1962, 495)29.
By 1912, matters had rather reached a head, with severe divisions opening between
the central committee of the Social Democrats and the non-Russian groups, whom Lenin
accused in 1913 of privileging nationalism over socialism and forging ahead with a damaging
isolationism (Lenin, 1963c, 465). It was also during this period that Lenin and Stalin began
to engage seriously with the work of Otto Bauer, the Austrian Social Democrat who produced
perhaps the most compelling treatment of the relationship between social democracy and
the nationalities question, originally published in 1907 (Bauer, 2000)30. Bauer's work is
monumental and as we are chieﬂy interested in how he inﬂuenced the Bolsheviks, we have
limited space to discuss it here.
There are two critical contributions to the debate made by Bauer. The ﬁrst is that his
conceptualisation of the nation relies on national character, the `complex of physical and
intellectual characteristics that distinguishes one nation from another' (Bauer, 2000, 20).
He sees this as wholly separate from class identity, but it is not an immutable component.
Both of these characteristics make it rather diﬃcult to analyse using the standard tools of
Marxism, but it is the second characteristic that encouraged Lenin and Stalin to grapple more
seriously with the nationalities question because it illustrated the problematic nature of their
earlier statements on self-determination. This is because Bauer's socialist solution to the
29This was in the guise of an explicit attack on the Bund, which had been aﬃliated with the Russian Social
Democrats but broke with the party in 1903, claiming to be the sole representative of the Jewish proletariat.
The Bund would reunite with the Social Democrats in September 1906, but relations between the two would
continue to be fractious.
30Perhaps it is unsurprising that Lenin and Stalin were not particularly interested in grappling with the
nationalities question as this juncture given that they were still analysing the aftermath of the 1905 Russian
Revolution and diagnosing the failures of the Russian Social Democrats to adequately capitalise on this
moment.
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problem of multinational states (his example was drawn from his experience in Austria, but
the analogues with Russia were obvious to both Lenin and Stalin and Russia was referenced
explicitly by Bauer as a problem for internationalists (Bauer, 2000, 419)) was to argue against
a form of vapid internationalism that he thought would be of little value to nationally-situated
proletarians. Rather, he argued that Social Democrats should be in favour of granting
nations territorial autonomy31. In his draft platform for the Social Democrats in Austria, he
calls for the country to be transformed into `a democratic federative state of nationalities'
(Bauer, 2000, 425) since it is only through the means of guaranteeing democratic rights to the
proletarians of the various nations that a thicker, more justiﬁable version of cosmopolitanism
can be achieved.
By May 1913 both Lenin and Stalin were ready to address what they saw as the serious
deﬁciencies in Bauer's work, although their responses would diﬀer in interesting and impor-
tant ways. Lenin attacked what he regarded as Bauer's bourgeois nationalism, continuing to
see any appeal to nationalism as a tool used by the bourgeoisie to divert workers from the real
struggle. The end goal for Lenin and Bauer was similar in that both aimed for perfect equal-
ity between nations: `No privileges for any nation or any one language! Not even the slightest
degree of oppression or the slightest injustice in respect of a national minority...' (Lenin,
1963f, 92). Tactically, however, there remained a chasm separating them as Lenin continued
to insist that while nations should have the political right to secede, cultural autonomy is
a misguided goal, since it `joins the proletarians and bourgeoisie of one nation and keeps
the proletarians of diﬀerent nations apart (Lenin, 1963b, 116; emphasis in original)32. Lenin
clariﬁed these abstract musings with respect to Russia in his 1913 Theses on the National
Question, stating that there were a number of nations within Russia's borders that had been
`unbelievably oppressed' by tsarism and were thus deserving of political self-determination
31He also emphasised the importance of education in the native language of indigenous peoples for devel-
opment, which was something the Bolsheviks would also adopt as they sought to remake the North Caucasus
(Bauer, 2000, 272).
32This is a direct attack on Otto Bauer's claims.
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(Lenin, 1963e, 243), though this would be subject to appraisal on a case-by-case basis de-
pending on the needs of the proletariat. He also states that `[i]t is impermissible, from the
standpoint of the Social Democrats, to issue the slogan of national culture' (Lenin, 1963e,
246). By September of 1913 we see the emergence of practical policy measures, including
(of particular interest to us) the requirement that a democratic government must `provide
the people with schools where instruction is given in all the native languages' (Lenin, 1963d,
427); though this is no way should be confused with an educational programme that fosters
bourgeois cultural nationalism, meaning that schools must not be segregated on grounds of
nationality (Lenin, 1963a, 504). In a further response to his critics (of whom he certainly
saw Bauer as being one of the more important), Lenin in late 1913 refers to the classic Marx-
ists base-superstructure claim, noting that in all nations there are bourgeois and proletariat
cultures, but that the `general national culture is the culture of the landlords, the clergy
and the bourgeoisie' (Lenin, 1964d, 24). Interestingly, at this stage Lenin explicitly rules
out development of national curricula as being wholly representative of bourgeois cultural
nationalism (Lenin, 1964d, 37). If this uncompromising line had been adopted by the Bol-
sheviks in the North Caucasus, it would have met with tremendous resistance and may have
even imperilled the attempt to establish Bolshevik power in the region.
But it was not to be, and this is again where we see the beneﬁts of debate in terms
of tempering problematic positions and forcing the leading Bolsheviks to compromise in
the service of greater practicality without losing the essence of their central claims. Not
coincidentally, 1913 is also the year where we see a clear development in Stalin's thinking on
this question, with huge implications for the subsequent Bolshevik nationalities policy. In
his brief letter On the Road to Nationalism, he exhibits obeisance to the Leninist line that
defence of the right to self-determination does not entail universal support for this ambition,
since the role of the Party is to `inﬂuence the will of a nationality towards a decision most
in accordance with the interests of the proletariat' (Stalin, 1953d, 296).
However, in the same year Lenin commissioned Stalin to address the nationalities question
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from a Marxist perspective. This work, Marxism and the National Question, came to be
Stalin's most important contribution to the Bolshevik debates and marked a signiﬁcant
divergence from his previous line and Leninist orthodoxy. The distinction between the two
is immediately obvious as Stalin develops his deﬁnition of the nation, citing four necessary
and suﬃcient commonalities:
A nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the
basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up
manifested in a common culture.
(Stalin, 1953c, 307).
We should place special emphasis on the claim of a `common culture', drawing, as it
does, on the work of Bauer and clearly contradicting Lenin's own take on the matter, since
this undermines Lenin's claim that the culture of a nation is merely a bourgeois manifes-
tation33. Stalin seems to recognise that he cannot side too openly with Bauer and argues
that the latter's own conception of a nation is insuﬃciently speciﬁc since Bauer downplays
the signiﬁcance of language and territory and focuses on national character, which Stalin
characterises as something more akin to the `mystical' and completely unhelpful with regard
to developing policy34 (Stalin, 1953c, 309-312). However, the fact that Stalin is willing to ac-
cept the existence of national culture is of great signiﬁcance and has tremendous bearing on
the ultimate policies pursued in the North Caucasus. At this stage, Stalin was still cautious
with regard to national autonomy and his strong preference was for regional autonomy, since
he believed the latter would minimise the attraction of nationalisms that could fragment the
proletariat (Stalin, 1953c, 375). He did recognise the importance of certain components in
minimising nationalist opposition and proposed that all nationalities be granted the right to
33Stalin was initially distrusted by many of the leading Bolsheviks on the basis that he was simply a
Georgian nationalist and ignored the orthodox Marxist line that nationality was completely irrelevant and
possibly harmful to the Bolshevik cause (Service, 2005).
34This would have important ramiﬁcations for the treatment of Jews in the Soviet Union, since Jews clearly
do not ﬁt well with Stalin's criteria and he explicitly dismisses them as a nation (Stalin, 1953c, 312-313).
While this is of great importance for general studies of Soviet nationality policy, it has limited bearing on
the North Caucasus since the Jewish communities there tend to be small and generally rather isolated.
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use their own language, their own schools and their own faith: `equal rights of all nations
in all forms (language, schools, etc.) is an essential element in the solution of the national
question' (Stalin, 1953c, 376).
By May of 1914, Stalin's arguments seemed to have at least partially convinced Lenin, as
the latter drafted a bill aimed at defending the rights of national minorities that called for
a redrawing of local boundaries based on national composition, the rise of democratic local
government (with limits to be established by a central parliament) (Lenin, 1964b, 281) and
proportional distribution of cultural and educational spending35 according to the presence of
national minorities in a given area; the bill was not ultimately introduced to the Duma, but
it proves instructive as to how Lenin was developing his ideas concerning practical means to
defend local minorities and the inﬂuence of Stalin (and, obliquely, Bauer) on his developing
conception of how to manage the nationalities question. This is also the juncture at which we
see Lenin's analysis of the dangers of imperialism formally connecting with this issue36. Thus,
during the early months of the First World War, Lenin clariﬁed his thinking on the nature
and dangers of Great Russian nationalism and argued that `the defeat of Russia [is] the lesser
evil in all conditions' as this would place further strain on tsarism, whereas victory would
embolden the forces of reaction (Lenin, 1964c, 163). Furthermore, he criticises both Kautsky
and Trotsky for supporting their respective governments, labelling this `opportunism' and
arguing that this threatens the international linkages of the proletariat (Lenin, 1964i). Lenin
viewed the First World War not as a war of liberation or historical importance, but rather
as `an imperialist war to enhance the oppression of nations ' (Lenin, 1964g, 411).
Hirsch has argued that there was little development in the pieces Stalin wrote from 1913
to 1917, suggesting that the Bolshevik leadership was content with the prewar nationality
policy they had advanced (Hirsch, 2005, 56). However, this seems to overstate the case
35Triggered by a dramatic rise in educational spending under Stolypin, the number of schools in the empire
rose from 92,295 to 123,754 (an increase of 34%) (Ascher, 2001, 234), although the ethnic minorities in the
Caucasus were typically not privy to this increase in resources.
36Although Imperialism would not be published until 1916, the outbreak of the First World War encouraged
Lenin to delve deeper into the nature of the division of the world's resources.
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somewhat. In 1916 Lenin again chose to address problems with Bauer's theory and cultural
autonomy and also clariﬁed the role of proletariat in oppressor nations, arguing that it must
`struggle against the enforced retention of oppressed nations within the bounds of the given
state, which means they must ﬁght for the right to self-determination' (Lenin, 1964j, 147).
He followed through on this in his Draft Platform for the Proletarian Party in May 1917,
calling for `the proclamation and immediate realisation of complete freedom of secession from
Russia for all the nations and peoples who were oppressed by tsarism' (Lenin, 1964l, 73),
although he believed that such a stance would attract these nations to remain in Russia as
a result of its obvious democratic qualities. In concrete terms, in a speech on the national
question at the 7th All-Russia Conference, Lenin called for the granting of autonomy to
Ukraine and Finland37 (although the Bolsheviks were later to backtrack on this demand,
realising that they needed the resources in both countries) (Lenin, 1964h).
Ultimately it was Stalin who would enjoy the freedom to implement his beliefs following
his appointment as Commissar of Nationalities; Lenin largely removed himself from these
debates in the aftermath of 1917. At this juncture there remained some residual uncertainty
concerning the appropriate support for self-determination: Stalin voices pro forma support
but states that `This...does not mean that Social-Democracy will support every demand of
a nation' (Stalin, 1953c, 321), since Social Democrats' main obligation is to ensuring the
success of the proletarian revolution. They will thus support self-determination insofar as
this makes it impossible for bourgeois nationalists to use nationalist rhetoric to gain support
for attacks on other nations.
However, this awkward position was largely jettisoned in the face of events. In November
1917, Lenin and Stalin (as Commissar for Nationalities Aﬀairs) issued a proclamation in the
37Pyotr Stolypin became personally involved in the Finnish question during his stint as Prime Minister,
railing against the use of Swedish in oﬃcial documents and exercising a ﬁrm hand over the local leadership
in order to prevent any expression of sovereignty; he argued in 1905 that in 1908 Finland was not on par
with the Caucasus as a region but was rather a part of the Empire like any other. This attitude was perhaps
unsurprising given that large numbers of Finns had participated extensively in the 1905 Revolution (Ascher,
2001). It had the rather predictable eﬀect of exacerbating the already strained relations between the Finns
and the Imperial authorities.
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name of the Russian Republic that clariﬁed the Soviet platform with regard to nationalities:
1. Equality and sovereignty of the peoples of Russia.
2. The right of the peoples of Russia to free self-determination, up to secession
and formation of an independent state.
3. Abolition of all and any national and national-religious privileges and re-
strictions.
4. Free development of national minorities and ethnic groups inhabiting Russia.
(Lenin and Stalin, 15 November, 1917 (1975, 192-193).
This was largely the platform that would provide the basis for Bolshevik actions in the
North Caucasus. As we shall see, it was closely linked with Stalin's belief in the importance
of education in local languages and developing local intelligentsia, both of which were integral
in winning support in the region38. Stalin would face serious opposition to his proposal from
leading Bolsheviks in a major conference of the party in April 1917, but would win approval
for his policy thanks largely to Lenin's intervention (Service, 2005, 130). Before proceeding
to a consideration of events in the North Caucasus, we should say a little about Lenin's
thoughts on the state (Stalin added very little to this), although these developed much later
than his work on the national question and are more superﬁcial.
Thus we see in May 1917, Lenin in writing the Draft Platform for the Proletarian Party
argues that the ﬁrst step in constructing the socialist state must be the direct arming of the
people themselves in order to destroy the previous means of oppression39 (i.e. the military
and police) and, particularly, government by Soviets of Workers and Peasant Deputies40
(Lenin, 1964l). These would oversee the nationalisation of land. Interestingly, while Lenin
38In April 1918, Stalin would draw attention to a primary challenge concerning the growth of Soviet power
among the `culturally backward elements' and argue that extending the authority of the Bolsheviks to these
regions was `impossible unless these regions are autonomous, that is, have their own schools...social, political
and cultural institutions and unless the labouring masses of these regions are fully guaranteed the right to
use their own language in all spheres of social and political activity' (Stalin, 1953e, 77).
39This explains the strong support the Bolsheviks oﬀered to the Red Guards, which were the local militias
organised in the February revolution and that persisted until November (Figes, 1996, 370).
40Lenin was concerned about the presence of wealthy, capitalist peasants in these organisations and did
not trust them, calling for shadow organisations to be formed in order to keep them in line and protect the
poorer peasants (Lenin, 1964f).
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stated that he preferred centralisation in order to resolve the problem of famine, he recognised
at the April 1917 Petrograd Bolshevik Conference that `there are times when things can best
be done locally; we should allow a maximum of initiative in the local areas' (Lenin, 1964e,
150) and this was further conﬁrmed when in July of 1917 he published the famous article in
Pravda demanding `[a]ll power to the Soviets' (Lenin, 1964a, 164).
Lenin's most famous work on the state is contained in his monograph, The State and
Revolution (Lenin, 1964k). This is an open attack on what Lenin perceives as Kautsky's
misinterpretation of Marxist theory concerning the state; he draws heavily on Engels to
argue that the state is the defender of ruling-class interests and therefore the appropriate
step for its opponents is to strip it of it oppressive powers through populist militias (see his
claims in the previous paragraph). Lenin criticises both those who assume the bourgeois
state will merely `wither away' without the need for a violent revolution and those who
argue that the proletariat can utilise the bourgeois state for its own ends - these attacks are
speciﬁcally targeted at Kautsky and the Mensheviks, whom Lenin sees as petty-bourgeois
opportunists (Lenin, 1964k, 412). It is worth emphasising that although Lenin calls for the
`smashing of the state' on numerous occasions in this piece, what he speciﬁcally means is the
smashing of the state's coercive and oﬃcial machinery, since the apparatus of the state is
vitally important for securing the revolution (something that would be of central importance
in helping to achieve victory in the Civil War):
`We are not utopians, we do not dream of dispensing at once with all admin-
istration, with all subordination[...]To organise the whole economy on the lines
of the postal service so that technicians, foremen and accountants, as well as all
oﬃcials, shall receive salaries no higher than a workmen's wage, all under the
control and leadership of the armed proletariat - that is our immediate aim.
Lenin (1964k, 425-427)
Having considered the Bolshevik debates over nationality policy in depth and in rather
more superﬁcial detail Lenin's work on the state, we can now move to a consideration of the
North Caucasus in the period from 1917 to 1927 and a consideration of how the Bolsheviks
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sought to overcome the twin legacies of civil war and extreme underdevelopment in the
region.
2.3.2 The North Caucasus: Warzone to Testing Field
The period of early Bolshevik rule in the North Caucasus was marked by intense activity
and episodes of extreme violence. The region was one of the principal battle zones of the
Civil War as the Cossacks and ethnic Russians in Krasnodar provided considerable support
for the anti-Bolshevik armies. Throughout this period, the indigenous peoples of the eastern
Caucasus worked to remove many of the Cossack population; a policy that was at least
tacitly encouraged by the Bolsheviks. After the Civil War the Bolsheviks were able to begin
applying their nationalities policy, which was intimately connected to state-building in the
region. We shall see that there were multiple compromises and revisions to the general policy
that emerged in this period, but unlike the Yeltsin administrations, the framework that had
been developed in the pre-revolutionary period provided some element of structure to these
and prevented the situation from spiralling out of control.
There is such a wealth of material on the North Caucasus in this period (albeit in highly
fragmented form) that I cannot hope to cover all of the events and details in this paper.
Indeed, the variations between the seven territories in the initial ten years would be enough
to ﬁll a monograph rather than a relatively brief paper. However, as the introduction to this
paper noted (and as the section providing an overview of the region demonstrated) one aspect
that united all seven territorial groups, with the exception of Krasnodar (and possibly North
Ossetia), was the extraordinary levels of underdevelopment. Literacy rates were often in the
single digits and agriculture was the dominant industry for many residents of the North Cau-
casus, notwithstanding the extreme land shortages that made this a problematic basis for
economic survival. This presented both a great challenge but also a tremendous opportunity
for the Soviets in terms of transforming the region and gaining legitimacy among the indige-
nous population. The second major challenge facing the Bolsheviks was administrative: the
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Russian Empire, along with neglect of the economic status of the North Caucasus, had also
failed to develop a feasible set of political organisations for the confusing ethnic divisions
in the territory and overcoming these was of critical importance for achieving any further
social or economic progress. Furthermore, the Bolsheviks generally lacked a presence in the
Caucasus and had been unable to establish strong organisations in the region, something
recognised as early as 1909 by the man on the ground, Joseph Stalin41.
It is undeniably true that the Bolsheviks did not envisage the collapse of the Provisional
Government to occur as rapidly as it did in 1917, nor did they expect to be in control
of a country on its knees following years of war and persistent famine. The state- and
nation-building challenges were daunting, yet the years of debates and policy promises had
furnished the Bolsheviks with a framework that would allow them to navigate these turbulent
times and implement their broad vision of nation- and state-building. This is not to say
that they were dogmatic in their pursuit of ideological goals; such an approach would have
doomed their cause, for they enjoyed limited support beyond the city conﬁnes of Petrograd
and as we shall see, were far behind the Social Revolutionaries in the North Caucasus42.
Nevertheless, the years of debates placed them in a position to be able to manage the deluge
of information and negotiate the extreme diﬃculties of the early years of power43. They
made many mistakes in the process, some extraordinarily clumsy and some the result of
lacking control over local actors in the early years, but the underlying commitment to a
speciﬁc vision and understanding of how to construct a socialist state ensured that none of
41Stalin wrote of the collapse of membership and highlighted that `St Petersburg does not know what is
going on in the Caucasus' (Stalin, 1953g, 151), although he claimed that ideological penetration of Bolshevik
thought remained high among the peoples of the region.
42This was largely because the North Caucasus was predominantly rural, with extraordinarily low levels
of urbanisation (even by 1920, only 4% of the inhabitants of the Kabard okrug lived in the okrug's only city,
Nalchik, with the rest classed as rural (Áåðáåêîâ, 1957, 62)) and the Bolsheviks were largely unknown outside
of the major urban centres. The Socialist Revolutionaries had been far more successful in demonstrating a
long-term interest in resolving the peasant question and had accordingly high levels of popularity among the
rural poor (Fitzpatrick, 1994).
43The confusion of their policies in Finland, the Baltics and Ukraine over what constituted self-
determination and the appropriate nature of secession speaks to initial uncertainty and sincere hopes of
a revolution throughout Europe, but in part this reﬂects the genuinely puzzling nature of the situation
(d'Encausse, 1991, 75-85).
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these proved terminal.
The build up the November Revolution was a period of extreme confusion for the Rus-
sian Empire as a whole due to the increasing power of local soviets and the emergence of
the system of dvoevlastiia44. This was magniﬁed in the North Caucasus as the complex in-
terrelations between the Cossacks and indigenous peoples were untethered by the withering
of central authority, leading to outbreaks of violence and claims for independence of the
localities (Marshall, 2010, 60-65). This dire situation would be further complicated by the
ferocity of ﬁghting in the Civil War, where the Caucasus would play a central role in the
battles between the Bolsheviks and defenders of the old order. Furthermore, the debates
over federalism were also occupying much of the attention of Stalin and the Commissariat
for the Aﬀairs of Nationalities; Stalin gave an interview to Pravda in April 1918 when he
characterised the federalism of the Bolsheviks as `a union of deﬁnite historically evolved
territories, each distinguished by a speciﬁc manner of life and national composition' (Stalin,
1953f, 70), reﬂecting closely Stalin's deﬁnition of a nation. We shall see below that this
ultimately resulted in the policy of raionirovanie, but there were serious problems regarding
the Tatar-Bashkir republic (the North Caucasus was not originally included in the list of
territories explicitly designated as part of the federation at this early stage).
The details of the struggle over the Caucasus in the years of the Civil War would ﬁll
an entire paper and are extremely well summarised in Marshall (2010, Chapter 3). The
presence of Cossacks in the Caucasus provided the White forces with a stronghold that was
absent in other parts of Russia45 and the North Caucasus would witness some of the most
intense and prolonged battles of the Russian Civil War; the ferocity of the ﬁghting made
44Although as Figes has argued, the near-complete collapse of central authority and burgeoning sense of
independence in the provinces entailed this could be more accurately described as mnogovlastie (Figes, 1996,
359).
45Although relations between the Whites and the Cossacks were extremely complex and never moved be-
yond a marriage of convenience against the Bolsheviks (Figes, 1996, 556ﬀ). Indeed, the Cossacks themselves
were at times hopelessly divided, with older Cossacks allying with the Whites and members of the younger
generation often preferring the Bolsheviks (see And Quietly Flows the Don for a literary description of this
impossible situation).
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it impossible for the Bolsheviks to impose order on the region and thoroughly independent
ispolkoms46 mushroomed (Marshall, 2010, 58), with the Bolshevik Party enjoying extremely
marginal support during the initial period of the Civil War47. Among the many parties that
were on the left of the political spectrum, it was the Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks,
both strongly committed to democratic socialism, who enjoyed the greatest popularity in the
Caucasus, with the former particularly strong (Kenez, 1977). Evidence for this is seen in the
results of the 1917 elections to the Constituent Assembly of November 1917, notwithstanding
the fact that much of the North Caucasus was in such a chaotic situation that elections were
not held48:
Table 2.2: Results of the November 1917 election to the Constitutional Assembly (selected
districts)
Party Votesa
SR Bols. Mens. CD (Cadets) Total
District
Don 478,901 205,497 6,327 43,345 1,406,620
Tauridab 300,150 15,642 11,118 29,904 524,750
Stavropol 291,395 17,430 10,898 327,916 647639
Kuban No election
Terek-Dagestan No election
Caspian No returns
a Source is Radkey (1950, 88-89).
b Crimea and Southern Ukraine.
The territories of the Eastern Caucasus (particularly Dagestan and Chechnya-Ingushetia),
given the mountainous terrain that made it near-impossible for regular supplies or fresh
troops to be sent from Moscow, swung between the Bolsheviks and the White forces through-
out the Civil War, with large numbers of partisan ﬁghters (the `greens') obstructing both
46Executive committees with responsibility for running local regions.
47The ﬁrst formal Bolshevik Party organisation in Kabarda was established in the ﬁrst half of 1918 and by
the end of that year could count only 50 people among its members . The timing was deeply inauspicious,
for Denikin's troops would seize Nalchik in January of 1919 and control Kabarda and Balkaria until the 24th
of March, 1920 (Áåðáåêîâ, 1957, 39-40).
48Lenin would allow the Constituent Assembly to meet in January 1918, but as soon as it became clear
that the Social Revolutionaries, who had won a clear victory, would not support the Bolsheviks on a number
of key policies, he ordered the Assembly disbanded.
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sides in the hopes of gaining independence for their territories49. The Terek region, which
ran east from Kabardino-Balkaria, declared itself as an independent Mountaineer Republic
(Ñîþç ãîðöåâ) in May 1917 under the leadership of local leaders of industry (including the
oil magnate from Grozny Cherm oev) and actively opposed the extension of Bolshevik power
and fought against the incursion of the socialists, receiving recognition from Turkey and sup-
port from Britain (Áåðáåêîâ, 1957). By December 1, 1917, a Terek-Dagestani government
had been declared in direct opposition to the Bolsheviks under the leadership of the Cos-
sack ataman Karaylov and Prince Kaplanov but this was quickly crushed and the leaders
executed, with the Bolsheviks establishing their own government in Terek oblast (Áåðáåêîâ,
1957)50. Meanwhile in the west, the Cossacks (and Germans, seeking to undermine Bolshe-
vik power) helped General Denikin and the Whites capture Ekaterinodar in August 1918,
which had formerly been established as the capital of the North Caucasus Soviet Republic
in April of that year (Marshall, 2010, 57,108). At this stage, the prospects for the Bolshe-
viks were not good, but the intransigence of the Whites in insisting on a continuation of
tsarist policies, combined with the Bolshevik rhetorical commitment to greater autonomy
were essential elements in changing the dynamic of the war.
Perhaps most important was Denikin's refusal to countenance any form of federalism
and his intransigence on land reform51 ensured that popular support for his forces would
remain marginal, facilitating the ultimate routing of White forces throughout the Caucasus
49Figes argues that these green troops, who were largely peasant insurrectionists, were responsible for the
advance of the Whites in the South due to the destruction of Red supply lines and the consistent ambushing
of troops (Figes, 1996).
50For more on the details in this region, see Êîáàõèäçå (1971), which details the extreme situation of the
Bolsheviks in 1919 and through the early parts of 1920.
51He would change his mind on this, but too late to change the course of the Civil War (Kenez, 1977, 233);
prior to this Denikin had followed a policy of returning land to the aristocracy after the reconquering of
land, which alienated the peasantry even further (Figes, 1996, 572). In the oblasts of Kabarda and Balkaria,
which were under White control for just over a year, he ordered the closing of all schools that had been
opened by the Soviets and returned the oblasts to the previous forms of governance and imposed high levels
of taxation on the working class (Áåðáåêîâ, 1957). These policies were generally representative of White
behaviour in towns and oblasts they seized and ensured that among the peasantry and poor there would be
extremely limited support for the continuation of counter-revolutionary government.
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in March 1920 through a combination of Bolshevik might and local insurgencies52 (Marshall,
2010, 131). The relationship between these insurgencies and the Bolsheviks was, to say the
least, rather fraught. The most obvious example of this is in Dagestan, where the actions of
the local revkom, which had been hastily convened in April 1920, the overzealous Cheka and
uproarious returning Red Army soldiers aggravated the local population to such an extent
that a dangerous armed rebellion broke out in September of that year, led in large part by
the remnants of the insurgency in Dagestan53. It was ﬁnally quashed in May 1921.
Ultimately, Lenin's understanding of the central role of organisation, and the priority
he placed on building a strong party apparatus, would prove decisive in ensuring the Bol-
shevik victory throughout the country (Kenez, 1977)54. Stalin's promises as Commissar of
Nationalities to grant greater autonomy to the regions of the North Caucasus (in particular
with regard to respecting Sharia law given the importance of Islam to many societies in the
North Caucasus55 ), were also integral to ensuring that Red Army recruitment remained
strong in the region and the Bolsheviks had suﬃcient breathing space to implement their
policies, dampening the attraction of the radical insurgents for the general population56. In
1921, reﬂecting on the victory in the Civil War, Stalin would argue that `the Russian workers
could not have defeated Kolchak and Denikin...had they not eliminated national enmity and
52Although, as we shall see in the next paper, War Communism and the requisitioning of foodstuﬀs from
a peasantry on the verge of starvation harmed the Bolshevik standing amongst the peasantry, especially in
the South (Kenez, 1977).
53Marshall argues that if the local representatives of Bolshevik power had been more disciplined and if the
promises of aid to oﬀset the worst eﬀects of War Communism had arrived earlier, there was `a critical window
of opportunity to maximize and build upon immediate local goodwill' that was ultimately irretrievably
squandered (Marshall, 2010, 133).
54Kenez argues that `In Russia, it was only the Bolsheviks who were predisposed by their intellectual and
political traditions to act on the basis of this understanding' (Kenez, 1977, 2), where the `understanding'
relates to the need for organisation and discipline.
55In November 1920, addressing the Congress of the People's of Dagestan, Stalin stated that `The Soviet
Government considers that the Sharia, as common law, is as fully authorized as that of any other of the
peoples inhabiting Russia. If the Daghestan [sic] people desire to preserve their laws and customs, they
should be preserved' (Stalin, 1953a, 409).
56Although these promises, with the exception of Dagestan, did not last. In Kabardino-Balkaria, for
example, sharia courts were liquidated by 1922 and by 1923 all oﬃcial madrasses in the oblast had been
shuttered (Áåðáåêîâ, 1958, 43).
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national oppression at home' (Stalin, 1953b, 21). While there is understandably some self-
aggrandisement and justiﬁcation for the continuation of the policy in such words, it cannot
be denied that they contain much that is true.
Nonetheless, as Marshall notes, following the end of the Civil War, the North Cauca-
sus was eﬀectively a `tabula rasa for the ruling Bolshevik party' (Marshall, 2010, 149); the
melange of previous governing policies in the region had nothing in common besides their lack
of success, meaning the Bolsheviks had virtually nothing practical on which they could draw
besides their pre-existing framework for nation- and state-building. This was a distinctly
unpromising situation for the new Bolshevik government, which found itself severely materi-
ally stretched and with extremely limited control over the region over which the government
claimed authority.
The extreme ethnic fractionalisation of the North Caucasus meant that the policy of
geographical division of territory along roughly ethnic lines (raionirovanie), which was es-
tablished in late 1920 at the Eighth Party Congress, would remake the region in dramatic
fashion57. Smith argues that the early decisions concerning the form of territorial organisa-
tion of the Soviet Union were `largely the product of on-the-hoof decisions and haphazard
developments' (Smith, 1999, 30), and he makes a compelling case that the early interactions
between the Central Commissariat and the Narkomnats (the People's Commissariat for Na-
tionalities) were troubled, principally because the individual leaders of the ethnic groups in
the latter saw themselves as advocates for their groups, rather than implementers of central
policy (Smith, 1999). These local representatives to Narkomnats also helped push policy
away from a pure focus on regionalisation to something that was more sympathetic to ethnic
divisions58. Similarly, Hirsch argues that the Soviet central administrators had no coherent
57Martin notes that this was originally designed to be an aid to economic reorganisation of the new state
but was rapidly grafted onto the nationalities policy as a reﬂection of Stalinist principles, resulting in the
creation of national soviets (Martin, 2001). We have seen in the debates over nationalities policy that Stalin
in 1913 called for the regional, rather than ethnic, division of the country to encourage local autonomy. It
because obvious in the North Caucasus that the complexity of ethnic divisions made such a plan unworkable,
so it was amended to include ethnic elements.
58Narkomnats created a special department for the highlanders of the Caucasus, with subdepartments
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plan for regionalisation and that this `was a process of trial and error', emerging from a com-
promise between a principle of nationality (supported by Narkomnats) and those advocating
the economic paradigm, who dismissed the importance of national rights in building the new
Bolshevik state (Hirsch, 2005, 64-65).
As suggested above, North Ossetia represents an exceptional case due to the fact that it
was the sole ethnic republic in the North Caucasus where the indigenous population professed
Russian Orthodoxy. This entailed that it was not subject to the same policies of neglect
by the tsarist administration; as of 1899 there were 72 schools functioning in the republic
and teachers' conferences (s'ezdi uchitelei) were organised in the republic in 1888, 1901 and
1904 (Bezhanova, 1991, 8). The Ossetian script was alphabetised by the Russian scholar
Andrei Shergen in 1844 and there were dedicated publishers for the Ossetian language in pre-
Revolutionary Russia, something that was not present in the other North Caucasian republics
and that provided the Ossetians with a local intelligentsia (in the Western sense) long before
the neighbouring republics (×åðäèæèåâ, 1971). While it suﬀered from the same shortage of
land common to all North Caucasus ethnic republics, industry was relatively well developed
with Belgian investment driving hydroelectric plants, ore and silver mines and chemical
factories; by 1915 there were 411 going industrial concerns, although the average number
of employees was just over ﬁve (×åðäèæèåâ, 1971, 11). Due in part to the large Cossack
presence and relative wealth of the oblast, Bolshevik power would not be consolidated until
March 1920.
Smith is surely right to argue that the Bolshevik ideal would have been for monoethnic
states (Smith, 1999, 66), but the tremendous population movements in the North Caucasus
in the preceding ﬁfty years prior to the revolution, combined with the chaos of the Civil
War period, made this goal utopian and as we have seen, it was soon dropped. In the initial
period after the oﬃcial ending of the Civil War, the local Caucasus Bolsheviks, with the
devoted especially to the Lezgins (Dagestan), Cherkessko-Kabardins (Kabards and Adigey) and the Osetins
(Áåðáåêîâ, 1957).
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full support of Sergei Ozhonikidze who was loosely in charge of the region, began deporting
Cossack stanitsas59 in wholesale fashion from the Terek region; this was ﬁnally stopped
in early 1921, but resulted in a dramatic restructuring of the local ethnic landscape. For
example, among the Ingush, only a fraction over 2% of the population remained in the
mountains as a large proportion moved to occupy land formerly seized by the Cossacks
during their original settlement (Marshall, 2010, 178). Baranov describes how in January
1921 the Central Executive Committee decreed that all Cossacks should be removed from
the Mountain ASSR (that had been established in November 1920 - see below), but that
this policy was rescinded in April (Baranov, 2005, 255)60.
The deportation of Cossacks was, at this early state, a reﬂection of the inability of the
Bolsheviks to exert any degree of control over the North Caucasus61. Their reliance on
the local ispolkoms and charismatic leaders to oversee the internal governance of the North
Caucasus during the years of the Civil War reﬂected an acknowledgement of the fact that
there was simply insuﬃcient state capacity to implement desired changes. There was also,
as Francine Hirsch has made clear, a severe knowledge deﬁcit among the central committee
members of the Bolsheviks, who relied on a combination of ethnographers from Moscow
and local experts to survey the terrain and provide much-needed information concerning the
state of relations and development in regions distant from Petersburg (Hirsch, 2005). This
intensiﬁed the clashes between the central committee and Narkomnats in the early years
of Bolshevik rule as the impression was that there was signiﬁcant leeway for local actors to
59A stanitsa is a Cossack settlement without an acceptable translation in English due to the extremely
high variance in both population and services that can fall under this general heading. `Settlement', if we
could drop the anachronistic nature of the term, would be an acceptable start. Stanitsas remain prominent
in contemporary Russia in all areas with Cossack populations and are particularly important in the Kuban
region of Krasnodar.
60He also notes that Cossack demands for an administrative territory for Russians carved out of Chechnya
and Sunzhen were initially ﬁrmly rejected, despite OGPU reports that the Chechens and Ingush were con-
tinuing to seize land and terrorise the Cossacks (Baranov, 2005). Similarly, the Russian population included
in the Adigeyan-Cherkess AO expressed severe discontent with the local administrators and demanded to be
moved into the Kuban-Chernomorskoya oblast; again, these demands fell on deaf ears.
61In 1921 Stalin was ﬁrmly supportive of the attempts to drive out `Great Russian kulaks' from the North
Caucasus (Stalin, 1953b, 27), which presumably included many Cossacks. Whether this simply reﬂected a
recognition of the absence of central control over the process is an open question.
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inﬂuence central policy and, as we have seen, many of the representatives on Narkomnats saw
their primary role as serving as advocates for their ethnicity, rather than resolving central
problems of governance.
It should be surprising to no one, therefore, that Soviet policy in the North Caucasus pro-
ceeded along a path of awkward compromises and, on occasion, appalling violence to achieve
their policy goals. There were, for example, frequent purges of the local ispolkoms (exec-
utive committees) and occasional reversion to revkoms (revolutionary committees), which
were supposed to be phased out as elections were held in the localities (Marshall, 2010, 153).
Both of these steps are further conﬁrmation (if any were needed) of the extent to which
the Bolsheviks struggled to ﬁnd reliable executors of the central policy platforms; many of
those removed were openly diverting resources or positions to relatives or members of the
same clan and evinced no more than a nominal commitment to Bolshevik ideals (we shall see
below that the leaders of the Mountain ASSR provide a good example of such behaviour).
It seems inarguable, therefore, that Donogo does not exaggerate when he talks of the
`basic miscalculations' (grybix proschetov) in nationalities policy that generated widespread
resistance to Soviet rule in the North Caucasus (particularly in Chechnya and Dagestan)
(Donogo, 2005, 270). There is an undeniable similarity with the early years of the Yeltsin
government at this stage; the sense is most certainly of a government struggling with reliance
on untrustworthy local ﬁgures and debating the extent to which local autonomy can cohere
with central authority. The classic example of this is the dithering over Bashkiria in 1919;
initially granted extremely wide-ranging autonomy (including control of a Bashkir army and
near-total command of the domestic system), the Bolsheviks recanted on this in 1920 and
clawed back most of the powers that had been ceded the previous year (d'Encausse, 1991,
93). Yeltsin, as we shall see, was both unable and seemingly uninterested in reasserting the
primacy of the central authorities of the Russian Federation over the local republics, granting
high levels of autonomy in the initial stages of the Russian Federation but uninterested in
clawing much of this back for federal authorities as the state stabilised.
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Bashkiria was far from exceptional in terms of debates over organisational structure. As
we have seen, the tsarist legacy in the North Caucasus was a confusing mess and there were
multiple problems facing the new rulers of the country with regard to the formal territorial
organisation of this region in the early years of Bolshevik power. Although both Stalin and
Lenin were sceptical of the value of federalism, both realised that this was the only feasible
means of governing the country and further elaborated the asymmetrical system that had
begun under the tsars (Smith, 1999). In the North Caucasus, the initial step following
the Bolshevik victory was to replace the unwieldy Terek oblast with a Mountain Republic
(ASSR) in November 1920, uniting the eastern North Caucasus peoples (with the exception
of Dagestan - see below) into a single administrative unit but supposedly granting greater
levels of autonomy. The extent to which Bolshevik power was rather underwhelming in these
areas is demonstrated by the fact that the ﬁrst meeting of the Kabard revkom took place on
the 15th of June, 192062 (Áåðáåêîâ, 1958, 41).
However, this was soon splintered by requests to leave the ASSR. The ﬁrst of these came
from the Kabards, whose ispolkom protested the lack of `any deﬁned economic link' with the
other component parts (Áåðáåêîâ, 1958, 47), which was approved on the 21st of September,
1921 leading to the formation of the Kabard autonomous oblast (AO). However, within a few
months further changes were in prospect; VTsIK decreed that in view of the close historical
and cultural links between the Kabards and the Balkars the latter should also leave the
Mountain ASSR and join the former, leading to the creation of the Kabardino-Balkaria
AO (Áåðáåêîâ, 1958, 51). ﬁrst from the Kabard/Balkar and then the Karachai/Cherkess
leaders, who demanded and were granted separate AOs on the basis of a more advanced
level of economic development (in September of that year and January 1922, respectively
(Smith, 1999)63). The Kabard settlement represented the ﬁrst North Caucasus territory
62The region had previously been dominated by Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries, with the Bolshe-
viks struggling to make initial inroads and forced to send external emissaries in order to provoke support for
the Party (Áåðáåêîâ, 1957).
63This casts serious doubt on the claims of various historians concerning the identity of local demands to
keep the Mountain Republic in existence, as suggested in Ware and Kisriev (2010, 27).
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to be organised along the lines of a single, dominant ethnic group and provoked years of
territorial debates with the Mountain Republic, as both the Ossetians and the Karachai
had disputes concerning the bordering land. These would be unresolved at the time of
the Mountain Republic's dissolution in July 192464, as by that point the leadership of the
Mountain Republic had completely lost the conﬁdence of the overseeing authority of the
Caucasus region and, decisively, the Central Executive Committee in Moscow (Marshall,
2010). This led to the formation of the Ingushetia and North Ossetia AOs, with Vladikavkaz
as a shared capital between the two until Ingushetia's absorption by Chechnya in 1933-34
(Marshall, 2010). The North Caucasus region was placed under the overall authority of the
North Caucasus krai administration.
Prior to the forced disintegration of the Mountain Republic, the Chechens were granted
autonomy in November 1922 (Groznyi remained a separate administrative region), although
Smith notes evidence that this was primarily to `empower the native population and restore
order to a region plagued by banditry' (Smith, 1999, 53). However, Marshall has convinc-
ingly demonstrated that the administration of the Mountain Republic was dominated by
Ossetians, with no Chechen or Ingush representative sitting on the local sovnarkom (Mar-
shall, 2010, 163). Unlike under the Russian Empire, this did not represent a Bolshevik
preference for the Ossetians over the Chechens and Ingush, but rather was representative
of the extremely weak state of the Bolshevik Party in these latter regions, forcing the new
revkom to admit non-Communist Chechens to six of the thirteen seats on the local revkom
(Marshall, 2010, 164), one of the most impressive cases of overnight korenizatsiia. However,
doubts over the head of the local revkom, T. El'darkhanov, grew over the next couple of
years as the revkom was consistently accused of inaction and corruption, and he was even-
tually removed in September 1925, along with many other members of the local leadership
(Marshall, 2010, 171). The initial purge of the leadership had actually begun in the spring
64At this juncture, the Cossacks were ultimately granted their demand for some degree of regional auton-
omy, though again their demands for a Cossack AO were rebuﬀed (Baranov, 2005).
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of 1924 in response to widespread local unrest in Chechnya, with rigged elections to revkoms
(extraordinary in and of itself since they were supposed to have been replaced by ispolkoms
by this time) and a disarmament drive aimed at quelling local dissatisfaction; similar disar-
mament operations were enacted in Dagestan, Ossetia and Ingushetia and the Karachai had
already been subjected to this in 1922 (Marshall, 2010, 173).
Dagestan, meanwhile, demonstrated remarkable persistence considering the extraordi-
nary number of ethnic groups coexisting within its boundaries65. The dramatic challenge
facing the Soviets was highlighted in a report from the Gunibskii revkom66 from the 9th of
May, 1920, which detailed the problems encouraging the local population to accept Bolshe-
vik power. The proposed solution was to assemble an armed group of 200-250 people to
enforce the power of the revkom; Red Army troops were on no account to be used because,
in the words of the Chair of the local revkom, they were `complete unfamiliar with local
customs' and could `initiate large numbers of undesirable conﬂicts' that would further dam-
age the standing of the Bolsheviks in the region (Ðàìàçàíîâ, 1962). By September of 1920
the Dagestanskii Bureau of the Bolsheviks was forced into making an address directed at
the poor of the oblast, particularly in the mountainous regions, who had proven unwilling
to embrace Soviet power and were still clinging to traditional forms of societal organisation,
including fealty to the Cossacks, which was seen as a major threat. The Bureau blamed this
primarily on the fact that the best party workers were located in the cities of Derbent, Shura
and Petrovsk and had thus recently dispatched many of them to the mountainous auls in an
attempt to overcome this problem (Áþðî, 1962).
This region, the furthest east of the territories in the North Caucasus, had been granted
autonomy by Stalin in late 1920 and Donogo argues this was in the hope of splitting the
nascent rebellion in the Terek region by separating Dagestan and the Mountain ASSR
65To gain an understanding of this, we refer the interested reader to Èíñòèòóò Èñòîðèè (1962), which
contains a series of reports from the diﬀerent Dagestani okrugs in 1920 and 1921 reporting on the progress of
building Soviets and the severe problems the central revkom had in coordinating the enterprise of building
Soviet power.
66Gunibskii okrug (now raion) is located in the centre of Dagestan.
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(Donogo, 2005, 274); the formation of the Dagestan ASSR was conﬁrmed on the 20th of
January, 1921. It was not deprived of this status despite the widescale rebellion in 1921-
192367, although it was still under the aegis of the North Caucasus kraikom, much to the
chagrin of local administrators. It would remain so until April 1925 when it was granted
independence from this supervision and fall under the direct authority of Moscow (Marshall,
2010, 191). The Soviets attempted to preserve a careful modus vivendi with the Dagestani
people, who had greater obeisance to Islam than the other groups in the North Cauca-
sus. This involved moderating the shariia courts (which were not closed until 1927, making
Dagestan the last territory in the North Caucasus to have a dual system of law operative)
and allowing the less dramatic features of adat to persist.
Nevertheless, the Soviets slowly attempted to remake Dagestani society by encouraging
widespread immigration from the highlands to the plains in the years after the Civil War,
with monetary inducements and large-scale irrigation projects to considerably expand the
amount of usable territory in the republic (Marshall, 2010, 191). The ultimate achievements
of this programme fell well short of initial hopes, but Marshall is surely right when he argues it
represents a `striking example of the Bolsheviks' desire to radically reshape local societies...in
ways that were held to oﬀer a better route to modernization and economic equality than the
Tsarist-era regional legacy of hopeless rural backwardness, poverty and neglect' (Marshall,
2010, 193). One of the major challenges for the Soviets in Dagestan was overcoming the hold
of Islam on life in the ASSR (which had been strongly linked to the resistance) and there was
a major push to open schools and break the hold of religion over education; by 1926 there
were 203 schools operative, educating over 25,000 children (Donogo, 2005, 278). However,
Ware notes that in 1925 there were 40,000 members of the Islamic clergy, constituting around
four percent of the population and by 1928 there were 2,000 functioning mosques, suggesting
67The resistance would continue at a lower level until October 1925, at which point the leader, Gotsinskiy,
was arrested and shot. For a detailed look at the speciﬁcs of the rebellion in Dagestan and Chechnya in
these years, see Donogo (2005).
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that a modus vivendi had been achieved68.
There were, perhaps inevitably given the extremely low levels of support for the Bol-
sheviks, continuing problems in the western North Caucasus. The Kuban region fostered
separatist movements opposed to the imposition of Bolshevik power (Baranov, 2005, 259).
Furthermore, Kuban contained one of the poorest and least educated peoples of the North
Caucasus in the Adigeyans; remnants of the Circassian/Cherkess people that had once been
a prominent force in the region and who were subsequently divided into Adigey, Karachai
and Balkar. It is estimated that at the turn of the twentieth century, in the territory that
would become the Adigeyan autonomous oblast, there was one school per 22,500 people and
that 96% of the pre-revolutionary population was illiterate (Khorotlev, 1958). Adigeya was
granted autonomy in 1922 as as an autonomous oblast; this marked the ﬁrst time in its
history that the Adigeyan people had been granted its own territory (Dzharimov, 1995); the
Cherkess peoples fell under particular suspicion from the tsarist authorities due to the close-
ness of their perceived links with Turkey and many thousands were deported in the aftermath
of the Crimean War (Figes, 2010). in the following years around a third of the budget for
the region was devoted to education (narodnoe obrazovanie), which entailed building schools
for the children and a series of eﬀorts to educate the adults, as well as creating a written
script for the ﬁrst time (Khorotlev, 1958).
By 1924, many of the basic territorial questions had been settled, although they would
undergo subsequent revisions under Stalin's centralisation (see the third paper for more de-
tails on this). While as we have seen, the Bolsheviks were forced into many compromises,
the basic principles of raionirovanie and principle of granting greater autonomy to the re-
pressed peoples had help guide them through the initially diﬃcult period of rule in the North
Caucasus. They had faced rebellions, corrupt local oﬃcials and the reality of severe eco-
nomic constraints, but unlike the Yeltsin administration, were able to stay committed to the
68As we shall see in the third paper, this was shattered by a move to persecute and outlaw religion in
Dagestan, beginning in 1928 and continuing until the end of the Soviet Union.
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guiding principles of policy in creating the administrative framework that would basically
persist until the present day. Of equally great importance was the relative ﬂexibility of the
ideational framework (not something usually associated with the Bolsheviks, which marks
a great misunderstanding of the initial years); Stalin recognised the a purely geographic
approach initially envisaged in the 1913 statement of raionirovanie was inadequate for the
North Caucasus and similarly, the experience of granting too much autonomy to Bashkiria
helped the Bolsheviks to limit subsequent claims, rather than using Bashkiria as the baseline
for other republics.
At this stage, the Bolsheviks could begin to implement their policy of korenizatsiia,
which entailed the attempt to develop and advance the local nationalities to make them
more suitable for the socialist utopia. As Martin has cogently argued, the Bolsheviks had
much in common with later modernisation theorists in terms of believing that there was a
single path to the future and all ethnicities would have to travel this; those backward nations
(of which many were located in the North Caucasus) were therefore deserving of special help
in this regard (Martin, 2001). Table 2.3 shows the extent of illiteracy among the major
ethnicities of the North Caucasus as of the 1926 census:
Table 2.3: Literacy rates of major North Caucasus ethnicities as of 1926 census.
Ethnic group Literacy ratea
Cherkessb 16.9
Karachai 9.2
Kabard 6.8
Balkar 5.3
Ossetians 21.2
Ingush 9.1
Chechens 2.9
a Source is Martin (2001, 127).
b The Adigey were included with the
Cherkess at this stage.
Despite these disspiriting statistics, it cannot be said that the Soviets refused to devote
resources to the problem of education. In Kabardino-Balkaria, for example, a quarter of
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the region's budget was spent on education in 1924-1925 and nearly a third in 1926-1927.
Moreover, the growth in the number of schools was truly impressive, rising from 84 with 3,800
students in 1922-1923 to 169 with 12,128 students in 1925-1926. This represented an increase
in the number of school-age children attending school from 8% to 40%; a ﬁvefold increase in
four years is quite remarkable and is testimony to the commitment of both the central and
local bodies on this front (Áåðáåêîâ, 1958, 95-96). Meanwhile, 1924 marked the publication
of a thrice-weekly newspaper in both the Kabard and Balkar tongues (`Karakhalk' - `The
Poor'), which marked the ﬁrst regular publication in the local languages, although textbooks
and other literature soon followed.
Martin notes that the years of 1924-26 were a period of experimentation for the Bolsheviks
in terms of how to achieve successful advancement of the backward nations; these initial
years were the marked by funding squabbles (particularly over the Cultural Fund), which
soon petered out as the resources for this evaporated (Martin, 2001). This was accompanied
by hiring practices that give strict preference to individuals with knowledge of the local
language, with the North Caucasus Mountaineer obkom ordering institutions in 1924 `not
to accept non-Mountaineers for employment or to hire them only in extreme cases, where
there is no local mountaineer' (Martin, 2001, 135). This is not to say there were no tensions
between the centre and the North Caucasus kraikom on this score; the latter protested
against the decision to begin Ukrainisation in the Kuban region (notwithstanding the fact
that over 60% of the okrug's population were Ukrainian) and blocked the Ukrainisation
of Cossack schools and districts until they were comprehensively overruled by the Central
Committee in December of 1928 following a full-scale investigation of nationalities policy in
the region (Martin, 2001, 285-289).
Given the low levels of literacy among the indigenous populations in the North Caucasus,
compromises were inevitably made on this front. Nonetheless, in Dagestan, the most complex
of all the North Caucasus regions with regards to ethnicity, a complex division of roles along
ethnic lines was developed and maintained until the eve of the Second World War (and
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reinstituted in 1948) (Ware and Kisriev, 2010). Levels of urbanisation were extremely low in
this area and as of 1926 only 18% of the population was considered urban (Baranov, 2005,
257).
Looking back over this period, it is clear that the Soviets were unable to solve all of the
problems inherent in building their multinational state. Such a task was arguably beyond
any authority seeking to maintain the integrity of new Bolshevik state (and subsequently the
Soviet Union). As Martin argues, the raionirovanie of the country, designed to resolve prob-
lems of ethnic identity and overcome Great Russian nationalism, `called forth an enormous
increase in ethnic mobilization, as well as a considerable growth in ethnic conﬂict' (Martin,
2001, 33). This is perhaps an oversimpliﬁcation, for as we have seen in our overview of the
North Caucasus, the ethnic groups needed no real encouragement to ﬁght one another and
dispute the tsarist divisions, especially as these related to the Cossacks and other inogorod-
nie69. Ware, by way of mitigation, notes that `the Soviet Union oﬀered North Caucasians
tangible beneﬁts in terms of security and economic development'; a marked change from
the tsarist administration and an achievement that the post-Soviets would ﬁnd diﬃcult to
replicate (Ware and Kisriev, 2010, 31).
2.4 Post-Soviet Disorder: 1991-1999
If anything, in comparison to the complete chaos facing the Bolsheviks in the weeks after
the collapse of the Russian Empire, the task facing Boris Yeltsin in terms of state- and
nation-building was arguably simpler. The Soviet Union was undeniably weak and tottering
in its ﬁnal years, but it had not been ravaged by the strains of interstate war, nor was the
post-Soviet government faced with the genuine spectre of civil war on a grand scale (the coup
attempt and brief battle with parliament in the spring of 1993, while undeniably serious, were
not really akin to the post-1917 struggles). Again, unlike in 1917, the victors in 1991 enjoyed
69Martin proposes four mechanisms connecting raionirovanie with increased ethnic conﬂict, drawing
strongly on Horowitz's analysis of stigmatisation of certain ethnic groups (Martin, 2001, 56-57).
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widespread international support70 and immediate legitimacy, meaning that the boundaries
of the new Russian Federation were not assailed by any other state. While there was certainly
chaos and the reverse-shift from Communism was daunting, the prospects for state-building
seemed much more favourable than upon the ﬁnal death-throes of the Kerensky government.
With respect to nation-building in the North Caucasus, while the relatively crude attitude
of the Russian Empire towards the North Caucasus had stoked resentment and presented
the Bolsheviks with a relatively simple target against which to aim, the Soviet deportations
of peoples from the North Caucasus during the Great Patriotic War and subsequent issues
surrounding resettlement likewise provided the incoming Yeltsin administration with the
clear opportunity to demonstrate that 1991 marked a clear changing of the guard. Moreover,
economic development in the region had, at best, stalled and there was the potential for great
strides to be taken in the early years of the post-Soviet reality in terms of integrating the
region more fully into the Russian Federation. Finally, the Bolshevik attack on one of the
unique features of life in the North Caucasus, namely a suﬁ strain of Islam, had generated
signiﬁcant opposition and provided the Yeltsin government with the opportunity to make
the type of relatively costless, yet deeply meaningful, gesture upon which rapprochement
and necessary forgetfulness can be founded.
So why is it, as this section will attempt to demonstrate, that the Yeltsin government was
systematically unable to resolve the basic challenges of state- and nation-building in these
ﬁrst few years after the fall of the Soviet Union? More piquantly, why was the performance
of Yeltsin's government markedly worse than the Bolsheviks on this score given that the
latter seemed to face more insuperable obstacles? I argue strongly that the primary reason
was that Yeltsin had no clear conception of how to understand these challenges and no
theoretical foundation from which to proceed. While there were debates over the meaning of
civic and ethnic identity in Russia during the collapse of the Soviet Union and immediately
70The British, for example, did not orchestrate a landing in early-1991 to help bolster the Communists,
as Winston Churchill chose to do in 1917 in support of the Whites (Hitchens, 2004, 17).
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after, particularly in the extraordinary eﬀorts of Valerii Tishkov and his group to craft an
ethnically-neutral civic identity that could take the place of the not-much-loved `Sovietskii',
they were never privileged in the Yeltsin administration and merely added to the confusing
melange of policies that emanated from the Kremlin.
This is not to say that Yeltsin was entirely bereft of a strategy in the North Caucasus,
more that his chosen means for governing the region was woefully inadequate in helping to
bind the region closer to the Russian Federation and central authorities. With the exception
of Chechnya, which is an extraordinary case and of necessity sui generis, we shall see that
Yeltsin's basic plan for the region was to rely on a series of strongmen who could restore order
(by dubious means, in many cases) and eﬀectively bribed to pledge fealty to the integrity of
the Russian Federation. This was achieved through granting signiﬁcant autonomy to these
leaders and providing generous federal subsidies to the North Caucasus regions (many of
which were appropriated by the leaders and their circle for personal enrichment). This may,
as Stephen Hanson argues, have helped the Federation to persist, but Yeltsin's unwillingness
to involve federal authorities as mediators in various ethnic clashes, combined with the
persistently high levels of unemployment, meant that a chance to reintegrate the region
into the new state was squandered. The negative consequences of this are still being felt
today as the North Caucasus is viewed by many Russians (and particularly supporters of the
nationalist factions in the Duma) as a lost cause and nothing more than a drain on resources.
Yet I also claim that Yeltsin and his advisors are not entirely to blame for this state
of aﬀairs. It also reﬂects a serious malaise in contemporary democratic theory, which has
largely failed to advance a compelling and uniﬁed theory for how to grapple with state-
and nation-building. The confusing overlapping nature of rights claims in such a scenario
hamstrings neutral observers and the implicit democratic urge to please the populace creates
irresolvable headaches when the policies at issue touch on irreconcilable claims to indivis-
ible resources. Unlike contemporary economics, as we shall see in the next paper in this
dissertation, which has generated coherent policy proposals to deal with cases of economic
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collapse and transition, democratic theorists have struggled to develop an account that can
integrate the competing demands of respect for autonomy with the necessary infrastructure
to guarantee protection of personal safety and other core rights that are an accepted part of
a liberal community.
2.4.1 The Intervening Period: 1927-1990
While this paper is not the appropriate place to delve into Soviet history, some joining of
the periods between the ending of the last period and the dawn of the Yeltsin era is in
order. This will of necessity be at a high level of generalisation, ignoring some of the subtler
trends in the relationship between Moscow and the North Caucasus, and will be rather light
on changes under Stalin, since these will be covered in more depth in the ﬁnal paper that
constitutes this dissertation as part of the perspective on consolidation.
However, the basic trajectory under Stalin was of increased distrust of the principles
of korenizatsiia and a shift towards collectivisation as a means to achieve the necessary
industrialisation of the country (Martin, 2001). Collectivisation was particularly harsh on
the peoples of the North Caucasus due to the extreme shortage of land suitable for farming
and the forced requisitions resulting in both starvation and uprisings (Conquest, 1970); it was
also the ﬁrst region to undergo full collectivisation (Gokay, 1998). Stalin's response was to
replace many of the local leaders with ethnic Russians and the local cadres were consistently
purged (along with much of the country) as Stalin sought to sideline rivals to his power on
both the right and left (Hanson, 1997; Conquest, 1990; Gokay, 1998). However, this failed
to quell the seeds of resistance in the North Caucasus and during the Great Patriotic War,
the commitment of the Red Army to dealing with the existential threat of Hitler's invasion
provided suﬃcient space for a spate of rebellions to break out across the region, especially as
the Wehrmacht threatened to sweep through the Caucasus (Polian, 2004). Stalin's response
was to instruct the NKVD to engage in forced deportations of ﬁve indigenous peoples of the
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North Caucasus (including the Kalmyks)71, which they did with remarkable eﬃciency and
thoroughness, shifting entire ethnicities to Siberia and Central Asia, on occasion in a matter
of days72. The chief charge lain against all these groups was Nazi collaboration, which had at
best tactical accuracy but was part of an overall Stalinist strategy to neuter `enemy nations'
that were seen as one of the drivers of the limited success of collectivisation (Martin, 2001).
Table 2.4: Times and dates of deportation of the ﬁve Caucasian ethnicities
Ethnic Group Time deported Number deported (est.)a
Chechens 1944 387,229
Ingush 1944 91,250
Karachai January 1943 69,267
Balkars January 1943 37,300
Kalmyks December 1943 91,000 - 131,927
a All ﬁgures in the table are taken from Otto Pohl (1999), with the exception of the high
ﬁgure for the Kalmyks, which is taken from Smith (2006). The latter is more of a
journalistic account and probably less trustworthy, but is included as a point of reference.
These peoples were banned from returning to their ancestral homelands until Khrushchev's
`Secret Speech' in 1956, which denounced the excesses of Stalinism and recognised the depor-
tations as having been unjustiﬁed73 and laid the path for resettlement in 1957-1958. By that
time, many of the original houses and lands of the people had been occupied by neighbours
or others who had been settled there by the central authorities in the aftermath of the de-
portation. Khrushchev, preoccupied by other matters relating to the de-Stalinisation of the
late 1950s (along with the advancement of the space race and developing events in Cuba),
devoted little thought to the complexities of resettlement, and as we shall see, these were
live issues during the collapse of the Soviet Union, reinvigorated by the atrophying nature
71This was not the ﬁrst time the Caucasus had seen widescale population movements; in the years before
and after the ﬁnal conclusion of the Caucasus War in 1864, up to one million indigenous peoples are estimated
to have left; though this was more than oﬀset by the considerable immigration of Russians and Cossacks to
the area (especially in the Kuban region) (Khuranov, 1984, 150-151).
72The best sources for details on the deportations and subsequent resettlements are Polian (2004);
Otto Pohl (1999), both of which draw on tremendous amounts of archival research to paint the wrench-
ing pictures of the details of these events.
73Khrushchev decried them as having been `in no way demanded by military considerations' (...`âûñåëåíèå
íèêàê íå äèêòîâàëîñü âîåííûìè ñîîáðàæåíèßìè') (Khrushchev, February 25th, 1956).
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of central power. There were no major changes to the administration of the North Caucasus
until the ﬁnal years of Gorbachev's rule (and thus the ﬁnal years of the Soviet Union), at
which point we can resume our story by considering the debacle of the Yeltsin period.
2.4.2 Yeltsin and Charismatic Confusion
Boris Yeltsin, who would lead the charge of independent states straining to break free from
the Soviet Union, was almost the antithesis of Vladimir Lenin. While Lenin was the rare
individual who combined a passion for theoretical advancements with practical concerns,
Yeltsin was almost exclusively focused on the latter74. An engineer by training, he was
constantly searching for improvements in his ﬁrst jobs linked to construction and took more
satisfaction from visiting the physical sites than overseeing bureaucratic meetings (Aron,
2000, 40). While he had some loosely connected ideas concerning the value of democracy and
local autonomy, they were poorly articulated and broke down rapidly under the stresses in
the North Caucasus75. Furthermore, the absence of coherent democratic models meant that
in contradistinction to the economic sphere, there were few readily implementable guides
that Yeltsin (or a team of advisors) could implement. The combination of both of these
factors entailed the early years of the post-Soviet experience in the North Caucasus were a
damaging morass of failed policies and poorly-judged interventions.
We began the preceding section with a sustained discussion of the relationship between
various Marxist interpretations of nationalism and the development of Soviet policy, but
74Yeltsin provoked the ire of the Moscow intelligentsia within a year of arriving in the capital by threatening
to close many of the research institutes on the basis that they were not contributing anything to society
(Aron, 2000, 146).
75Yeltsin in fact refers directly to the early Soviet period in his View from the Kremlin during his recounting
of the negotiation of the Belovezhskoe Accords, noting that `The Bolsheviks managed to suppress all the
nationalist uprisings [in 1917-1918], forcing peasants and soldiers into a civil war, although the revolution
was supposedly spontaneously proletarian. With an iron ﬁst, the Soviets strangled the liberation struggles,
executed the national intelligentsia, and dispersed national parties' (Yeltsin, 1994, 112). He sees this as a
break with the troubled past, as Russia ﬁnally freeing itself from imperial commitments and ceasing to play
'the role of policeman in the resolution of ethnic conﬂicts' (Yeltsin, 1994, 113). If these were his genuine
feelings at the time, they were to be sorely disappointed as the Russian state would be forced to don the
uniform to quell its own internal problems in the Caucasus throughout his presidency.
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it is almost impossible to mirror that for the post-Soviet case. This is not because the
problems of nation-building were any less severe76 for Boris Yeltsin and his new government,
or because the vestiges of the Soviet state were more functional than the network of Soviets
in 1917 (although this latter part was true), but rather because Yeltsin was not particularly
interested in questions of theoretical debate and abstract musing. Thus, in Timothy Colton's
extraordinary biography of Yeltsin, drawing on vast previously-unpublished material, there
is barely any mention of Yeltsin being involved in a theoretical discussion; his exemplary
work-ethic and ingenuity for solving problems (especially in construction, where he was
certainly primus inter pares in Sverdlovsk, then Moscow) shine through, but until very late
in the day there is little to suggest that Yeltsin has devoted time or energy to thinking
seriously about remaking the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) into a
functioning, coherent state in the aftermath of the Soviet Union.
This is not to say that he had given no thought to the nationalities question. Colton
notes a schematic sketch of a potential division of the RSFSR made by Yeltsin prior to his
move to Moscow that divided Russia into seven or eight republics with the idea of making
it self-suﬃcient from the USSR (Colton, 2008, 99)77. His program for the 1988 Congress
of People's Deputies stated `All peoples of the USSR must have real economic, political,
and cultural autonomy', although it did not elaborate further on precisely what he meant
by that (Aron, 2000, 263)78. However, the most accurate description of Yeltsin's general
stance in these years is arguably delivered by Colton in his summation of Yeltsin's `secret
76Although in at least one sense the situation was simpler; the Yeltsin government had no desire to change
the administrative system established by the Soviets, with the exception of the separation of Chechnya and
Ingushetia which proceeded with a minimal level of federal interference due to the situation in the former
republic.
77Somewhat ironically, something approximating Yeltsin's scheme would be implemented by Vladimir
Putin through the latter's creation of federal districts in 2000. This was largely in response to the perceived
absence of federal control in the regions that was the product of Yeltsin's policies throughout the 1990s.
78He did, in an interview with an Estonian paper, suggest that `The Republics are primary...The opinion
of a people is primary and so is that of a Republic which represents this people', implying that his remarks
were directed towards the Union Republics rather than a more far-reaching claim for all ethnicities, although
given that Estonia had recently declared sovereignty, this may be one of the countless examples of Yeltsin
perfectly crafting his response to his audience (Aron, 2000, 265).
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speech' before the Politburo in October 1987 during which Yeltsin openly attacks Gorbachev
and (by implication) the Soviet system. Colton suggests that Yeltsin was not `adhering to
a well-deﬁned program or set of ideas...[his speech] was grounded more in an almost feline
instinct for the moment than in ideology' (Colton, 2008, 143).
By 1990 and his decision to stand for the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies, Yeltsin's
programme was somewhat better articulated. Colton notes that at this juncture he called
for the RSFSR to have `an elective president, a full-time parliament, a constitutional court,
a state bank, an academy of sciences, a territorial militia, and multiple political parties'
(Colton, 2008, 179). While this would have required signiﬁcant changes to the Soviet Con-
stitution, it highlighted the anomalous situation of the RSFSR lacking these institutions in
comparison to the other Union Republics, with the call for an elected president and multi-
party elections representing his nascent commitment to democracy. On August 5th, 1990
he would make perhaps his most famous (and problematic) statement on the nationalities
question facing the Soviet Union (and, by implication, the new Russian Federation), seeking
Tatar and Bashkir support (and apparently not having read his early Soviet history on the
problems with Bashkiria), he pronounced to the peoples of these republics that they should
`take as much sovereignty as you can swallow!' (Colton, 2008, 186). This was an incredibly
piece of political theatre, garnering support from the ethnic regions of the RSFSR against
the behemoth of the Soviet Union. However, the lack of ﬁrm foundations underlying it would
ultimately cause serious problems for Yeltsin and his team over the next few years as they
struggled to build independent Russia. It is undeniably true that Yeltsin had a precocious
gift for improvisation and problem-solving; these had driven his rise in the Soviet appara-
tus and would deﬁne his presidency, but such gifts were tempered by a failure to develop
coherent policies that would prove to be extremely damaging, most notably in the North
Caucasus. Reﬂecting on his memories of the early stages of reform, Yeltsin himself suggests
that `Maybe I was in fact mistaken in choosing an attack on the economic front as the chief
direction, leaving government reorganization to perpetual compromises and political games '
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(Yeltsin, 1994, 127; emphasis mine).
I have argued in an earlier section that part of the problem facing Yeltsin and his team
was a reﬂection of the crisis in liberal theory in terms of the inability of scholars to articulate
a framework that would lend itself to coherent policy-making. The point here is not that
Yeltsin would ever have been a strident proponent of such a structure for his nationality and
state-building policy; his personality was not predisposed to such overarching commitments
and his political instincts would have prevented him from strapping himself too ﬁrmly to the
mast of any long-term programme. Rather the impact was more subtle and can only be seen
in comparison with the economic sphere, where a close-knit group of young economists were
able (for the most part) to convince Yeltsin of the value and importance of shock therapy
in avoiding a return to the days of communism and centralised planning. The absence of an
equivalent body of theory eﬀectively undermined the position of Yeltsin's liberal advisors on
nationalities policy; Emil Pain and Valerii Tishkov had no internationally-recognised body
of theory on which to ground their proposals and I argue this made it far simpler for Yeltsin
to move them aside in favour of a more hard-minded set of advisers that contributed to the
chaos in the North Caucasus in general and Chechnya in particular. As we shall see below,
the conﬂict in Chechnya would supervene on the situation in the entire North Caucasus
through spreading a general sense of disorder and federal neglect, though this should not
obscure the general chaos in the region that was taking place regardless of the situation in
Chechnya.
Scholars are near-unanimous when it comes to their judgement of the early Yeltsin years
in terms of the absence of a coherent framework. Yoi Herrera describes the period from
1991-1993 as `a Hobbesian every-region for itself state of anarchy that exacerbated regional
inequality' and argues that `[t]he lack of an established conceptual structure allowed for the
emergence of novel categories of regional politics and economic thinking' (Herrera, 2005,
143). She runs through the confusion of this period with regards to regional-centre politics
and the ever-changing institutional framework under Yeltsin in the early years: `throughout
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1992, contradictory understandings of inter-regional and center-regional economic relations
proliferated' (Herrera, 2005, 155). Gayle Lapidus similarly criticises the central government
for the `ad hoc, personlized, and improvisational policymaking process exhibiting little pro-
fessionalism' and suggests that this led directly to the Chechen conﬂict (Lapidus, 1999, 56).
Nikolai Petrov and Darrell Slider note that `Yeltsin did not take the goal of developing fed-
eral principles seriously', thus exposing his nascent federal framework to the whims of local
demands and legislative patches (Petrov and Slider, 2007, 77).
However, this is not to say that all of them agree with the argument of this paper that
this absence was intensely problematic. Stephen Hanson, for example, oﬀers a comparison of
the collapse of the Soviet Union with the persistence of the Russian Federation and suggests
that, `the peaceful breakup of the Soviet Union can be understood as the distinctive product
of Marxism-Leninism's delegitimation within a liberal world order, whereas the absence
of a coherent ideological basis for Yeltsin's regime has ironically made full secession from
the Russian Federation much more diﬃcult to legitimate and mobilize' (Hanson, 1999, 18).
Hanson believes that Yeltsin's combination of `coercive and accommodative strategies' were
essential in holding together the federation and the fact that `Yeltsin's regime lacks ideological
underpinnings makes it harder to rally people against it' (Hanson, 1999, 33). Gerald Easter
advances a similar argument in his work on building ﬁscal capacity, suggesting that Yeltsin
used his relationships with regional leaders to oﬀset the crisis in the centre. Thus, `the
state resembled a medieval mosaic of competing political and economic ﬁefdoms, in which
governing capabilities often appeared to be enfeebled...But in granting concessions, Yeltsin
did not give up the central state's ultimate claim on their use' (Easter, 2006, 23). Taking a
slightly diﬀerent angle, Kathryn Stoner-Weiss suggests that the actions of the central state
were largely irrelevant during the initial years because the regions had agglomerated such a
signiﬁcant degree of power in the late Soviet period (Stoner-Weiss, 2006).
Thus there is suﬃcient debate over the role and value of Yeltsin's reliance on pragmatism
to make this section of the paper valuable (though everyone agrees about the absence of a
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coherent framework). We should also note that the political scientists above are interested in
the general nature of centre-periphery relations without much focus on the North Caucasus.
In that sense, the North Caucasus is the most demanding test for Hanson et al.'s claims that
Yeltsin's approach was either beneﬁcial or irrelevant to solving the problems of reinstituting
central authority and overcoming the persistent problems of underdevelopment in the region.
As with the Soviet case, there are more than enough events and personalities in the North
Caucasus during the initial post-Soviet years to ﬁll a monograph. We do not have suﬃcient
space in this paper to do justice to the degree of complexity, but we do not have to delve
into all the details to present a convincing case that Yeltsin's policies were inconsistent and
problematic, lacking any genuine overall structure. With the exception of Chechnya, which
was sui generis, the basic strategy for Yeltsin and the federal government was to attempt
to distance themselves from local politics in the North Caucasus, relying on strongmen to
run the regions as they saw ﬁt. While Yeltsin initially installed a relatively liberal team of
advisors on nationalities policy, headed by Emil Pain, the events in Chechnya drew him to
a more uncompromising set of ministers who were simultaneously unwilling to compromise
on the question of Chechen autonomy and uninterested in resolving other problems in the
North Caucasus.
We should note that Yeltsin's initial support among the people of the North Caucasus
was certainly higher than that of the Bolsheviks. In the elections for the Presidency of
the RSFSR in June 1991, which took place in the death throes of the Soviet Union, he
polled remarkably well among residents of the region, with the marked exception of the
North Ossetians who favoured Ryzhkov. As is the case for all electoral results from this
region (with the exception of Krasnodar), these ﬁgures should be treated with some degree
of suspicion in terms of their ability to represent the feelings of the general populace, rather
than inﬂuential ﬁgures in society. Nevertheless, the fact that this suggests that Yeltsin did
enjoy support among such ﬁgures is in itself testimony to the fact that the situation was far
more promising for him than the Bolsheviks.
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Table 2.5: Results from the RSFSR Presidential Election, June 1991
Region Yeltsin vote (%)a
Adigeya 46.38
Dagestan 65.86
Checheno-Ingushetiab 89
Kabardino-Balkaria 63.88
Karachaevo-Cherkessia 61.76
Krasnodar 45.89
North Ossetia 27.34
a Source: Orttung (2000) for all regions except Checheno-
Ingushetia.
b Soulemainov (2007, 85).
In large part, support for Yeltsin reﬂected the fact that the major ethnic groups were
extremely unhappy with their position in the Soviet Union by the time of its dissolution.
In April 1991 the RSFSR passed a Law on the Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples, calling
for the restitution of territory to all who were repressed by the Soviet Union, which gave
hope to the groups who had suﬀered deportation under Stalin but was seriously threatening
to the Ossetians, who had occupied large parts of the Prigorodnyi raion on the outskirts of
Vladikavkaz following the forced removal of the Ingush. Yeltsin's calls for greater autonomy
were perceived as extremely dangerous in this regard by the population of North Ossetia,
which partly explains the low levels of support for his candidacy. We shall have more on the
chaos in Ingushetia below.
As we have mentioned above, Yeltsin's initial team of advisors on nationalities policy
was relatively liberal (certainly compared to what was to come), with Emil Pain and Valerii
Tishkov occupying prominent roles in his administration.
Chechnya is the archetypal case for those seeking to establish the extremely negative
implications of the ﬂux and uncertainty of the Yeltsin period in centre-regional relations
and is the North Caucasus republic that has received by far the greatest attention in the
literature as a consequence of having seen two bloody wars fought on its territory. This is
understandable given the interest in civil conﬂict and counterinsurgency in political science,
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but also unfortunate since the other republics provide valuable information on the extent to
which Yeltsin's pragmatism undermined their development and generated fertile ground for
a spreading Islamist insurgency. Nonetheless, it is impossible to ignore Chechnya, although
this paper will not cover even a fraction of the vast literature on the conﬂicts between the
federal troops and local ﬁghters (Lyall, 2008, 2009; Zhukov, 2010). We shall, however, provide
a brief overview of the major events and the dynamics leading up to the ﬁrst conﬂict in 1994.
The All-National Congress of the Chechen People approved a Declaration of Independence
in November 1990 that made no reference to either the USSR or the RSFSR and this was
clariﬁed by Dzhokhar Dudayev, a former general in the USSR air force, who declared the
formation of the independent state of Chechnya as head of the National Congress of the
Chechen People in November 199079 (Soulemainov, 2007), following Tatarstan which had also
declared independence in 1990 under the leadership of Mintimer Shaimiev. It is worth noting
that Dudayev and the National Congress strongly supported Yeltsin against the putschists
and Soulemainov notes an `explicit kinship' between Yeltsin and Dudayev in terms of their
desire to overthrow the structures of the Soviet Union (Soulemainov, 2007, 85).
From 1991 to 1994, Chechnya eﬀectively functioned as an independent state, notwith-
standing some disastrous Russian attempts to overthrow Dudayev and internal disputes over
the latter's authority. These attempts, ranging from the humiliating retreat of spetsnaz in
November 1991, to the failure of a subsequent mission to reach Chechnya, alienated large
sections of the Chechen population and served to strengthen Dudayev's hold on power (Soule-
mainov, 2007). Dzhabrail Gakaev, one of the pre-eminent experts on Chechnya, goes as far
as arguing that absent Yeltsin's declaration of a state of emergency in Chechnya in November
1991, `the chances of the Dudayev group holding on to power were practically nil' (Gakaev,
2005, 22). Dudayev was by no means impregnable; the northern part of Chechnya, which
had large numbers of ethnic Russians, was opposed to the declaration of sovereignty and
79The ﬁnal declaration of sovereignty and separation from the Russian Federation would occur almost
exactly one year later, following some ill-advised manoeuvring by Ruslan Khasbulatov, who had been sys-
tematically sidelined by Dudayev (Soulemainov, 2007).
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Dudayev made few friends by dissolving the Parliament and then the Constitutional Court
in April, 1992. Moreover, the provisional Chechen government proved equally as inept as its
federal counterpart in rebuilding the shattered Chechen economy, with wage arrears begin-
ning in mid-1991 for state workers (Soulemainov, 2007). Russo-Chechen talks that seemed
promising in 1992 and 1993 ultimately led nowhere as Moscow's oﬀer to Chechnya of a special
status within the federation was rejected.
In late 1993, under pressure as a result of the unexpected performance of Vladimir Zhiri-
novsky's hardline nationalist LDPR in parliamentary elections, Yeltsin replaced his liberal
advisors on nationality politics with a more uncompromising set of personnel. Chief among
these was Sergei Shakhray, who seemed to have a personal animus against Chechnya (he
was a Terek Cossack) and pushed Yeltsin to exert greater pressure on the republic, openly
supporting alternatives to Dudayev, which eﬀectively torpedoed any chance they may have
had of gaining local support. The ﬁrst Chechen War would begin in December 1994 as the
Russian authorities had failed to generate suﬃcient political opposition to Dudayev, not least
due to the ineptitude of their chosen candidates (Soulemainov, 2007). It would conclude in
August of 1996, with little achieved besides an agreement to defer discussions of Chechnya's
status until December 2001 (Soulemainov, 2007). This was, in the words of Matthew Ange-
lista, `Yeltsin's war - to win, to lose, or to avoid altogether, if he had so chosen' (Evangelista,
2002, 11). The period from 1996 to the second declaration of war in late 1999 was overseen
by the Presidency of Aslan Maskhadov and an uneasy modus vivendi with federal author-
ities, who largely ignored the Chechen problem until Putin decided to renew hostilities (a
topic for the third paper).
While Chechnya is the classic example of Yeltsin's failure and inconsistency with regard
to governance in the North Caucasus, there is a reasonable argument to be made that the
situation was so hopeless as to be largely beyond the remit of any possible government in
the early post-Soviet years. This is not to excuse the mistakes or petulance of many of the
decisions and the outcome of war should certainly have been avoided, but Yeltsin was dealt
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an unenviable hand. We have seen that the Soviets similarly struggled to impose order in
Chechnya for the ﬁrst few years of their rule, so it seems reasonable to argue that this is not
the best comparison if we are seeking to argue that Yeltsin's lack of a coherent framework
was disastrous.
Fortunately for the argument of this paper (but not for the people involved), the states on
either side of Chechnya provide a vivid example of the extremely problematic consequences
of the absence of a consistent policy in the North Caucasus. Both of these republics are
excellent examples of the extent to which Yeltsin and his administrations were content to
allow local politicians to run the republics with markedly limited federal interference, beyond
the disbursement of funds to help the struggling administrations. While to some extent this
allowed space for creative solutions to ongoing issues, it also failed to generate any sense of
fealty to the central authorities and limited the understanding of situations at the federal
level, both of which resulted in storing signiﬁcant problems for the future.
Ingushetia, which lies to the immediate west of Chechnya and was long included in the
same territorial organisation, ﬁnally severed ties with Chechnya in 1992 following the decision
of the Chechen parliament to restore the 1934 borders80. It was one of the more benighted
republics, lacking any real industry or economic advantages that could help it develop; while
it has the potential for oil and gas extraction, the crippling lack of capital investment entailed
these were largely unrealised dreams.
However, Ingushetia's most obvious problem stems from the inﬂux of refugees, both
from Chechnya (in 2001 up to a third of the population was estimated to be refugees) but
also from the Prigorodnyi conﬂict, which started in April 1991 and concluded in October
1992 with 700 estimated deaths. This conﬂict is between Ingushetia and North Ossetia and
concerns the land surrounding Vladikavkaz that was occupied following the deportation of
80This followed a petition in 1988-89 by the Ingush people clamouring for independence. As Orttung notes,
this was the one territorial resolution in the North Caucasus that was resolved without bloodshed (Orttung,
2000, 131). Somewhat ironically, it was also the sole instance where the Russian federal authorities were
completely irrelevant given the quasi-independent nature of Chechnya at this juncture.
118
the Ingush. While 2,000 federal troops were dispatched to quell the ﬁghting in 1992 and
a tentative peace accord was signed in 1997, Yeltsin largely relied on Ruslan Aushev, the
President of Ingushetia, to attempt to restore the badly frayed relations between Aushev's
territory and North Ossetia. Aushev also played a critical role in mediating between Yeltsin
and Aslan Maskhadov and was strongly in favour of avoiding conﬂict in Chechnya (largely
for this reason he was encouraged to resign by Putin at the start of the latter's presidency).
If the Yeltsin administration had implemented a coherent plan for economic development
in the region that could have lowered the extraordinary high levels of unemployment (see
table 2.6), this could have served to lower the demands on Aushev and generated some level
of goodwill towards the central government. However, rather than commit to a long-term
plan, the Yeltsin government bizarrely declared it a oﬀ-shore zone (oﬀshornaya zona) in
July, 1994, with huge tax beneﬁts for those registering companies there81 (Freedland, 2000,
94). By the end of Yeltsin's second term, Ingushetia was the poorest republic in the country
and could only cover 12% of expenditures from its own revenue base (Orttung, 2000, 130).
The other side of the dispute, North Ossetia, has also struggled with issues of development
and had its own refugee crisis, as fellow-ethnics from South Ossetia ﬂed the Georgian Civil
War in the early 1990s and settled in the republic, further exacerbating the intense issue of
overpopulation (North Ossetia was the most densely populated territory in Southern Russia
as of the 2000 census (Dzidzoev, 2010)). The ﬁrst President of the republic was Aksarbek
Galazov, who was acting head until his formal election in 1994. He took a strong line against
the resolution of the conﬂict with Ingushetia and notably limited progress was made until
his replacement in 1998 by Aleksandr Dzasokhov (Orttung, 2000), who signed an agreement
on refugee repatriation with Aushev in March 1999, the latest of a series of attempted
resolutions to problems in the North Caucasus in which the central authorities have been
largely a bystander. Galazov also oversaw the stalling of development in the republic, leaving
81This cartoonish strategy of having an oﬀshore zone located on the periphery of Russia would seem absurd
were it not for the equally strange accounts of business relationships in Alena Ledeneva's research (Ledeneva,
2006).
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Dzasokhov with limited room for manoeuvre and a large part of the latter's electoral appeal
was his business background and ability to extract further federal subsidies.
The situation in Dagestan, which lies to the east of Chechnya, provides another example
of central irrelevance. The former Soviet rulers realigned themselves using tribal and ethnic
claims (just as Bates would predict (Bates, 1983)) and then moved to craft a constitution and
electoral law that would respect ethnic boundaries and resolve many of the potential problems
of order by a careful, quasi-consociational arrangement. The central actors are complete
absent from this tale and barely merit a mention in a recent history of the region; Ware
and Kisriev note that their ﬁrst intervention in Dagestani politics comes in September 1998
(supporting the re-election of Magomedov to the Presidency in Dagestan), just over a year
before Yeltsin would leave oﬃce (Ware and Kisriev, 2010)82. Ware and Kisriev argue that
this attitude characterised the federal government's `chronic failure to understand Dagestan'
following the reduction in central aid and inevitable economic and developmental problems
that followed from this (Ware and Kisriev, 2010, 140).
Aslan Dzharimov was elected President of Adigeya in January 1992 as a result of a repeat
ballot; the parliament had 100 deputes, of whom in the ﬁrst election 49 were ethnic Russians,
45 Adigey and the remainder from diﬀerent nationalities (Dzharimov, 1995, 33). Adigeya had
been upgraded to the status of a republic in June 1991 (Dzharimov, 1995). Dzharimov claims
that work on a new Constitution for Adigeya began in March 1992 and originally included
the contentious phrase `sovereign democratic state' (Dzharimov, 1995, 39). However, it
seems that the ﬁght over the federal-level Russian Constitution was suﬃcient to force a
reconsideration of this statement and that by the time it was approved by the legislature
in March 1995, this language had been expunged (Dzharimov, 1995). While Adigeya has
relatively high levels of mineral resources, it is sorely lacking in infrastructure, although
Dzharimov did push some degree of land privatisation and economic reforms, helped by the
82Ware does note that the local leaders were always adept at skimming oﬀ federal funding for their own
purposes, but this is hardly a convincing case of reasserting Muscovite control over Makhachkala (Ware and
Kisriev, 2010, 44).
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insulated nature of Adigeya (it is entirely contained within Krasnodar krai) (Orttung, 2000).
This relative stability explains the consistently lower levels of unemployment, but Adigeya
has not and does not receive much attention relative to events further east.
The ﬁnal republics in the North Caucasus, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachaevo-Cherkessia
do not deviate from this general pattern. The former continues the theme of the non-Chechen
republics and was dominated by an ethnic Kabardin (Valerii Kokov) throughout the 1990s.
This is perhaps no surprise given Kokov's strong support for the territorial integrity of the
Russian Federation, although he took an extremely uncompromising stance on the issue of
repatriation of Balkar land, which contributed to serious (and unnecessary) tensions be-
tween the Kabards and the Balkars that was another legacy of the Soviet deportations. The
Balkars consistently looked to Moscow to act as an intermediary in the dispute, but the fed-
eral authorities ignored Balkar demands and left the governing of the republic to Kokov, who
outlawed the main Balkar political party and the Congress of Balkar People in 1996 following
the latter's declaration of Balkar sovereignty (Meskhidze, 2008). Karachaevo-Cherkessia has
been calmer than the other republics (with the exception of Adigeya), but it has also faced
separatist claims, with the Karachai, Cherkess and Cossack populations all clamouring for
their own state at the end of 1991. This republic was the last of all the Russian republics to
hold elections; Yeltsin appointed the Communist-era leader, Vladimir Khubiev, to the post
and he delayed elections until 1999, at which point widespread protests ﬁnally forced his
hand (Orttung, 2000). Yeltsin cannot be faulted for desiring the initial degree of stability
aﬀorded by Khubiev, but the absence of federal pressure on Khubiev allowed him to continue
in the post and avoid serious oversight, storing signiﬁcant problems of interethnic relations
for the 1999 elections.
Alongside these ongoing problems of order, unemployment would remain stubbornly high
in the North Caucasus throughout the entire Yeltsin presidency, underlining the absence of
a coherent developmental plan to assist the region in moving away from its dependence
on agriculture and the reliance on informal channels to acquire the necessities to maintain
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a subsistence-level of standard of living. The fact that these jobs were typically under
the control of republican or ethnic leadership meant that impetus for change was stiﬂed
throughout the region (though Kabardino-Balkaria provided a heartening example with the
defeat of Kokov). There is little doubt that the violence and instability contributed to
these extraordinary problems, although even in the western North Caucasus the levels were
alarming by the end of the Yeltsin presidency. Note that as with much of the data from
the North Caucasus, these ﬁgures should be viewed with a somewhat sceptical eye, but
nonetheless the general pattern seems clear and is entirely consistent with the general policy
of neglect that marked the various Yeltsin administrations' attitude to the North Caucasus.
Table 2.6: Unemployment rates for the North Caucasus region
Unemployment (%)
Region 1992a 1994b 1995b 1997b 1999b
Adigeya 7.7 12.7 11.7 12.3 19.6
Dagestan 12.5 14.7 22.3 28.9 30.4
Ingushetia 45.2 58.2 51.8
Kabardino-Balkaria 9.4 14.8 14.7 17.7 25.1
Karachaevo-Cherkessia 6.0 11.9 24 18.9 21.4
Krasnodar 6.0 7.8 8.8 16.5 15.2
North Ossetia 2.3 2.7 24.0 22.2 32.0
Chechnya No data
a Orttung (2000).
b Data taken from the Goskomstat annual publication for the relevant year.
Thus we see that for the Yeltsin administration, a costly form of pragmatism was the
guiding principle for governing the North Caucasus in the 1990s. While this was perhaps of
great importance in the initial period of separation from the Soviet Union in terms of securing
the loyalty of the ﬁssiparous republics, the failure to make a serious eﬀort to reclaim the
autonomy granted entailed that the cycle of corruption and violence continued in the region.
In particular, the reliance on local hardmen and the unwillingness to intervene directly in
a number of local conﬂicts undermined any attempt to build central authority, although in
reality this was always going to be diﬃcult after the disastrous war in Chechnya. Yeltsin's
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general lack of interest in developing an ideational framework, combined with the failure
of any members of his team on nationalities to articulate one, was a major driver of this
unfortunate result and continues to aﬀect both the low developmental trajectories of the
republics in the North Caucasus and the slow spread of radical terrorism in the region.
2.5 Conclusion
Ïîíèêíè ñíåæíîþ ãëàâîé,
Ñìèðèñü, Êàâêàç: èäåò Åðìîëîâ!
Bow your snowy head,
Submit, O Caucasus: Ermolov approaches!
Pushkin, The Prisoner of the Caucasus (1822)
So wrote Russia's greatest poet in a paean to the general who was instrumental in securing
the obeisance of the Caucasus to the Russian Empire. The imperial strategy of governing
the region was harsh and unremitting, relying almost entirely on force of arms and alliances
with the few ethnicities who sought the certainty of Russian rule compared to the crushing
uncertainties of raids and blood feuds that had marked the region for centuries. By the
time the imperial hold on the region was secured, in 1864, the great cracks in the ediﬁce of
rule had started to emerge; the serfs had been liberated in 1861 and the Crimean War had
ended in near-humiliation for the Russian forces. Cruelty to non-Russian ethnicities was also
beginning to cause serious problems of disorder and the ﬂames of revolution that had been
ignited by the Decembrists in 1825 continued their slow burn throughout the great Russian
cities and abroad.
These factors would ultimately unite in the great conﬂagration of 1917, a revolution that
entrusted the keys to a moribund state to a group of revolutionaries with little experience in
governing and facing both the German army and an impending Civil War that would funda-
mentally alter the nature of societal relations in Russia. As we have emphasised throughout
this paper, state- and nation-building are hard irrespective of the political and social situa-
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tion and are processes that are best achieved over the course of decades, ideally with some
separation between the two. Rarely can a situation have been less favourable than that facing
the Bolsheviks in the early days of 1918, with the embers of Revolution growing colder and
the magnitude of the task ahead becoming evident. Perhaps no region of the country was
less promising than the North Caucasus, a region in which the Bolsheviks enjoyed at best
marginal levels of support and which, thanks to the Cossack population, provided signiﬁcant
support for Denikin and his White forces during the Civil War. Even those groups who
opposed Denikin did not look kindly on the Bolsheviks beyond a marriage of convenience,
seeking to protect their nascent autonomy from Muscovite or Petersburg intrusion.
By way of contrast, the situation facing Boris Yeltsin and his administration in December
1991 at the expiration of the Soviet Union, while undeniably diﬃcult, was not as desperate
as the equivalent set of circumstances seventy three years earlier. For a start, there was no
genuine threat of civil war and whilst there were secessionist rumblings in Tatarstan and
Chechnya along with a number of unresolved ethnic disputes as part of the legacy of the
Soviet Union, the prospects of open conﬂict were limited. The North Caucasus republics
were consistently among the poorest with regard to the other territories of the Russian
Federation, but compared to their desperate state in 1917, basic infrastructure and human
capital were there and potentially ready to be invested in productive industries.
Given all this, why do we see the relatively dramatic divergence in establishment of cen-
tral authority and commitment to modernising and developing the North Caucasus between
the two, and not in the direction we should a priori expect? This paper has strongly argued
that the crucial diﬀerence between the two periods was the presence of an ideological frame-
work possessed by the Bolsheviks that allowed them to navigate the initial years of intense
confusion and begin to implement their policies centred on developing the repressed peoples
of the Russian Empire and generating some institutional structures to safeguard their au-
tonomy. We have seen that a major spur for the development of Bolshevik thinking was the
work of Bruno Bauer and his belief in the importance of territorial autonomy for distinc-
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tive ethnicities; Stalin adopted this with minor modiﬁcations in his important theoretical
contributions to the nationalities debate and was able to implement them in virtue of his po-
sition as Commissar of Nationalities. Unlike in future periods, the Bolshevik framework was
also suﬃciently ﬂexible in these early years to allow for modiﬁcations in the face of serious
challenges: the shift of raionirovanie to include ethnicity was a critical part of establishing
the governing apparatus in the North Caucasus, as was the commitment to allowing for the
continuing practise of Sharia law, especially in the eastern part of the region.
Yeltsin and his administrations lacked any grounding principles for governance beyond an
ethereal and rapidly-compromised commitment to democracy and the initial commitment to
regional autonomy generated a thoroughly problematic precedent that Yeltsin was unwilling
to revoke. His initial administration had a somewhat liberal attitude towards the North
Caucasus, although this was more realistically characterised as thoroughly laissez-faire, with
the instalment of Soviet-era functionaries as leaders of various republics in the region and an
absence of concern for brewing interethnic crises. The Prigorodnyi crisis is the most obvious,
but the unwillingness to become involved in the Balkar-Kabard conﬂict, which should have
been resolvable with limited federal involvement, is equally compelling. The deterioration
of relations with Chechnya opened the way for a harder group of advisors, dominated by
power ministers such as Pavel Grachev of Defence, to advocate for an ill-advised military
intervention that had knock-on and destabilising eﬀects in the entire North Caucasus region,
while simultaneously ignoring the crippling unemployment rates that benighted the republics
(and continue to do so).
I have no wish to elide the problems of Bolshevik rule. As we have seen, violence was an
undeniable part of their armoury for re-establishing authority and the chaotic deportation
of the Cossacks in the initial years reﬂected both a prejudice against oppressor nations and
an inability to restrain the local actors who professed nominal allegiance to their cause. The
founding of the Cheka and establishment of local branches along with the subsequent policy
of collectivisation generated widespread discontent and set the stage for the subsequent
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deportations of entire peoples from the region (more on this in the third paper).
However, the basic point of this paper is that we must learn to take ideational factors
more seriously in our discourse of political (and social) science. Material factors are largely
mute when it comes to helping us understand why the Bolsheviks and Yeltsin administrations
varied when faced with markedly similar decisions. There is much more work to be done
on the North Caucasus, which is a fascinating and varied region that has been inexcusably
neglected. But at this juncture, this paper (and writer) must fall silent.
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Chapter 3
Not all Frames are Created Equal: A
Comparison of Early Soviet and
Post-Soviet Economic Policy
0A draft of this paper was presented at MPSA, 2012. I thank participants at the conference and members
of the Comparative Politics Workshop and the Postcommunist Politics and Economics Workshop at Harvard
University for comments and suggestions. I also thank Asad Ahmed for help and guidance and Sabeel
Rahman for advice and literature recommendations.
Introduction
If root-and-branch economic reform is one degree removed from the complexity of state-
and nation-building in the chaos of post-imperial environments, it is no less transformative
in terms of the impact on the daily lives of the aﬀected citizenry and has similarly large
implications for social welfare in a country. Dramatic shifts in the ownership of the means
of production and huge changes in the regulations on the use of capital require time and
patience for their successful realisation, as old customs and exchange relations must be
unlearned and new habits and consumption patterns formed. However, as we have seen in
the ﬁrst paper, time is in extremely short supply in such situations1. Large parts of the
citizenry understandably grow quickly frustrated with the fall in living standards that often
accompany such changes2, putting the new masters of the economy under great pressure
to demonstrate tangible results or oﬀer a convincing justiﬁcation for the slow progress by
touting the bright future that awaits following the successful negotiation of the transitional
period. While making a clean break with the past and preventing costly reversions are
understandably considered to be of incalculable importance for the new government, the
process of deep structural reforms also places huge demands on the population to absorb these
changes and adjust to the new economic realities, which often require wholesale adjustments
to many aspects of life.
As the events of the past few years have demonstrated, most societies ﬁnd even relatively
minor tweaks to the structures of their economy to be overwhelming and extraordinarily
painful, triggering widespread societal protest and the fall of governments. These adjust-
ments generate claims that the basic social contract between the people and their elected
masters has been violated and that basic precepts of justice involving predictability and
1Stephen Hanson wrote a fascinating book on the attempts of the Bolsheviks to alter the nature of time
and inculcate a `revolutionary' understanding that would allow them to accomplish more in short periods,
but ultimately this proved to be a quixotic endeavour (Hanson, 1997).
2Famously characterised by Adam Przeworski's J-curve (Przeworski, 1991), though this was modiﬁed
in an important fashion by Joel Hellman to take account of the political process and the role of `winners'
(Hellman, 1998).
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certainty of the relation between action and consequence are being sacriﬁced for economic
expediency3. Moreover, the majority of developed countries have arrived at a basic consensus
on the appropriate structuring of economic relations and it has been a number of years since
any genuinely new project for economic policy has been launched4. With very few excep-
tions, most now accept the need for the `neoliberal straitjacket' that restrains government
spending and gives increasing prominence to private actors due to perceived ineﬃciencies of
state action and concerns about individual liberty. While there is a lively and ongoing debate
about the appropriate relationship between democracy and capitalism in the ﬁeld of com-
parative political economy, primarily focused on the extent to which government interference
with the market is permissible and advisable and the appropriate size of the welfare state
(Esping-Andersen, 1990; Hall and Soskice, 2001), there is now broad scholarly (and policy)
consensus that market-based relations are the only genuine choice for organising economic
relations in an advanced economy.
The relative consistency of economic development and broad similarity of paths5 have
had the unfortunate consequence of stiﬂing debate over the relevance and importance of
ideational factors in economic discourse. Economics has certainly not been a discipline that
has welcomed this kind of analysis, in large part due to the misplaced faith in the rational-
scientiﬁc approach that ignores non-material drivers of outcomes, but it has been exacerbated
by trends in the latter part of the twentieth century. Technical debates over the appropri-
ate estimations and characterisations of growth or eﬀectiveness of government intervention
3The demonstrations in Cyprus over the plan to `tax' the savings deposits of all accounts held in Cypriot
banks in recent days are one of a chain of European events demonstrating this claim. The heavy Russian
involvement in the Cypriot crisis, combined with the fact that Cyprus is one of the largest sources of Russian
FDI (Rossii, 2013), suggests that the Russian Federation has yet to resolve all the economic issues that
resulted from the fall of communism.
4China presents a fascinating case but I simply don't know enough about the complexities of the situation
in this country to state with any certainty what the likely outcome will be.
5As we reach the present day we see that most developed countries have broadly charted the same
trajectory in terms of economic advancement, moving through the stages of feudalism to early unregulated
capitalism and ending up with something akin to a modern welfare state via Karl Polanyi's double movement
(Polanyi, 1957). T.H. Marshall's account of the development of capitalism in Britain is a rather exemplary
demonstration of this process (Marshall, 1992).
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dominate the ﬁeld, leaving limited space for appreciation of the intellectual roots of govern-
ment policy and the impact that ideational factors have exerted on the great socioeconomic
transformations of the past few hundred years. While there are a few notable exceptions
in political science (Blyth, 2002; Darden, 2009; Herrera, 2005), for the most part political
economy draws on the language of incentives and regressions, rather than frameworks and
ideas, in its analysis of the generation and implementation of economic policy. This leaves
economists and political scientists largely bereft of tools when a situation arises that calls
for dramatic reform of an underlying economy, since many of the tools and policies that
have been crafted are suited to an advanced economy that has resolved basic problems of
industry, employment and consumption. In an ironic twist, contemporary macroeconomics
is repeating the errors of the Marxists of the late nineteenth century in building a policy
toolkit that is wholly unsuited to resolving the basic problems of underindustrialised and
transitional economies6.
However, it was not ever thus. We have not even reached the sesquicentennial of some
of the most signiﬁcant experiments in the organisation of economic relations, from the Paris
Commune to the autarky of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, from the the drawn-out debates
over mercantilism to the emergence of the welfare state (Shafer, 2005; Heckscher, 1955).
Moreover the twentieth century was the locus of one of the great debates between alter-
native economic paradigms, as the Soviet Union and the West competed to demonstrate
that their system provided the highest standard of living for their populations and that
the alternative came with unavoidable and unacceptable moral costs. We can trace the
origins of these positions to the nineteenth century, for as we shall see in this paper the
debates involving leading actors in the Second International exerted a strong inﬂuence over
the formulation of Bolshevik economic policy in the early years after the collapse of the So-
viet Union. Furthermore, the genus of neoclassical economics that would come to dominate
6State-led industrialisation and import-substitution were two alternatives that gained great prominence
in the mid-to-late twentieth century, but were largely the product of speciﬁc economic circumstances that
are somewhat unlikely to be repeated (Johnson, 1982).
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twentieth century thinking can be found in the work of Alfred Marshall. The relationship
between socialism and capitalism was dynamic and the organisation of economic life in the
Soviet Union prompted advocates of the classical form of capitalism to develop the economic
doctrine of neoliberalism as a response. This body of work would exert a signiﬁcant inﬂuence
over economic theory and practise in the latter half of the twentieth century in terms of its
rejection of Keynesianism and denial of any prominent government role in the economy. We
shall witness our own curious form of double movement in this paper; the origins of neolib-
eralism were in opposition to the Soviet system, yet it would ﬁnd its apogee in restructuring
of the economy of the Russian Federation following the collapse of socialism in 1991 under
the combined aegis of a team of local New Reformers and foreign experts, both schooled in
recent advances in economic theory.
This paper builds on the foundations outlined in the introduction and the research on
state-building from the ﬁrst paper to examine the impact and importance of ideational factors
on Russia's recent economic history. While, as suggested above, many countries have followed
a common path over their recent history, Russia represents a stark exception to this general
rule. Russia entered the twentieth century as a society still possessing many vestigial traces of
feudalism resulting from the thoroughly incomplete Emancipation of the Serfs in 1861. Under
the aegis of ﬁrst Sergei Witte and more comprehensively Pyotr Stolypin, attempts were made
to develop a modern form of capitalism through state-led industrialisation (Gerschenkron,
1962), but this was cut short by the November Revolution and was stalling long before that.
At this stage, the country embarked on the world's ﬁrst full-scale communist experiment
under the leadership of the Bolsheviks, before ﬁnally pivoting to a somewhat wild form
of capitalism based on the recommendations of neoclassical economics in the 1990s7. To
negotiate one major economic reform in a century is diﬃcult, two is remarkable, but three
rather beggars belief and it is of no surprise to anyone studying contemporary Russian
7For an extraordinary account of the nature of Russian capitalism in the 1990s, see Freedland (2000),
written by the former Moscow correspondent of the Financial Times who had unusual access to many of
the central ﬁgures (and some extremely interesting side characters) in her writing of the book.
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politics that the country and many of its citizens still bear the scars of these changes8.
Continuing the central theme of the dissertation, this paper focuses on the latter two
of these radical restructurings and advances a comparison of early Bolshevik rule with the
early post-Soviet Russian Federation in order to assess the impact of ideational factors on
policy making in times of crisis. The focus in this instance is on the economic sphere and
involves a contrast between the communist-inspired move away from the proto-capitalism of
the late Russian Empire with the almost reverse-movement from communism to capitalism
in the early 1990s under the stewardship of Yegor Gaidar and his acolytes. As we shall see,
neither of these transitions was smooth and there was a signiﬁcant extent of backsliding and
compromises in the early years in order to appease various important stakeholders. The
Bolsheviks had serious internal struggles over the appropriate formulation of policy centred
chieﬂy around the appropriate means of dealing with the peasantry and the ﬁnancial sector,
while the post-Soviets tried to implement radical market reforms without alienating large
sections of the Russian population and an obstreperous, unreformed parliament that was
little inclined to help facilitate this shift. Having seen in the ﬁrst paper on state-building that
the Bolshevik predilection towards developing a coherent ideational framework far surpassed
that of Boris Yeltsin and his administrations and that this contributed to consistent crafting
of policy in this realm, we might a priori expect the same to hold in the economic realm,
notwithstanding the fact that Yeltsin's experience in the construction industry provided
him with familiarity with the economic contradictions inherent in the late-Soviet system.
In fact, we should probably expect this a fortiori given the centrality of economics to the
Marxist analysis that was the theoretical core of the Bolshevik position. Unlike questions
over nationality policy and state-building, which were tangential to most debates among
leading European socialists who broadly assumed them to be irrelevant and a transitory
8As a illustrative example, the family with whom I lived while conducting ﬁeldwork in Krasnodar preferred
to use a sewage tank in the courtyard of their house rather than rely on the local government to deal with
this rather unpleasant task since their level of trust in the latter organisation had been thoroughly enervated
by their experiences.
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feature of the pre-socialist environment, all the leading thinkers of the left at this time had
much to say about the collapse of capitalism and the nature of advanced economies and the
historical record is rich with their predictions, disagreements and diagnoses.
However, when we start to examine the issue in depth, we ﬁnd almost the reverse of
the result in the ﬁrst paper. To be more explicit, the Bolshevik economic policies in the
initial post-revolutionary period were a confusing mess, swaying uneasily between full-scale
implementation of hardline communist reforms during War Communism and capitalist con-
cessions during the New Economic Policy. The latter was belated recognition of the fact
that the country they inherited was underindustrialised and far from the beacon of capitalist
advancement that Marx and Engels prophesied to be the motor of collapse for the global
economic system, as well as a realisation that the excesses of War Communism were haem-
orrhaging support and self-defeating. By way of contrast, the early years of post-communist
rule followed the path of neoliberal reform under the leadership of Yegor Gaidar and his
team, strongly inﬂuenced by trends in economic discourse of the preceding twenty years
and the rejection of Keynesianism by the Chicago and Virginia Schools. It is true that the
implementation of Gaidar's economic programme was obstructed by the Russian Duma and
Gaidar was removed from his post having accomplished only part of what he envisaged at the
outset and with considerable cost to the Russian population. Nevertheless, the well-deﬁned
parameters for a radical transformative programme that had been developed in the years
preceding the collapse of the Soviet Union enabled a remarkable remaking of the Russian
economy in the early years of Yeltsin's rule and ensured that a return to state socialism was
an impossibility.
In large part the problems the Bolsheviks faced in attempting to restructure the economy
were a product of their own hubris and the theoretical constraints of Marxist analysis. They
displayed a disturbing lack of false conﬁdence in their economic prescriptions, bred primarily
by the fact that the economy was the idee ﬁxe of the Marxist thinkers who dominated the
ﬁn de si ecle intellectual landscape and they felt conﬁdently well-versed in contemporary
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economic debates, notwithstanding the marked lack of actual economic experience among
the leading Bolsheviks. This misplaced sense of competence was in marked contrast to
the nationalities policy where, as we saw in the ﬁrst paper, the Bolsheviks were much less
sure of themselves and willing to countenance ﬂexibility alongside their basic theoretical
commitments whilst maintaining a framework that structured the necessary compromises.
The second major distinction was the obeisance of the majority of Marxists to the idea of
natural laws of economic development that structured arguments in such a way that very
few even considered the genuine possibility of communism revolution in a backward agrarian
country such as Russia. The Bolsheviks held a similar position until the last moment before
the Revolution and this meant that the existing Marxist ideational framework was extremely
unhelpful in terms of strategising the transition from the proto-capitalism of late-Imperial
Russia to the communist paradise.
Running throughout this paper is the auxiliary point that contemporary economics fails
to take account of ideational factors in the analysis of the formulation of economic policy.
This methodological and ontological stance has also inﬂuenced other ﬁelds that study ques-
tions relating to economics. As we shall see, even David Harvey, who has authored the most
compelling recent account of neoliberalism, focuses more on the political aspects and ignores
the economic foundations of this doctrine, impoverishing our understanding of its emergence
(Harvey, 2005). We shall also see a further tension between democracy and reform in that
Yeltsin ultimately felt unable to continue supporting Gaidar due to the unpopularity of the
latter's programme, stunting its full implementation and generating an extremely unpromis-
ing halfway house of paused reform that set the stage for the emergence of oligarchs and
widespread corruption that would come to characterise the contemporary Russian economy.
This continues the subtheme of the dissertation that the severe problems with contempo-
rary democratic theory have an inimical eﬀect on governments seeking to make dramatic,
all-encompassing transitions, though we shall largely reserve this point for the conclusion.
This paper proceeds in the following fashion. The ﬁrst section provides an overview of
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recent literature that focuses on economics, suggesting that with few exceptions, the impor-
tance of ideational factors is, at best, sidelined. The next section justiﬁes the case selection
and provides a brief overview of economic events in Russia leading up to the November
Revolution in 1917. The following two sections are the empirical meat of the paper; the ﬁrst
considers the debates among leading socialists and Bolsheviks in the twenty years prior to the
November Revolution and how this impacted the chaotic nature of economic policy-making
in the years immediately following the Revolution. The second presents an analysis of the
main drivers of neoliberalism via the Chicago and Virginia schools and how this inﬂuenced
Yegor Gaidar and the dramatic reforms of the early 1990s. The ﬁnal section concludes.
3.1 Ideational Factors and Economics
For this paper, we shift to a new realm, that of economics. There is no need to belabour
the literature we have already reviewed in the opening two parts of the project concerning
general discussions of ideational factors and the problems with making causal claims on
this basis, as this has already been covered in some depth. In this section we shall instead
discuss the (limited) literature on ideational factors in economics and oﬀer an explanation
for why this has been generally overlooked by social scientists (though not by historians9).
However, the main contribution is to advance our understanding of the role of ideational
frameworks by outlining that not all ideational frameworks are equally capable of solving the
serious problems of order and sequencing in economic transformation. Both the Bolsheviks
and the early post-Soviets were in possession of seemingly well-deﬁned plans for reforming
the economic system, but only the latter was to prove of any great help in navigating the
immediate period following imperial collapse.
9Daniel Rodgers is one of many authors who has participated in the development of our understanding
of intellectual history as it bears on economics in his work examining the relationship between Europe and
American and the development of progressivism (Rodgers, 1998). Edmund Wilson's To The Finland Station
provides an exemplary study of the beneﬁts of intertwining the study of history and economics (with a
particular focus on the emergence of socialist thought), though his model has been little adopted (Wilson,
1940).
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The relationship between political science and economics is complex, especially given the
rise of rational choice analysis and the colonisation of research agendas by econometric tools
and game-theoretic models. This has produced some of the most compelling work in the
discipline, from Jim Fearon's work on rationalist analyses of war to Jim Robinson and Daron
Acemoglu's analysis of regimes, revolutions and economic growth (Fearon, 1995; Acemoglu
and Robinson, 2006, 2012). Scott Gehlbach et al. have tailored some of the fundamental
results of political economic analysis to ﬁt the contemporary Russian environment in terms of
the prominence of businessmen choosing to expend valuable resources on election campaigns
(Gehlbach, Sonin and Zhuravskaya, 2010). There is now an extensive and growing literature
seeking to apply these tools of analysis to questions as diverse as calculating the optimal
number of nations to analysing the proclivity to ethnic conﬂict in virtue of minimum-winning
coalitions (Alesina and Spolaore, 1997; Bates, 1981). In almost any area of political science,
we see the growing inﬂuence of economic analysis and economic tools in helping to answer
many of the fundamental questions facing the discipline, as well as mainstream economists
turning their attention to such topics (Persson and Tabellini, 2000).
All of these are important contributions, but there is a justiﬁable unease that focusing
too rigidly on methods of analysis derived from economics impoverishes our analysis and
removes crucial non-material drivers of outcomes from the purview of acceptable topics of
study (Mahoney, 2007; Parsons, 2007). This is particularly true when we turn to the primary
theme of this paper, namely the ideational drivers behind economic policy in transformational
periods. While it is true that a limited number of scholars in political science have recently
devoted much of their work to an examination of the politics of ideas behind economic shifts
(Blyth, 2002; Darden, 2009), such research programmes remain few and far between. Indeed,
Yoi Herrera, in her work on the sources of Russian regionalism was forced to delve into the
constructivist literature in international relations due to the absence of compelling frames
in the economic literature (Herrera, 2005). My paper is an attempt to contribute to this
small but important literature by highlighting the importance of a speciﬁc type of ideational
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framework in resolving basic problems of transition economics, an area in which technical
questions of speciﬁcation must take a back seat to basic issues concerning the appropriate
economic system for the new country.
Before delving further into the complex relationship between frameworks and economic
outcomes, we should begin with an brief overview of why economics as a discipline (and,
by implication, all subdisciplines parasitic on this, such as political economy) has generally
failed to give much credence to non-material factors in explanations of phenomena that
clearly seem to touch on objects within its purview. I think there are two primary reasons
behind this stance, both of which ultimately stem from the underlying epistemology of the
discipline, which we shall discuss in a moment. However, it seems appropriate to begin by
noting that this has not always been the case and that modern economics has been marked
primarily by a wish to diverge from the other branches of the social sciences and humanities
in a fashion that would have been alien to the original practitioners10. We shall see that this
emerged as a prominent desire of the Chicago School in terms of codifying its major ﬁndings
in an increasingly esoteric fashion, but the trend can certainly be traced back to the work of
Alfred Marshall, who was instrumental in revitalising the study of classical economics using
a more robust and technical mathematical language (Marshall, 1961 (1890, 1975).
The ﬁrst of these is methodological. We shall set aside the regression and data-driven part
of economic analysis, since we have already examined the issues relating to ideational factors
that result from using these tools in the introductory piece; suﬃce to say that regressions
and ideational factors are strange bedfellows given the diﬃculty of accurately measuring an
idea's inﬂuence. However, and perhaps surprisingly for our purposes, economics is in fact
well-equipped to deal with abstract features of the social environment. This is because one
of the main analytical tools of the discipline, game theory, relies explicitly on the language
10Adam Smith was centrally involved in the Scottish Enlightenment and contributed to a sustained dialogue
with David Hume, among others (Marshall, 2000). Similarly, Karl Marx began his academic career as a
member of the Young Hegelians and integrated contemporary philosophical debates as part of his economic
analysis (Tucker, 2001).
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of incentives and utility to calculate equilibrium outcomes, neither of which are inherently
measurable but rather theoretical assumptions that help economists structure the environ-
ment under study (Binmore, 1990). While this may seem promising, in fact it leads to a dead
end in terms of allowing us to make any advances on understanding the value of ideational
frameworks for the formulation of economic policy. This is because ever since Paul Samuelson
developed the language of revealed preference theory (Samuelson, 1948), game theorists have
been largely agnostic about the origins of preferences and have deduced them from consumer
actions, with the baseline assumption of rationality guaranteeing this claim. While many
have pushed back against this methodological stance (Sen, 1977), it continues to operate as
one of the centrally-recognised components of modern economics11 and is unlikely to change
due to severe problems of interpersonal comparability that result from the move away from
revealed preference theory12. There is a marginal role for ideational factors in game theory in
terms of providing information about the origins of preferences or helping to solve problems
of multiple equilibria (Henrich, 2000), but this is more of an afterthought than a consistent
attempt to look beyond the language of incentives to reﬁne the predictions and results of
game theory.
This brings us to the conclusion that ideas are hard to measure and also hard to model,
making them largely derivative or unhelpful from the perspective of the orthodox economist.
They can function as background conditions or omitted variables in some analyses, but
these are hardly acceptable fare for the self-respecting practitioner13. This is not particu-
11Ken Binmore has attempted to view social contract theory in terms of games (Binmore, 1998), but
this bears strong similarity to Gary Becker's extension of the economic Weltanschauung in terms of solving
coordination problems. Nevertheless, the extension into political philosophy is a welcome change from the
standard uses of game theory and points to the potential for a more promising interaction between economics
and the other social sciences. John Rawls implicitly relied on the economic conception of rationality for much
of his work in A Theory of Justice, suggesting that both sides are aware of the potential beneﬁts to be gleaned
from collaboration (Rawls, 1971).
12See Elster and Roemer (1991) for a recent discussion of the fraught territory of interpersonal comparisons
of utility and why modern economics has retained a very thin version of utilitarianism with much of the
moral dimension stripped away.
13Elinor Ostrom's award of the Nobel Prize in Economics for her work on the conﬂuence of politics and
tragedy of the commons situations, particularly in environmental sectors, suggests there may be some hope
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larly surprising and this thought has animated much of the discussion of this project in terms
of questioning the potential for conducting standard causal analysis using ideational frame-
works. However, this problem is not something that aicts economics alone; we have already
seen that social science as a whole fails to grapple convincingly with non-material factors
as potential explanations or factors in policy outcomes for very similar reasons (albeit they
are heightened in economics due to technical sophistication and availability of supposedly
high-quality data that makes certain types of analyses more attractive).
Perhaps of greater import is the second factor contributing to the neglect of ideational
factors, namely that economics is largely a discipline without history14, standing aside from
the other social sciences in terms of relying on the development of axiomatic postulates to
explain phenomena of interest, approximating the research paradigms of Imre Lakatos in a
truer sense than any of the sister disciplines (Lakatos, 1970). This generates an increased
focus on technical questions of estimation and modelling, building an esoteric approach to
the subject matter with high barriers to entry for those unfamiliar with the issues at stake. It
also leaves extremely limited time or energy for discussion of the underlying philosophies on
which these programmes are constructed or basic normative issues implicated by seemingly
technical arguments. This tends to the emergence of an epistemological hegemony that raises
economics above other social sciences in the eyes of its practitioners and prevents potentially
fruitful cross-collaboration. This is not to say that such research is non-existent; Charles
Kindleberger's sociological study of the role and prominence of economists in international
organisations provides a fascinating study of the relationship between particular types of
organisations and the economists they attract (Kindleberger, 1955). But such pieces are the
exception, rather than the rule, especially when authored by a member of the economics
profession. Although fascinating, this problem deserves a far deeper treatment than I can
that this much-needed area of research could yet ﬂourish even under the suspicious eyes of the deans of
economics (Ostrom, 1990).
14Economic history does exist as a separate research programme, but it stands well outside the main-
stream academic discourse of economics and is primarily the province of historians rather than mainstream
economists.
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oﬀer here since our principal interests lie elsewhere. We shall thus leave it for subsequent
research.
This general neglect of ideational factors stands in direct contrast to the theoretical
position of this paper (and indeed the entire dissertation), which argues that we cannot
understand the formulation of policy in the two periods under study without a ﬁrm grasp on
the debates that informed the major participants. The focus here, as can be gathered from
the introduction, is on the schools of neoliberalism and Marxism and how they informed
the policy decisions of the early Bolsheviks and the Gaidar government. We shall see that
we cannot make sense of the confusing Bolshevik policies or the post-Soviet radical reforms
without a better understanding of the preceding debates in economics among the relevant
parties and that a focus on speciﬁc material factors is not particularly illuminating with
regard to these problems. But ﬁrst, we must reﬁne further our speculations on the type of
ideational frameworks that will be of greatest use in period of crisis.
3.1.1 Reﬁning Frameworks
We have already seen the general contours of the argument relating ideational factors and
outcomes in conditions of extreme uncertainty in the introductory chapter and ﬁrst paper.
The opening theoretical chapter proposed the overarching framework for the dissertation,
noting that ideational factors are typically underanalysed in political science but that there
is some evidence this is slowly beginning to change. The unfortunate dimension of this
otherwise welcome shift is that much of the work on the impact of non-material aspects
of the socio-political environment has been funelled through the desire to advance causal
arguments, which strips away an important aspect of the value of this strand of research. The
central claim that animates the entire project is that possession of a pre-existing framework
that helps to organise the tremendous amount of information and lend order to the post-
imperial chaos is of incalculable value for ensuring the production of coherent and consistent
policy-making in the initial years after the assumption of power by the new forces. As we
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have good reason to think that there are strong elements of path dependency that follow
from the initial years of policy formation in such formative periods (Blyth, 2002; Pierson,
2004), the cost of a muddling pragmatism may be extremely high and lead to a series of
problems that become ever more complex with the passage of time.
The ﬁrst substantive empirical chapter demonstrated this claim with reference to nation-
and state-building (particularly the former) in terms of a comparison of the policies in
this area of the Bolsheviks and post-Soviets in the initial years after the collapse of the
previous regime. I argued that the inﬂuence of the socialist debates in the initial years of
the twentieth century (in particular the work of Otto Bauer) exerted a decisive inﬂuence
on Stalin and Lenin in terms of the formulation of their nationalities policy, providing an
essential structuring to the attempt to pacify the volatile North Caucasus region. By way of
contrast, the absence of similar debates in the years preceding the Yeltsin period entailed a
corresponding architectural lacuna with regard to how nationalities policy should be crafted
in the immediate post-Soviet environment, storing signiﬁcant problems for later (the topic
of the ﬁnal paper). The overall theoretical purpose was to demonstrate the value of an
ideational framework in comparison with a broad reliance on pragmatism during the chaotic
post-imperial periods, with particular reference to the nature of compromises struck between
central and regional actors with regard to state- and nation-building.
The task of this paper is diﬀerent, since unlike the ﬁrst case, both the Bolsheviks and
the post-Soviet reformers possessed clearly articulated frameworks that seemed to provide
suﬃciently detailed advice with respect to transforming the economy. The Bolsheviks were
able to draw on the decades of debate following Marx concerning the steps needed to shift
to a communist system of organisation, while the post-Soviets could draw on the work of
neoclassical economists (particularly the work of the Virginia and Chicago schools) in their
desire to irrevocably reduce the role of the state in the economy and establish a functional
market system from the still-warm ashes of the Soviet experiment. What I seek to develop
here is the claim advanced in the introduction that speciﬁc forms of frameworks are more
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helpful than others; not all frameworks are equal and not all are as well-positioned to help
new governments navigate these periods of fundamental uncertainty. The hope is that by
the end of this paper, we shall be in a position to understand the value of speciﬁc types of
framework and how they are likely to originate, leaving the discussion of the legacies for the
ﬁnal paper.
In order to help us do this, we can develop another stylised characterisation of ideational
frameworks, this time focused more explicitly on the internal dynamics rather than the brute
fact of their existence. We have already seen that one important dimension is the clarity of
frameworks, namely the extent to which they provide concrete policy recommendations and
provide a basis for shaping the compromises that are inevitable in the post-imperial period.
Weak frameworks tend to cause severe problems; Yeltsin arguably had a tepid commitment
to some form of democracy, but as we have seen that was not particularly helpful in resolving
the central-local conﬂicts in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse since it provided virtually
no concrete guidance on speciﬁc matters of policy. The second dimension of interest seems
parasitic on the ﬁrst but is in fact analytically distinct and critical for our analysis in the
current paper. This is the degree to which frameworks are able to adapt to the empirical
realities on the ground, since it is inevitable that the situation will diﬀer from the theoretical
ideal. We saw this work well for the Soviet nationality policy in the early Bolshevik period
and we shall also see that neoliberalism was, for all its manifest faults, capable of adjust-
ing to the post-Soviet environment thanks to the brilliance of Yegor Gaidar and his team.
By way of contrast, the Bolshevik economic policy was clearly articulated but hopelessly
inﬂexible, generating severe tensions between the leading members of the Bolshevik party
and creating a nightmarish situation of unsatisfying compromises and dogmatic insistence
on policies that were little short of disastrous and necessitated complete about-faces. We do
not have an empirical case of an unclear and inﬂexible framework in the ﬁrst two papers,
but it is not unreasonable to think that it would be a good ﬁt for a regime driven by per-
sonalism or sultanism (Chehabi and Linz, 1998), where the dictator has a poorly articulated
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ruling philosophy and yet is unwilling to accept or respond to contradictory information or
change seemingly whimsical policies. Stalin and Mao would be reasonable exemplars of this
phenomenon and we shall have some cause to return to the former of these in the ﬁnal paper.
Table 3.1 illustrates the relation of these dimensions and the purported results:
Table 3.1: Simpliﬁed categorisation of frameworks across two dimensions.
Flexibility
Low High
Low Unpredictable Insistence Feckless pragmatism
Clarity
High Blind Dogmatism Informed Compromise
Having a ﬂexible and clear framework does not necessarily guarantee success in resolving
problems of order or economic transformation; these issues are often so severe and wide-
ranging that it would be presumptuous and misguided to search for this kind of guaranteed
solution. We saw in the ﬁrst paper that the Bolsheviks struggled mightily with revolts
in the Eastern North Caucasus and altered their perspective on the extent to which self-
determination was a viable framework for centre-regional relations, particularly with regard
to their policy of raionirovanie. In this current paper we shall see evidence that Yegor
Gaidar's government was able to achieve only part of what it had hoped in terms of the
transformation of the Soviet economy and even that at a slower pace and more inconsis-
tently than was originally desired. Nevertheless, the basic point is that developing and
possessing this type of ideational tool kit provides the new governments with the basis for
understanding and organising the chaotic elements of the situation and structuring the nec-
essary compromises, thereby maximising the chances of achieving their goals. This, I think,
is the best we can hope for and developing our understanding of this particular character-
istic can make a major contribution to both the scholarly and policy community in terms
of clarifying our understanding of where best to focus energies and resources in unstable
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environments.
Conceptualising which frameworks are helpful is only half the battle, however, since it
rather begs the question of what drives their development and emergence. In the ﬁrst paper
we saw that the debate between Lenin, Stalin and Otto Bauer was crucial for developing
the nationalities policy that would be of crucial importance for defeating the Whites and
pacifying large parts of the North Caucasus, notwithstanding the extremely weak Bolshevik
presence in the region in the years immediately following the November Revolution. I claimed
that sustained debate in the years prior to cataclysmic events helps to sharpen and clarify
the frameworks and elucidate speciﬁc policies in a manner that was thoroughly absent from
the post-Soviet experience given the limited attention devoted to the speciﬁcs of how to
cope with the ﬁssiparous tendencies of the North Caucasus and the competing and varying
demands for sovereignty from the regional republics.
This paper demonstrates that extended debate is not eo ipso suﬃcient, since both the
Bolsheviks and the post-Soviets could draw on lengthy discussions concerning economic
policies; the Bolsheviks participated in and beneﬁted from the debates surrounding the
Second International, with Bernstein, Kautsky and Luxemburg particularly prominent. For
the post-Soviets, the neoclassical debates were critical, in particular the diﬀering critiques of
Keynesianism (and thus, governmental intervention in the economy) oﬀered by the Chicago
and Virginia schools and the associated proposals to minimise the state role in the economic
as much as possible in terms of providing both an intellectual underpinning and speciﬁc
policy advice. Both sides could draw on well-articulated frameworks to inform their policies
and yet, as I have claimed above, we see markedly diﬀerent outcomes and successes, with the
Bolsheviks bedevilled by failed and internally contradictory policies while the post-Soviets
were able to implement the outlines of a coherent programme of macroeconomic stabilisation
and privatisation before becoming overwhelmed by the extent of popular discontent and an
obstreperous parliament. This variation in initial outcomes suggests that we need to specify
a second factor to facilitate our explanation and bolster our theory of the importance of
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frameworks.
The added insight provided by this paper is captured in Table 3.1 by the `ﬂexibility'
dimension, which has been discussed in the preceding paragraphs and needs no further elab-
oration at this juncture. The issue of how ﬂexibility is fostered by the debates without
sacriﬁcing clarity is real, however, and not one that we can easily sidestep. To be more
speciﬁc, why was it the case that the Bolsheviks were entrapped by the legacy of unpro-
ductive preceding debates that devoted little attention to the unique problems of socialist
transformation in an underindustrialised, rural country while the post-Soviets were able to
alter the neoclassical framework to ﬁt the realities of their environment?
My argument in this paper is that the Bolsheviks were themselves taken by surprise by
the collapse of the Russian Empire and the November Revolution, meaning that they were
largely reliant on pre-existing and wholly unsuitable models for economic transformation
that had been designed with a completely diﬀerent scenario in mind. This general failure
on their part to foresee the development of events in Russia, combined with Lenin's tactical
decision to cast out the Mensheviks who had a more realistic conception of how to achieve
economic shifts in Russia, entailed that a dogmatic reliance on wholly utopian schemes
that were completely unsuited to the realities. The further twist is that it was the very
theoretical postulates that created such problems with economic transformation that made
the Bolsheviks blind to the political and social problems in Russia because of the stipulations
concerning the `laws' of economic and social development that were embedded in orthodox
Marxism, particularly through the work of Karl Kautsky. Rosa Luxemburg presented a more
promising perspective, but theoretical disagreements between her and Lenin in the aftermath
of the revolution, combined with the abstract nature of her thinking, meant that this option
faced ultimately insurmountable obstacles to its realisation and may not have been much
help regardless.
The central lesson is that the leading members of the Bolsheviks developed and attempted
to implement a framework that was completely suited to the task at hand, reﬂecting the
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general inﬂexibility of orthodox Marxism. Although it produced relatively clear advice in
terms of how to launch the socialist transition, this was not tailored to the speciﬁcs of the
Russian experience and the Bolsheviks were unprepared, unwilling and unable to make the
necessary changes in large part because the essence of this particular framework was its
very rigidity and relative imperviousness to speciﬁc historical events. This contrasts directly
with the ideational framework that was developed for nation- and state-building that was
markedly less strict in terms of its application and allowed Stalin to focus on how to adapt
Bauer's work to the Russian case.
By way of contrast, the slow toppling of the Soviet Empire entailed that there was a
long and fruitful discussion of how to resolve the pressing economic issues prior to its ulti-
mate collapse in 1991. The `500-Day' plan, authored by Gregory Yavlinskii and Stanislav
Shatalin in 1990 provided a softer version of economic reform under Gorbachev with the
gradual introduction of market mechanisms to correct the worst problems of central organi-
sation but was ultimately rejected by Gorbachev himself as being too radical and untimely
given the rising discontent from within the Party (Brown, 2007). Nevertheless, this was
symptomatic of a general trend among leading Russian economists, of whom Yegor Gaidar
was an extremely prominent member, to think carefully and deeply about the necessary
changes to the economic system that would address to deep-seated problems inherent in the
late-Soviet system. Furthermore, by 1991 the transition governments in Eastern Europe had
already embarked on radical restructurings of their economies, providing valuable evidence
and important models for Gaidar and his team to study and partially emulate. The size and
centrality of Russia guaranteed that it would have to follow a diﬀerent path, but the combi-
nation of years of preparation and hard empirical facts provided an excellent foundation for
Gaidar and his team to tailor the transformation strategy to the realities of the situation in
Russia and convince a somewhat sceptical Yeltsin of the value of their reform strategy.
While the neoclassical framework developed by Western economists is often criticised for
being inﬂexible (especially in the guise of the `Washington Consensus') (D'Arista, 2002-3),
156
the extended discussion and ability of Gaidar and his team entailed that they were able to
decide on what they believed to be the best sequencing for the new country. In particular
they sought to achieve two goals simultaneously while recognising from the outset the tension
between them, namely attempting to balance irreversibility with minimising the social cost
of the radical programme of `shock therapy'. While there is little doubt that they didn't
achieve all they set out to do and that large sectors of the Russian population suﬀered greatly
during the initial years, the understanding of transformation economics they inherited and
adjusted ensured that a coherent path was established. The most prominent example of
this is the decision to prioritise privatisation over macroeconomic stabilisation; the standard
reform framework suggested that the reverse was optimal but Gaidar and his team believed
that privatisation would help garner public support for the changes as well as arrest the
perverse `spontaneous privatisations' by factory managers that were occurring due to the
weak defence of state property rights during the twilight of the Soviet Union.
Having outlined the major theoretical contribution of this paper to the dissertation and
situated it in the (sparse) literature, we can now move to a discussion of the empirics of the
paper. Again, we pay particular attention to the period some time before the cataclysmic
events generating the collapse of empire, both in terms of the debates over the appropriate
nature of economic transformation and the economic legacy of the preceding regime, since
these strongly condition the policy responses of the new administrators.
3.2 Case Selection
This paper has the same general analytic strategy as the ﬁrst in the dissertation, drawing
a diachronic comparison between the early Soviets and the early post-Soviets. To be more
speciﬁc, I focus here on the economic policies developed in the years from 1918 to 1926 and
from 1991 to 1995, taking into consideration the economic legacies of the preceding period.
For gathering information on the ideational frameworks deployed by the new governments in
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each period, I go back rather further. The Bolsheviks were strongly inﬂuenced (and leading
Bolsheviks participated in) debates among the leading socialists from the Second Interna-
tional, lasting from 1889-1916. The New Reformer government, under the leadership of Yegor
Gaidar, evinced the pull of the neoclassical or neoliberal school of economics, which I argue
had major intellectual debts to the Chicago and Virginia Schools. As we shall see, Gaidar
and his team were more successful in moulding the demands of neoliberal reform to the
Russian experience and solidifying the emergence of capitalism as compared to the troubled
early Soviet swings between continuing the capitalist path to development or pushing for full
socialism that resulted from a failure to adapt the preceding theoretical postulates. In large
part I ascribe this to the fact that Gaidar and his team had devoted the years preceding the
collapse of the Soviet Union to analysing concrete reform strategies rather than engaging
in abstract theoretical debates or analyses of utterly diﬀerent scenarios, as the Bolsheviks
chose to do.
The justiﬁcation and value of using a diachronic comparison of the same country has been
suﬃciently elucidated in the ﬁrst paper and there seems to be little beneﬁt from rehashing my
reasoning for so doing. The arguments about the ability to control for multiple unmeasurable
and slow-moving variables remains in place, as does the general claim concerning the relative
comparability of the situations facing the Bolsheviks and post-Soviets on the wresting of
power from the decrepit hands of the former imperial masters. While diachronic comparisons
of the same country may often be aicted by the criticism that the ﬁrst period directly
aﬀected the second and there is thus a logical problem of independence, in the case of
imperial collapse I think this is less of a concern. This is because the totalising nature of
the regime shift lessens the importance of the past, creating periods of what Mark Blyth
has termed `Knightian uncertainty', whereby even basic assumptions are called into question
(Blyth, 2002). I am not denying that what went before is irrelevant, and indeed I shall
spend some time outlining the inheritance of both governments in terms of the state of the
economy. But the fact that economic policy making in both periods drew on entirely alien
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philosophies and assumed the fundamental bankruptcy of the system that preceded the shift
suggests that we can sideline to a large degree these objections.
But that does not absolve us of all responsibility concerning the comparison. In the ﬁrst
paper, we had a geographical focus, the North Caucasus, that provided an organisational
heuristic in terms of selecting material. The common histories of the peoples in this region,
combined with their parlous treatment by the authorities and low levels of development across
almost any indicator, entailed that these cases were underpinned by suﬃcient similarities to
validate the comparison of the two periods. The levels of ethnic diversity also provided a
compelling lens and natural variation through which we were able to examine the formulation
and implementation of nationalities policies by the two new governments. This proved
particularly useful as we sought to understand the nature of compromises arrived at by
central authorities in their dealings with localities.
For this paper, we drop the regional focus. This is largely because the critical economic
policies during the transitional period are the product of debate between a limited number of
powerful individuals, who are often (but not exclusively) members of the central government.
I do not claim that there is uniform application of the economic policies decided upon by
these central actors; the vicissitudinous nature of regional politics is exacerbated by the
chaos of imperial collapse and we have already had ample demonstration in the ﬁrst paper
of the variation between the administrative territories of the North Caucasus to realise that
this is an untenable position. Indeed, Yoi Herrera's research has demonstrated just how
much variation there was in terms of the implementation of reform in the post-Soviet space
between local jurisdictions (Herrera, 2005), while Terry Martin's extensive research on the
early Soviet period includes reams of economic data demonstrating similar variation for the
earlier period (Martin, 2001). However, for our purposes we shall retain focus on the process
by which the main policies were determined, rather than examining the details of their
implementation.
Thus, the task for this section is somewhat simpler that in the ﬁrst paper, since we must
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only demonstrate that there is suﬃcient overlap between the economic conditions facing each
set of actors at the start of their respective periods and then defend the time periods chosen.
Even though this paper does not engage in formal causal analysis, it must still bow to the
basic postulates of comparative analysis in demonstrating that the Bolsheviks and early
post-Soviets were facing suﬃciently similar situations as to render our analysis of ideational
frameworks convincing (Mahoney, 2007; Brady and Collier, 2004). We look at two central
determinants of the comparison.
First, we consider the desires of the two governments. We need to show that each had
plans that were similarly dramatic in scope in terms of reforming the economy in order
to ensure we are assessing the role of ideational factors using an equally demanding crite-
rion. If the Bolsheviks, for example, were only seeking to make minor adjustments while
Gaidar's team was aiming for a total overhaul, it would be unsurprising if we found that
the ideational framework of the Bolsheviks was more successful in achieving their limited
objective15. However, this does not apply in our case because leading policymakers in the
two periods shared the desire to completely transform the existing economy and remake
socio-economic relations in their societies. The Bolsheviks sought to completely overhaul
the odd and contradictory form of capitalism that had emerged under the stewardship of
Sergei Witte and Pyotr Stolypin and replace it with a pure form of socialism. The post-
Soviets, under the aegis of Boris Yeltsin and Yegor Gaidar, had the goal of a similarly radical
transformation, dismantling the state-dominated economy of the late-Soviet period in favour
of a somewhat wild form of capitalism.
In terms of the material conditions, which is the second factor of relevance, in neither case
was there a strong foundation for the radical shift in terms of preparation for such a dramatic
overhaul of the economy. The twilight of Imperial Russia was distinguished by a generalised
15This problem is fairly common in political science, where we often seek to judge the success of government
policy by looking solely at the stated aims of the government, rather than investigating why and how these
aims were formed. Much of the work on state capacity falls into the trap of assuming that strong governments
are those able to carry out their express desires, even if these express desires are extremely modest in form.
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sense of weakness and the possible ﬁrst shoots of capitalism, but certainly was some distance
from the advanced capitalist state that the Marxists had always assumed they would inherit.
Notwithstanding the beliefs of certain Russian Marxists (such as Georgi Plekhanov) that
certain features of the Russian system would allow for a shortcut to socialism, the majority
of the leading Bolsheviks did not really consider conditions in the country to be ripe for the
revolution prior to the events of 1917. Yegor Gaidar and his team of New Reformers likewise
inherited an economy largely on its knees, running a huge trade deﬁcit and dominated by a
combination of black market traders and state-run enterprises with managers running amok
(Kornai, N.d.). This chaotic inheritance presented new governments in either period with
a severe challenge; both wanted to achieve complete overhauls of the economic systems yet
lacked basic institutions that seemed to be required to accomplish such a shift.
Turning to the speciﬁcs of the paper, I realise that the time period may seem somewhat
arbitrary in the sense that I draw the analysis of the post-Soviet case to a close before the
second presidential election in 1995. The Soviet ending is more natural in the sense that
we pause prior to Stalin's consolidation of absolute power (the topic of the ﬁnal paper). I
justify the post-Soviet period by arguing that by that point Gaidar's team had been almost
entirely replaced, bringing to an end the attempts to engage in serious and sustained reform
of the economy. The loans-for-shares scheme that has been characterised as having set the
Russian Federation ﬁrmly on the path back to corruption and oligarchy16 was intimately tied
to this election given Yeltsin's poor performance in the ﬁrst round and by this point a rather
diﬀerent approach to managing and reforming the economy was undertaken by Yeltsin and
his team that more closely resembles their approach to state-building17.
We can now ﬁnally shift our attention to the primary empirical research of the paper,
beginning with the Soviet period and concluding with the post-Soviet attempts at radical
16For a recent re-evaluation of the loans-for-shares programme that argues it was not nearly as damaging
as has been conventionally argued, see Treisman (2010).
17Yeltsin's ﬁre-ﬁghter-in-chief, Viktor Chernomyrdin, who served as his Prime Minister on multiple occa-
sions, characterised the Yeltsin period in general using the terms `õîòåëè êàê ëó÷øå, íî ïîëó÷èëîñü êàê
âñåãäà' (`we hoped for the best but it turned out like it always does').
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market reform. Because there is so much potential material available in answering these
questions (far more than was the case for state-building), in what follows I have tried to be
selective and include only the most relevant thinkers and information that bears directly on
the central issue of the formulation of policy.
3.3 Marxist debates: False Conﬁdence and Misdiagnoses
We have already mentioned that the situation facing the Bolsheviks with regard to economic
policy diﬀered markedly from that of state- and nation-building that we explored in the ﬁrst
paper. In the latter case, the issue of nationality policy and the role of the state was largely
ignored by leading Marxists prior to the November Revolution, with Otto Bauer providing
the primary exception in terms of lending important structure to Lenin and Stalin's thinking
on the matter. This provided Lenin and Stalin with intellectual freedom of movement to
tailor these nascent theories to the reality of the Russian experience and while the ﬁt re-
mained inexact, the framework they developed enabled them to ensure there was underlying
consistency in their attempts to resolve the problems of the North Caucasus. With regard
to economics, the situation is dramatically diﬀerent. The centrality of the subject to the
Marxist Weltanschauung guaranteed that all the major thinkers of this school had much to
say on the topic, studying questions of transition and collapse in great detail. While we
may think that this extended and extensive debate would have provided a wealth of material
on which the Bolsheviks could draw, the impact was in fact largely detrimental, since the
focus of the vast majority of the analysis was on transforming an advanced capitalist state
into a socialist paradise. Notwithstanding the evident discrepancies between the realities
of the Russian situation and the hypothesised scenario, the leading Bolsheviks were drawn
into these speculations and concentrated much of their intellectual energy on contributing
to these debates, rather than examining the state of play in their country. In part this was
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because until the fateful days of 1917, most of them were in exile abroad18, but it also reﬂects
the dialectical nature of Marxist ontology, which did not lend itself to bending the iron laws
of development.
The upshot of these economic debates was that the Bolsheviks were extremely ill-prepared
to deal with the realities of the farcical state of the Russian economy in 1917. They were
far from alone in this and there is certainly a grain of truth in Alec Nove's statement that
`practical problems of operating a socialist economy...were not seriously discussed by Marx-
ists...before 1917' (Nove, 1977, 17). While the speciﬁc operational issues may have been
largely sidelined, major ﬁgures in the movement devoted time and energy to the transforma-
tion from capitalism to socialism and developed a framework that would have proven to be
of greater use if the socialists had inherited an advanced industrial economy at the apogee
of capitalism. However, there were two speciﬁc problems facing the Bolsheviks given the
economic situation of Imperial Russia from the late nineteenth century on. These should
have merited far more attention than they received and this failure to pay them suﬃcient
heed would ultimately doom the economic policy of the Bolsheviks to a series of reversals
and awkward compromises in the initial years after the revolution that could have been
minimised if a more ﬂexible framework had been developed.
The ﬁrst of these was the problem of the peasantry. Marx and Engels largely dismissed
the peasantry as a backward class with no genuine historical role to play once feudalism had
subsided (Marx, 1939); in the modern world it oﬀered only a potentially retarding inﬂuence
that would be eliminated by industrialisation and the growth of the urban proletariat. In
Russia this was to prove a far from accurate diagnosis of the situation simply not the case
and the peasantry would play a serious role in both the 1905 Revolution and the more ﬁnal
version in November 1917 (Moore, 1966; Skocpol, 1979). The dependence of the major urban
centres on the peasantry and the legacy of the failed reforms to privatise the land represented
18Stalin would continually press his claims to be included among the leading Bolsheviks on the basis that
he was on the ground in the Caucasus and Petrograd while many leading Bolsheviks were enjoying the
relatively comfortable life of European exiles (Service, 2005).
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perhaps the most serious challenge to the Bolsheviks and they were completely unprepared
for this due to the general absence of this class from the theoretical debates. As we shall see,
Lenin did mention the peasantry in his writings, but his analysis was problematic, somewhat
cursory and deeply ﬂawed. Georgi Plekhanov gave greater prominence to the potential
independent role of the rural communities in his early work, but this was subsequently
replaced by a thoroughgoing orthodox Marxism that replaced his initial position with a less
helpful perspective. Finally, Nikolai Bukharin arrived at a more promising media via in terms
of promoting a more gradual transformation of the countryside, but only after having been
a staunch advocate for radical measures that obliterated what little support the Bolsheviks
enjoyed in the countryside.
The second was the vague understanding of the necessary role of currency and ﬁnancial
systems, especially in a country with parlous levels of private capital investment and the
state thus playing a major role in driving economic progress. This reﬂected a general unease
among leading Marxists concerning the close connections between ﬁnancial capital and the
higher stages of capitalism, a connection highlighted in Lenin's Imperialism (Lenin, 1920),
among other works during the pre-revolutionary period. Many Marxists, with Bukharin
chief among them, pressed for the immediate destruction of the ﬁnancial system during the
revolutionary period, a step eﬀectively taken in the early stages of the Russian Revolution,
but this proved entirely unworkable and created a series of increasing diﬃculties and eventual
reversions to a new system (the New Economic Policy). The chaos created an unfavourable
precedent and sacriﬁced further sources of support for the new government. Ultimately
this was further illustration, if more were needed, that the theoretically utopian schemes
of leading Marxists were entirely impracticable in a country whose development had been
predicated almost entirely on state-led investment (Gerschenkron, 1962).
To set the theoretical stage for the Bolshevik debates, we must quickly consider the period
dating back a number of years prior to the November Revolution. Leszek Ko lakowski argues
that the period of the Second International (1889-1914) was Marxism's `golden age': `Marxist
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doctrine had been clearly enough deﬁned to constitute a recognizable school of thought, but
it was not so rigidly codiﬁed...to rule out discussion or the advocacy of rival solutions to
theoretical and tactical problems' (Ko lakowski, 1978, 1). We look at two of the central
ﬁgures, Karl Kautsky and Rosa Luxemburg, since they provide contrasting perspectives on
historical processes but ultimately are of marginal help when thinking through the speciﬁcs of
the problems of the countryside. For work on ﬁnancial capital, we stray a little farther from
centre stage and draw on the work of Rudolf Hilferding, who presented the most considered
take on this topic and was highly inﬂuential for both Lenin and Bukharin when they came
to formulate their own ideas on this issue. When we address the speciﬁc works of the
major Russian contributors, we shall focus on Vladimir Lenin, Nikolai Bukharin and Georgi
Plekhanov19. There were a number of minor authors whose inﬂuence waxed and waned, but
many of these were taking positions eﬀectively derivative on these major thinkers or had
little inﬂuence on the Bolsheviks and there seems little beneﬁt to casting too wide a net for
our purposes here.
Karl Kautsky was, as described Ko lakowski, the proponent of `German orthodoxy' (Ko lakowski,
1978), meaning that he attempted to maintain the foundations of Marx and Engels' economic
analysis and was extremely critical of Bernstein's attempts to remove the dialectic and rev-
olutionary element of Marxism. He cast perhaps the largest shadow over the Bolsheviks and
Lenin was a strong defender of Kautsky in the pre-revolutionary years, turning against him
only when Kautsky expressed his lack of support for the Revolution due to the unripeness
of Russia, the split between the Russian socialist parties and the rejection of democracy20
by the Bolsheviks (Kautsky, 1964). We could delve into Kautsky's thought in depth, but
that is largely unnecessary for our purposes since his main contribution, beﬁtting his ortho-
doxy, was to press for the appropriate stages of historical development before launching a
19Stalin, who played such an important role in the development of the Soviet nationality policy, had not
such prominence in economic policy and is largely a second-rate theorist in this ﬁeld. We shall return to his
contribution in the third paper when we consider the legacy of the Bolshevik problems with economy.
20For Kautsky, the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat would be one characterised by radical
democracy, not tyranny.
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socialist revolution; Ko lakowski draws our attention to Kautsky's ontology that assumed the
presence of `natural necessity' of social processes (Ko lakowski, 1978, 36). For this reason,
Kautsky was insistent that revolution could and should only be attempted when the prole-
tariat have achieved a suﬃcient level of class consciousness and he explicitly excludes the
`small peasants' from these ranks (Kautsky, 1964, 14).
This evidently created a serious problem for Lenin and the Bolsheviks, since it entailed
that the appropriate course (on this orthodox reading) was to wait until Russia has reached
the appropriate stage of political, economic and social development before launching the
revolution. This was exacerbated by the fact that many Bolsheviks subscribed to this belief,
often until the eve of the November Revolution. The economic policies that derived from
this perspective were evidently tailored to an advanced industrial superpower, focusing on
implementing workplace democracy and placing the tiller of the ship of industry in the hands
of the proletariat rather than tasks more suited to the underindustrialised, predominantly
rural case of the fallen Russian Empire.
Rosa Luxemburg was a second strident critic of Eduard Bernstein's revisionist take on
Marxism, but she was situated to the left of Kautsky in terms of her belief in the transforma-
tive power of revolutions to overcome historical barriers and thus, in theory, provided a ﬁrmer
foundation for the Bolsheviks. She argued strongly that because the goal of social revolu-
tion was the deﬁning characteristic of socialism and critical in separating it from bourgeois
democracy, renouncing this explicit goal was tantamount to relinquishing that which was
of any theoretical or practical value (Luxemburg, 2004d). However, if we read Luxemburg
carefully, we see that she does hew to the classic Marxist line that the time is not always
ripe for a socialist revolution, since the latter `presupposes...a deﬁnite degree of maturity
of economic and political relations' (Luxemburg, 2004d, 158); conditions which were most
deﬁnitely not present in Russia in 1917. In fact, she explicitly criticises Blanquist minority
coups, which she characterises as `bursting out at any minute like a pistol shot, and for this
very reason, always inopportunely' (Luxemburg, 2004d, 158), a seemingly entirely accurate
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description of the work of the Bolsheviks. She clariﬁed this further in her analysis of the
Revolution of 1905 in Russia, writing: `Before absolutism can, and may be, overthrown, the
bourgeois Russia must be formed in its interior' (Luxemburg, 2004a, 182).
In a later piece we see the extent of confusion over Russia among European socialists. For
having suggested above that there are severe problems with subverting the standard order of
Marxist development, she then argues that the events of 1905 reﬂect `the high development
of capitalism, modern industry and commerce in Russia' even though (as she recognises) the
bourgeoisie is barely extant in the country at this time (Luxemburg, 2004e, 224). So Russia
presents a curious paradox, on Luxemburg's reading, of a proletariat driving a bourgeois
revolution in order to ultimately achieve proletarian rule. This ultimately plays out in her
criticism of Lenin's conception of democratic centralism since, Luxemburg argues, `the nec-
essary conditions for it could not yet be said to exist in full measure in Russia at the present
time' due to the limited political schooling of the Russian proletariat (Luxemburg, 2004b,
253). In her consideration of the Russian revolution, written in the immediate aftermath
but published only posthumously in 1922, Luxemburg caustically upbraids Kautsky for be-
lieving that no socialist revolution could take place in Russia. However, while she evinces
admiration for the perspicacity of Trotsky and Lenin, she is extremely critical of the decision
to allow the peasants to seize the estate of the aristocracy, seeing this as merely the transfer
of private property from one hand to another, rather than the instantiation of communal
property (Luxemburg, 2004c, 292)21.
Neither Kautsky nor Luxemburg were much help in terms of strategising how to overcome
the extremely problematic legacy of the Emancipation of the Serfs, to which we shall turn
in our empirical section. With regard to ﬁnance, the work of Rudolf Hilferding is similarly
problematic, since it was similarly aimed at a highly industrialised country at the highest
stage of capitalism. Hilferding was an Austrian socialist whose most famous contribution to
21She was also harshly critical of the Bolsheviks for demurring on the question of socialist democracy, as
Luxemburg saw this as intertwined with the seizure of power by the proletariat: `It is the same thing as the
dictatorship of the proletariat' (Luxemburg, 2004c, 308).
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Marxism, Finance Capital, was published in 1910. This work took Marx's theory far beyond
the superﬁcial analysis of money and ﬁnance oﬀered in Capital and lays the foundation for
Lenin and Bukharin's theoretical work on imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism
(Bottomore, 1981).
Hilferding's basic perspective is that the demands of capitalism drive leading industrial-
ists to seek new markets and new bases of production, a process made far simpler by the
internationalisation of capital standards and the competition between locales for this invest-
ment (Hilferding, 1981, 317). The export of capital by rich industrialists to poor countries
brings into being a proletariat class through `forced expropriation', often with the active
help of the state in a given country (Hilferding, 1981, 319). The best of all outcomes is for
the state in which the industry is based to take control of the locale, which explains the
tight link between the export of capital and imperialism and also drives tension between
the imperialist nations (Hilferding, 1981, 329). Ultimately, Hilferding notes, `[f]inance cap-
ital does not want freedom, but dominion' (Hilferding, 1981, 334), replacing the bourgeois
ideology of democratic peace with the capitalist demand for avaricious aggression towards
others. It is only when we realise that the logic of ﬁnancial imperialism extends to the do-
mestic front that we see why this became so problematic for Lenin and Bukharin; just as any
added cost to the expansion of ﬁnance capital abroad should be minimised, preferably using
the state, so the same applies to the domestic sphere, where the major cost to capital is
labour and therefore the proletariat. Thus, the fundamental question illuminated by ﬁnance
capital is that `of a struggle for power waged by the working class against the organized
power of the bourgeoisie, the state' (Hilferding, 1981, 355). While Hilferding does not take
it to this extreme, one potential way to cut this Gordian knot is to thoroughly emasculate
ﬁnance capital in order to free the proletariat from its demands and this is broadly what
Bukharin recommends before realising that the steps required for this are so disastrous that
they threaten the entire ediﬁce of Bolshevik power.
It is clear from the works of these prominent socialist thinkers that Russia was, for
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the most part, far from their minds until the tumultuous events of 1917, at which point
both Luxemburg and Kautsky were highly critical of the conduct of the Bolsheviks (albeit
for diﬀerent reasons). Hilferding mentions Russia, but only as a potential threat to the
rising Germany that is the shadow empirical case for much of his book. The economic
analysis and eﬀorts of these thinkers were primarily devoted to considering the transition
from an advanced economy to socialism, in accordance with the laws of economic development
outlined by Marx and Engels, or of developing a softer alternative in the case of Bernstein.
As we turn to the work of prominent Russian socialists, we shall see that they also paid fealty
to the tenets of this analysis, limiting their preparedness for conducting the transformation
in Russia.
3.3.1 Russian Socialists
While considering the work of Kautsky, Luxemburg and Hilferding is instructive in terms
of setting the overarching context in which the major Russian thinkers were situated, it can
only take us part of the way to understanding the ﬂawed economic programme enacted in
the immediate years following the Bolshevik seizure of power. For this we turn to three
Russian socialists who represent the spectrum of opinions but ultimately demonstrate the
same fatalism concerning the course of historical events that would prove so damaging for
the conduct and formulation of economic policy. We begin with Georgi Plekhanov, who was
largely responsible for introducing Marxism to Russia, then move to consider two of the more
central thinkers for our purpose, Vladimir Lenin and Nikolai Bukharin. Bukharin is perhaps
the ideal ﬁgure for this speciﬁc paper because the shifts in his thought encapsulate the
general trajectory of the Bolsheviks and illustrate the uncertainty and damaging reversions
that characterised their policy making, as he shifted from one of the most radical voices on
the left of the party clamouring for the destruction of the ﬁnancial system and expropriation
of the peasantry to become the staunchest defender of the rightist New Economic Policy in
the space of just four years.
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Georgi Plekhanov, widely credited as the father of Russian Marxism, stood well to the
right of the Bolsheviks by the time of the 1917 Revolution and was thus sidelined in sub-
sequent debates, although his passing in May of 1918 entailed his practical inﬂuence would
have been inevitably rather limited (Baron, 1995). However, Plekhanov's thought is fascinat-
ing because it represents a curious evolution, one that would take him away from the actual
current of events in Russia and demonstrate just how pernicious the Marxist ideational frame
could be in terms of exerting inﬂuence over thinkers and revolutionaries who would otherwise
be well situated to assess the conditions on the ground and tailor their tactics and reforms
accordingly. The young Plekhanov had an astute understanding of the peasant problem in
Imperial Russia and was actively engaged in attempting to foment revolution in the coun-
tryside as a precursor to widespread social change in the late 1870s and early 1880s (Baron,
1954). Thus, in an early piece from 1879, Plekhanov challenges directly those who assume
that there is one path of historical development and that Russia must therefore follow the
European states before it can transition to socialism (Plekhanov, 1905); this represents a
clear break with established Marxism and diﬀers markedly from the abstract nature of the
discussions among the leading European intellectuals we saw outlined above22.
Baron convincingly notes that Plekhanov was forced to abandon his theoretical position
regarding the peasantry following the publication of a book showing the irreversible decline
of the commune and this, in combination with his European sojourn from 1880 until 1917,
solidiﬁed his conversion to a more orthodox Marxist perspective (Baron, 1954). By mid-1880
Plekhanov was already evincing that he was no longer committed to the position that Rus-
sia's historical path would vary from that of any other country, and he arrived at his ﬁnal
position that the country's ultimate trajectory must pass through capitalist development.
Furthermore, he entirely dropped his focus on the historical role of the peasantry, arriving
at the far more orthodox (and damaging) position that the peasantry were largely irrelevant
22Baron justly suggests the strong inﬂuence of an earlier Russian anarcho-socialist on Plekhanov's thinking
at this stage, Mikhail Bakunin (Baron, 1954).
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for the purposes of this development (Ko lakowski, 1978). Plekhanov lays out his conception
of scientiﬁc socialism in contradistinction to the narodist and anarchist tendencies he sees as
both dominant in Russia and hopelessly utopian and in two works, from 1883 and 1885, he
illustrates his transition from his earlier position to a more orthodox Marxism (Plekhanov,
1974b,a). In the ﬁrst piece, Socialism and the Political Struggle, he even criticises the po-
sitions he had held a few years before, describing the notion of Russian exceptionalism as
a `ﬁction' that was founded on `extremely widespread ignorance...of the economic history
of the West' (Plekhanov, 1974b, 64). This position placed Plekhanov closer to Marxist or-
thodoxy and allowed for the continuing profusion of these doctrinal disputes into Russian
socialist discourse, but the cost was extremely high in terms of blunting the appreciation of
the unusual situation of Russia.
To be more speciﬁc, Plekhanov's lucid and compelling explication of the Marxists to a
Russian audience was tremendously inﬂuential, integrating Marxist thought with the pre-
ceding strands of narodism and populism that had characterised socialist discourse in the
country to that point. The cost of so doing was, however, considerable, for it introduced
an orthodoxy and rigid structure on debates that had previously been directed explicitly to
addressing the particular problems facing the growth of socialism in Russia. Plekhanov's
theoretical shift on the question of the peasantry is most instructive, dropping his belief
in the potential revolutionary power of the countryside and replacing it with the standard
slogans concerning the power of the proletariat. His work would inﬂuence the work of both
Lenin and Bukharin, ensuring that the leading Bolsheviks were desperately ill-prepared to
deal with the peasant question upon the seizure of power in November 1917.
We can see how this plays out in much of the early work of Vladimir Lenin, which is
the most informative in terms of Lenin's writings on the peasantry. Given that Lenin has
already featured prominently in the ﬁrst paper and is of suﬃcient notoriety, no biographical
sketch seems to be needed here. Notwithstanding some familiarity with the complexity of
the rural situation, Lenin clearly relied on orthodox formulations that ultimately lead to
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him denigrating the potential role of the rural communities in driving social change. His
reductionist division of the peasantry into two classes dramatically simpliﬁed the actual
situation in the countryside and was seriously damaging for the Bolsheviks' understanding
and theoretical positioning on this vital question. This will, as we shall see, prove extremely
costly given the dependence of the central government on the countryside in the initial years
of Bolshevik rule as the policies antagonised this critical group without demonstrating that
Bolshevik rule would resolve any of the fundamental problems facing it.
In one of the earliest-known of his written works, Lenin evinces knowledge of the complex-
ity of the peasant situation in Russia by summarising in depth a recent report on conditions
in southern Russia, but he is also already seeking to divide the peasantry into Marxist classes,
which was empirically problematic given the scarcity of supposedly `bourgeois' peasants. Re-
viewing Postnikov's description of farming, Lenin argues that `a study of peasant farming...is
quite impossible unless the peasants are divided into groups', where these groups are basi-
cally classes, with penurious peasants one one end of the scale and exploitative peasants on
the other (Lenin, 1960e, 69)23. Drawing on this analysis, as early as 1893, Lenin argues that
the emergence of monopolistic trends combined with the spreading impoverishment of the
handicraftsmen entailed that `capitalism is already the main background of the economic life
of Russia' (Lenin, 1960f). However, it is clear that Lenin is not concerned with protecting
the life of the artisans and peasants who are suﬀering as a result of the shift (at least in
the sense that such protection would involve a defence of the existing order); it is precisely
this maudlin sentimentality for past times and attempt to prevent the emergence of the
exploitative bourgeoisie that he sees to be at the root of Narodism (Lenin, 1960c)24.
23In a later analysis in his Development of Capitalism in Russia, Lenin explicitly argues that the peasantry
is divided into a rural proletariat and a peasant bourgeoisie (Lenin, 1960b, 113), although there is an
unstable mittel peasant that is buﬀeted between these, owning land but not employing proletariat labour
and precariously situated with regard to material well-being. He estimates that the petty bourgeois among
the peasantry constitute around 20% of the peasant population but occupy a dominant role in production,
being the `masters' of the countryside' (Lenin, 1960b, 177). Orlando Figes argues that this is `pure fantasy'
and that as of 1917, only around 2% of the peasantry could credibly be classiﬁed as employing wage labour
(Figes, 1996, 617).
24Lenin was not against reforms that ameliorated the well-being of the downtrodden classes, but he saw
172
Moreover, Lenin was evidently not hopeful concerning the revolutionary potential of the
rural communities25, notwithstanding his positing of the dual-class structure of agrarian life.
Addressing his fellow Social Democrats at the end of 1897, he describes the rural labourers
as part of the `backward strata of the proletariat' and argues that it is not yet appropriate to
begin agitating these workers because priority must be given to the urban centres26 (Lenin,
1960h, 330). Nor does Lenin advocate for the preservation of the mir at this juncture27,
seeing this as a core feature of the Narodism that he ridicules28. Indeed, he writes that
`the Russian community peasantry are not antagonists of capitalism, but...its deepest and
most durable foundation', though he also recognises that the element of traditionalism in
agriculture entails that capitalism is slower to blossom in such communities (Lenin, 1960b,
173). He clariﬁed his thinking in outlining the agrarian programme of the Russian Social
Democrats, written and published in the year 1902 (Lenin, 1961a). He we see the extent to
which the peasantry represents such a diﬃcult problem for Lenin and his compatriots; Lenin
argues that `in present day society the peasantry of course no longer constitutes an integral
class' because it will divide into rural proletariat and bourgeoisie (Lenin, 1961a, 115). As
such, the Social Democrats have no interest in defending the independent interests29 of the
these as a means to an end, the end being `to speed up the development of this [capitalist] system and,
consequently, its downfall' (Lenin, 1960c, 370). In the disagreement between Bernstein and Luxemburg,
then, Lenin is clearly on the side of the latter.
25A point with which Stalin was in complete agreement. Writing in Georgian in 1901, he notes that
notwithstanding the suﬀering of the peasantry, it `is still downtrodden by age-long slavery, poverty and
ignorance' (Stalin, 1952, 21), meaning that the proletariat are the only option for forcing the hand of the
tsarist regime.
26Plekhanov began his revolutionary career by attempting to stir up revolutionary sentiments among the
peasantry and enjoyed considerable initial success, but he soon dropped this in favour of urban mobilisation
(Baron, 1954).
27Lenin's position on this was seriously complicated at the turn of the century, for he also argues that the
Social Democrats should uphold the commune `as a democratic organisation of local government' (Lenin,
1961a, 146). However, they should push for the annulment of the principle of collective liability in order to
grant greater freedom to the individual members of the commune and thus foment capitalism. He clariﬁes
this in his appeal to the rural poor from the Social Democrats, arguing that the mir should be replaced by
a voluntary association that can help the poor to ﬁght the rich (Lenin, 1961b).
28`The Narodnik is stubbornly determined to believe in a non-existent non-capitalist development which
is a ﬁgment of his imagination' (Lenin, 1960d, 519).
29Lenin allowed that those interests of the peasantry that would help foment the formation and strength-
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peasantry, but only the nascent rural proletariat.
At the turn of the century, Lenin was a strong intellectual ally of Kautsky, defending
him against criticism of his analysis of the development of agriculture and siding with him
against Bernstein regarding the debates over the materialist conception of history and the
appropriate theory of value (Lenin, 1960a,g). He continued to adhere to Kautsky's views af-
ter the 1905 Revolution, agreeing that the primary task facing the Russian Social Democrats
is `not that of eﬀecting the socialist revolution but that of removing the political obstacles to
the development of the existing, capitalist, mode of production' (Lenin, 1962b, 232). Note
here that Lenin emphasises the fact that the primary obstacles to capitalist development are
political, not economic at this stage of Russian development, which explains the enthusiasm
for democratic reforms displayed by Lenin at this juncture. We ﬁnd further evidence for
this in another piece from 1905, where Lenin states that the full abolition of private prop-
erty (the ultimate goal of the Social Democrats) cannot be achieved without `a very high
development of the productive forces of capitalism' but that this is `inconceivable without
complete political freedom' (Lenin, 1962a, 511). The role of the proletariat is to embolden
the bourgeoisie to seek political freedom, but the countryside at this juncture is relegated to
an irrelevance and this was the position he would broadly hold until the Revolution in 1917,
especially given that he would be in exile from 1907-1917, spending his time in Western
Europe and distanced from the situation in his native land.
With that, we turn to Nikolai Bukharin. Bukharin was an extraordinary ﬁgure in early
Bolshevik history, ﬂitting from the far left to the far right in the space of a few years follow-
ing the November Revolution. As suggested above, Bukharin encapsulates the problems the
Bolsheviks faced in the realm of economic policy and the relationship with Marxist thought.
He argued initially for policies that would have tested the structure of an advanced industrial
polity in terms of the dismemberment of the role of ﬁnance and the trampling of the country-
ening of the rural proletariat, such as the abolition of all remnants of serfdom, were defensible. But he
saw these as exceptional cases since they retarded the development of capitalism and were not generally
applicable (Lenin, 1961a, 134).
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side, but that proved completely disastrous in the Russian case. Then he moved to a more
moderate perspective that called for a gradual shift away from the rural-based economy and
a slow transformation that would allow Russia to continue along the path to capitalism be-
fore reaching the socialist heights. By this time, his earlier position had largely undermined
the prospects for a peaceful transition and the Russian economy was on its knees by the
time the New Economic Policy was inaugurated. Nicholas Kozlov has attempted to defend
Bukharin's about-face with regard to the transformation period by arguing that it reﬂected
the changing circumstances and Bukharin's thinking was informed throughout by a commit-
ment that `the building of socialism entailed an active if problematic role for the peasantry'
(Kozlov, 1990, 108). On Kozlov's interpretation, for Bukharin socialism was inevitably a
transitory state between capitalism and communism proper, so the speciﬁc dynamics were
of limited importance; War Communism and NEP were thus `diﬀerent phases of the same
process ' (Kozlov, 1990, 117: emphasis Kozlov's). This interpretation may have some truth
in it, but it also betrays the extent to which the Bolsheviks lacked a compelling framework
for their economic policies in the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union.
Unlike Lenin, where we focused primarily on his early writings to gain a ﬂavour of his
perspective on the peasantry, for Bukharin we begin by looking at a his Towards a Theory of
the Imperialist State, published in 1915 (Bukharin, 1982b). In this work, Bukharin outlines
his theory of imperialism that would exert a strong inﬂuence over Lenin; the outlines of this
we have already seen in our discussion of Hilferding. Bukharin sees the state in classical
Marxist perspective as simply the `most general organization of the ruling classes, its basic
function being to preserve and expand the exploitation of the oppressed classes' (Bukharin,
1982b, 8). As a result, the abolition of classes brings about the abolition of the state and,
ﬁnally, the abolition of all forms of oppression; `the society of the future is a society without
a state organization' (Bukharin, 1982b, 13; emphasis Bukharin's) and the sooner this can
be achieved, the better. Bukharin does acknowledge that for the revolution to succeed, the
dictatorship of the proletariat needs a transitional state structure, but this should take place
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after the proletariat `destroys the state organization of the bourgeoisie' (Bukharin, 1982b,
32). This is the major contribution of Bukharin with respect to the problem of ﬁnance
capital outlined by Hilferding and it bears signiﬁcant similarity to Lenin's view (Lenin,
1920). As we shall see, Bukharin's inﬂuence would be signiﬁcant in the immediate period
after the November Revolution as he defended radical tactics that did cause the near-collapse
of the bourgeois state machinery and the ﬁnancial system that it underlaid. This was the
implementation of standard Marxist thought on the problem, the issue being that the Russian
economy was far more dependent on state investment and support than should have been
the case in an advanced capitalist society, meaning that this brought the Bolsheviks near to
ruin and necessitated a dramatic shift in policy in order to avoid the complete collapse of
the economy.
For Bukharin's thoughts on the peasantry, we turn to his General Theory of the Trans-
formation Period (published in 1920). This book was a full-throated defence of War Com-
munism from the left, excusing the excesses as necessary for the construction of socialism:
`Capitalism was not built: it built itself. Socialism...is built by the proletariat, as organized
collective subject' (Bukharin, 1971, 68). Bukharin argues that in the transition to socialism,
the countryside will lag signiﬁcantly behind the city due to the dynamics of production in
agriculture and the persistence of partial payment in kind, which blunt the worst excesses of
capitalism (Bukharin, 1971, 89). Nevertheless, the inﬂuence of the city will overcome these
retarding elements, notwithstanding peasant resistance and demands for the redistribution of
land into private, rather than communal, hands. Moreover, Bukharin suggests that the only
means for arriving at a serviceable equilibrium between the city and country is through `state
coercion' to drive nationalisation of larger farms and collectivisation of the rest (Bukharin,
1971, 93). Without such a move, the interruption to production will leave the city with
nothing to oﬀer the country and therefore the socialist economy will be unable to get oﬀ the
ground. He also argues that a form of labour conscription (`universal compulsory labour')
will be necessary in order to resurrect the damaged system of production that is the legacy
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of the capitalist collapse (Bukharin, 1971, 111); this, combined with the overall orchestra-
tion of the economy, will generate signiﬁcant technological advances that will revolutionise
agriculture and erase the distinction between city and country. We should note the internal
contradiction between the state-directed economy required to shift the economic locus of
activity from rural to urban centres and the demands Bukharin earlier made to dismantle
the bourgeois state; this tension would be writ large in the early Bolshevik years and force
a major change of direction. We shall return to Bukharin's ideological gymnastics when we
introduce the New Economic Policy but as this was largely an ad-hoc response to events
(albeit one conditioned by his Marxist training) it is out of place to introduce it at this
juncture as this section has been primarily concerned with establishing the parameters of
debate leading up to the 1917 November Revolution and immediate period following.
This eﬀectively sets the stage for the Bolsheviks up to the implementation of War Com-
munism. We see that all three of the major thinkers proﬁled in this section were strongly
inﬂuenced by Marxist orthodoxy and did not concern themselves with the speciﬁc conditions
in Russia or how these would inﬂuence the formulation and implementation of these policies.
In large part this was because the Marxist ideational framework did not lend itself to geo-
graphical adjustment; all countries were following a broadly similar developmental path and
all would ultimately progress to socialism once the inevitable revolution took place. We shall
that this was to prove extremely costly, but in order to set the state we must begin with an
appreciation of the imperial legacies that Tsar Nicholas II bequeathed to the Bolsheviks30.
3.3.2 Imperial Legacies
Having examined the plethora of diﬀerent theoretical positions both within the Bolshevik
party and European Marxism/socialism as a whole, we can now move to considering how
these impacted the formation of economic policy in the early years of Bolshevik rule. First
30The transitional government of Alexander Kerensky that was in power from February to November
1917 following Nicholas' abdication was too short-lived to accomplish anything substantial in the realm of
economics and will thus not feature in this paper.
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we should consider the imperial legacy as this exerted a direct bearing on the ability (or
otherwise) of the Bolsheviks to implement their preferred vision and it helps us to further
understand the extent to which the leading Bolsheviks were unprepared to take the reigns
of the economy following the November Revolution. We shall pay particular attention to
the role of the state in the economy and the problematic legacy of the Emancipation of the
Serfs in 1861. Then we shall move to the policies enacted following the revolution, focusing
on War Communism and the New Economic Policy as indicative of the theoretical morass
into which the Bolsheviks fell following their assumption of power in November 1917.
When Tsar Nicholas II ascended to the imperial throne in 1894, he inherited an empire
with a population of 129.4m and covering over eight million square miles (Charques, 1958)31.
However, this was an empire in serious trouble; a large proportion of this population was
peasant and rural and the great reforms of the nineteenth century, in particular the Eman-
cipation of the Serfs in 1861, were still working their way through the system32. Power in
the countryside was held either by the great landowners or the peasant commune (the mir),
with the condition of the individual peasant ultimately disarmingly similar to the situation
prior to 1861, albeit with diﬀerent masters and a somewhat altered social structure.
Compounding this issue were the restraints on peasant mobility that had been enacted
along with the Emancipation. Peasants seeking to leave the mir had to have both the
approval of the elder of their family and the collective support of the commune (two-thirds
majority) (Charques, 1958), a restraint that was in place until Sergei Witte's construction of
the Trans-Siberian railway and the drive to resettle peasants from the seriously overcrowded
Black Earth region to sparsely settled Siberia (Judge, 1992). As a result, from 1893-1902
over one million peasants relocated (this compared with just over 500,000 for the thirty
intervening years between Emancipation and 1893) (Judge, 1992, 77). However, this did
31As a point of reference, the continental United States is just over three and a half million square miles.
32The forty-nine year redemption payments owed by the liberated serfs to the former owners of the land
were scheduled to end only in 1910 and were based on substantial over-valuations, constituting a major source
of rural tension (Charques, 1958). These were ﬁnally cancelled in the aftermath of the 1905 Revolution as a
concession to the peasantry (Fitzpatrick, 1994).
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not solve the basic problems of unequal population distribution and severe land shortages,
both of which were compounded by massive population growth in the 1880s and 1890s. In
1902 widespread peasant revolts forced the central administration to reconsider the wisdom
of perpetuating the extraordinary levels of land shortage, although a severe conﬂict between
Witte and Viacheslav Plehve, the Minister of Interior33, prevented a graceful and rapid
solution emerging34 (Judge, 1992).
Witte attempted to advance Russian industrialisation through state-led development,
drawing on the German model founded in his admiration of Otto von Bismarck (Wcislo,
2011), with a particular focus on the railways (the Trans-Siberian railway was largely con-
structed under Witte) and a large increase in foreign capital investment (Barnett, 2004).
Witte saw the focus on industrial development and the corresponding shift from agriculture
as essential for supporting the legitimacy of the House of the Romanovs35. He moved Rus-
sia on to the gold standard to encourage foreign investment in August 1897 and oversaw
tremendous internal growth, but his decision to route the Trans-Siberian railway through
Manchuria rather than remaining in the territory of the Russian Empire was a direct pre-
cursor to the Russo-Japanese War that would undo the impregnability of the imperial state
that he had worked to support (Wcislo, 2011).
Pyotr Stolypin, who was plucked from relative obscurity as Governor of Saratov to head
the Ministry of the Interior in April 1906, was to be the man who resumed Witte's quixotic
attempt to provide the tottering ediﬁce of tsarism with the necessary economic stability36.
He arrived in the capital in the aftermath of the 1905 Revolution, facing continuing unrest
33Plehve and Witte were united as to the importance of resettlement in easing problems of order and
economic growth, respectively, but Plehve wanted a far greater central oversight of the resettlement process
than Witte, who was primarily concerned with helping spur industry.
34Their dispute was ended by a combination of Witte losing the post in Minister of Finance, the outbreak
of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904, Plehve's assassination in June of that year and, most importantly, the
outbreak of the 1905 Revolution.
35Wcislo has argued that thanks to Witte's programme of state-led capital infusions, by the start of World
War One, the levels of investment had become `self-sustaining' (Wcislo, 2011, 143).
36Witte, a notoriously jealous man, did not look kindly on Stolypin's reforms and believed the latter man
was claiming credit for trends that had started under his administration (Wcislo, 2011).
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in the Empire, and was immediately swept up in the debates over agrarian reform given
the worrying levels of famine plaguing the Russian Empire. The fact that Saratov had
experienced more destruction of gentry property in 1905-6 than any other province in the
Russian Empire would strongly inﬂuence Stolypin's belief in the importance of resolving
agrarian problems (Figes, 1996). If the Bolsheviks had taken a similar lesson from the same
events and understood fully both the radical potential of the peasantry and the widespread
grievances that fuelled this unrest, they could have managed the post-1917 situation with far
more sensitivity and elan than would prove to be the case. As we shall see, the reliance on
forced collectivisation and state coercion favoured by Bukharin won the day, but had deeply
inimical consequences for their future policies.
Stolypin rapidly replaced the feeble Ivan Goremykin as Prime Minister and embarked
on a widescale reform of the Russian economy, directing many of his eﬀorts to preventing
the causes of dissatisfaction that he saw as driving support for the revolutionaries37. His
attempts to remake the Imperial countryside were centred on freeing the peasantry from
dependence on the peasant commune, an attempt to fully break the shackles that had been
at best partially severed by the Emancipation of the Serfs in 1861. For Stolypin, restoring
order was closely linked to the prosperity of the peasantry, which by implication meant the
widespread development of private property38. He oversaw a dramatic increase in the amount
of land available to peasants, implemented reforms to diminish the social stigmatisation of
the peasantry and loosened the hold of the mir, but he anticipated having twenty years for
his reforms to take eﬀect; they had at best eight before the outbreak of the First World War
(Barnett, 2004). Even in this short time period, Ascher suggests that the markedly limited
results did not bode well; by 1914 only 20% of peasants enjoyed private ownership of land
37This included concrete steps such as ensuring the eﬀective functioning of the Peasants' Bank and oﬀering
some degree of protection to peasants from rapacious landowners (Ascher, 2001). However, he also oversaw
the attempts to quell peasant insurrection through less noble means; the nooses used to hang prominent rural
revolutionaries were named `Stolypin's neckties' in commemoration of his perceived oppressive techniques
(Figes, 1996, 221).
38`Private peasant ownership is a guarantee of order, because each small owner represents the nucleus on
which rests the stability of the state' - so wrote Stolypin to Tsar Nicholas II in 1905 (Ascher, 2001, 156).
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and the number leaving the commune in 1913 was just 27% of that in 1908 (Ascher, 2001,
164). Figes has suggested that on the basis of this rate of progress, nearly a century would
have been required to build the class of agrarian bourgeoisie needed to buttress the system
Stolypin envisaged (Figes, 1996, 240). However, Stolypin's assassination in 191139 and the
outbreak of war in 1914 conclusively brought to an end any hopes that the agrarian problem
could be decisively resolved without further major unrest, which arrived in the 1917 double
revolutions of February and November, the latter bringing the Bolsheviks to power.
There is much more we could say about the imperial period, but for our purposes it should
be clear that the imperial legacy was unpromising from a Marxist perspective, particularly
along the lines of the two factors identiﬁed above. The state was a driver of industrialisation,
with many of Witte's projects continuing until the outbreak of the First World War and not
being replaced by private capital. While this may seem on a superﬁcial level to support
the perspective of Hilferding and Bukharin that the interests of state and capital are funda-
mentally interlinked, the orthodox perspective was that capital should be under control of
industrialists who dominate the state, rather than the reverse. This distinction would prove
of great consequence when Bukharin successfully advocated the evisceration of the ﬁnancial
sector as part of the plan to overthrow the state machinery. The prospects regarding the
peasantry were, if anything, less promising. The countryside was still largely unreformed
and the peasant grievances largely unaddressed by the time of the fall of the regime, while
the agricultural sector was far more prominent for the Russian economy than should have
been the case according to Marxist beliefs. This would again result in serious missteps, as
we shall see in the next section.
39As Figes has suggested, the fact that Stolypin singularly failed to build a broad base of support or to
generate any `stolypinites' who would be willing to continue his reforms in the absence of their leader suggest
that his project was probably doomed given the untenability of his political position in the months before
his death (Figes, 1996).
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3.3.3 From War Communism to the New Economic Policy
We have seen in the ﬁrst paper that the Bolsheviks were in a rather desperate situation with
regard to state- and nation-building in November 1917, with weak control over large parts
of the country and systemic problems of order impeding their attempts to implement the
nation-building policy that Stalin had outlined in 1913. Turning to the principal topic of
this paper, we see that the economic situation was no better. The First World War had
brought Imperial Russia to its knees, inﬂation was spiralling out of control and the Civil
War was very much in prospect following the Bolshevik seizure of power. Although the
economy of the Russian Empire was the ﬁfth-largest in the world in 1917 (Pipes, 1990, 681),
by October of that year only six percent of the currency in circulation was covered by gold
reserves (down from 104% in July 1914), suggesting that the Bolsheviks faced a problem
of inﬂationary trends in the currency regardless of their policy (Barnett, 2004, 51). A
better grasp of the economic situation of the country might have helped to Bolsheviks secure
support in areas where they lacked it, particularly in the countryside, but the determination
to press on with radical policies in an attempt to forge a socialist shortcut defeated this
possibility. By the point at which the Bolsheviks realised the excesses of War Communism
and reverted to the New Economic Policy, a more gradual approach to reform intended to
take the country further along the road of capitalist development, it was arguably too late to
ﬁx the situation created by the initial excesses. In a strange sense, both policies represented
orthodox Marxist procedure in terms of the transformation of a capitalist economy; War
Communism and the early policies basically reﬂected the established doctrine in place for
advanced capitalist states, whereas the more gradual New Economic Policy was a sustained
eﬀort to help Russia continue along the standard path of development before the advance to
full socialism. Neither met with particular success, but the sequencing was disastrous, since
the radical measures alienated essential constituencies who were then predisposed to block
future Bolshevik eﬀorts.
Returning to our two main themes of interest for the Bolsheviks, we see that neither policy
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was particularly successful. With regard to the peasant question, War Communism sharply
illustrated the lack of knowledge and failure to grasp the situation of the leading Bolsheviks.
We have already seen in the ﬁrst paper that the low levels of rural support for Bolsheviks
in the pre-revolutionary period reﬂected the fact that they had been comprehensively out-
argued on the peasant question by the Social Revolutionaries, who had developed a core
base of support in the countryside due to their long record of attempt to resolve the major
problems facing the peasantry (Fitzpatrick, 1994). The New Economic Policy represented a
realisation that the excesses of the previous policy were doing immense harm to the legitimacy
of Bolshevik rule and attempted to arrive at a modus vivendi with the countryside, but the
damage of forced collectivisation and expropriation of the peasants meant they were little
inclined to trust the Bolsheviks. As with Stolypin's reforms, it could have enjoyed greater
success over the long run, but was choked oﬀ by Stalin's renewed push for collectivisation
in the late 1920s; in any case it was probably fatally damaged due to Bukharin's ideological
switch. With regard to ﬁnance and capital, War Communism represented a push by Bukharin
and others on the far left to dismember the existing ﬁnancial system and replace it with the
ideal of a barter economy, though this again largely represented a failure to understand the
underlying dynamics and drivers of the Russian economy and was internally contradictory
due to the Bolshevik reliance on state power and ﬁnancing. Again, the New Economic Policy
sought to correct this and was more successful than with the peasant question, but not to
the extent that it could provide a basis for opposing Stalin.
We should note that there is considerable historical controversy concerning the extent to
which War Communism and the New Economic Policy, the two policies that would deﬁne
this early period of Bolshevik rule, represented the culmination of careful planning or were
a hasty reaction to unforeseen events by a party riven by internal schisms. The truth, as is
almost always the case with these matters, lies between these two extremes. Richard Pipes
represents a strong proponent of the notion that Bolshevik policy making was primarily the
product of preconceived plans. He claims that `Bolshevik economic policies in the ﬁrst years
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of the regime were neither improvisations nor reactions' and argues that throughout the early
years of the regime, Bolshevik economic policy was directed at eliminating private property,
with laws in 1918 directed at abolishing inheritance, debt and the expropriation of urban
landed property (Pipes, 1990, 672). He views War Communism as a major development
in this general trajectory and that this was not a response to the exigencies of the Civil
War but something that had long been planned and was implemented regardless of the dire
economic situation. However, as Pipes recognises, these attempts to abolish property and
a monetary system by decree were often not worth the paper on which they were written.
Given what we have learned in the ﬁrst paper, it is unsurprising that the nascent Soviet state
was unable to enforce such extraordinary measures as the abolition of the monetary system
and replacement by barter (Pipes, 1990). Julie Hessler oﬀers a more moderate version of
this claim in her research on the dynamics of trade in early Soviet Russia, arguing that
`[c]entralization was the governing principle behind Soviet interventions' (Hessler, 2004, 56).
She notes that the Bolsheviks sought to bring all the quasi-bourgeois communes under the
supervision of VSNKh (Supreme Council of the National Economy) and stripped away the
independence of the communes due to concerns about their fealty and obeisance to Bolshevik
power.
Alec Nove, meanwhile, sees War Communism as the result of the parlous economic situ-
ation and the lack of coherent forward planning by the Bolsheviks, suggesting that it `was
an amalgam of response to the harsh necessity of civil war and of a naive attempt to leap
quickly into socialism' (Nove, 1977, 17). Alan Ball is also an advocate of the position that
War Communism was largely a response to the exigencies of the initial situation after seiz-
ing power, but that it was easy to ﬁt these emergency measures into a rhetorical frame
that emphasised the necessity of a rapid transition to socialism (Ball, 1990). Representing
a media via is the work of Nicholas Kozlov, who suggests that both of these positions are
rather extreme. As we have seen above, there is undeniable evidence that the exigencies of
the situation took leading Bolsheviks by surprise and that War Communism was a response
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to the extremely troubling economic situation of the immediate post-revolutionary years.
Nevertheless, Kozlov suggests that it was integrated into a theoretical narrative after the
event, with subsequent developments viewed as evolutions from the starting point of War
Communism (Kozlov, 1990). Figes also supports the moderate view, suggesting that viewing
War Communism as either purely pragmatic or purely ideologically driven lead to problem-
atic interpretations of the actual facts. He suggests that the purely pragmatic perspective
ignores the fact that War Communism was an integral part of the conduct of the Civil War,
while the purely ideological school ignores the very real debates over the conduct of economic
policy in 1918. Instead, he prefers to view War Communism as `a political response to the
urban crisis of 1918' (Figes, 1996, 614). We shall delve into the nature of this urban crisis
in due course.
War Communism was the policy that was inaugurated in 1918 as soon as the Bolsheviks
realised that they would need signiﬁcant resources to ﬁght the Civil War, though as Pipes
notes it was only given this name in 1921 during the shift to the New Economic Policy
as part of a post-hoc rhetorical justiﬁcation for the hardships endured by the population
(Pipes, 1990, 671). Tactically speaking, Lenin was in an extremely weak position and forced
to accede to Bukharin's push to radicalise economic policies. This was largely the result of
Lenin having accepted peace with Germany to bring the First World War to an end through
the Treaty of Bretsk-Litovsk40; Bukharin and the left faction of the Bolsheviks viewed this
as an unforgivable compromise and would ultimately go on to form the Left Communists,
who would press Lenin for ever-more radical economic policies (Pipes, 1990). The First
World War and Civil War were also responsible for a dramatic reduction in the quantity of
usable agricultural land (though peasant resistance also contributed); in Kabardino-Balkaria
autonomous oblast there was a 50% reduction in the available sowing area in comparison
with 1913 and the horse population, absolutely critical given the low level of technological
40Figes reports that this resulted in Russia relinquishing 34% of her population and 32% of her agricultural
land; German property was also exempt from nationalisation (Figes, 1996).
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advancement (by 1924, when the ﬁrst tractors appeared in the AO, only 49% of households
claimed possession of a horse), had seen a threefold decrease. It was hardly surprising that
famine would be rampant in the AO in 1921-1922. (Áåðáåêîâ, 1958).
By 1920 all banks with the exception of the People's Bank had been liquidated and
inﬂation was rampant due to the issuance of currency with no backing; by October 1919
prices had increased by a factor of 923 in comparison with 1913, and by 1923 the level of
price increases had reached an extraordinary 650m%, making the paper roubles eﬀectively
worthless (Pipes, 1990, 683). Real wages were at 2% of their 1913 level by 1920 and the
average worker's monthly salary was enough to aﬀord merely three days of food. This collapse
of the monetary system was seen as a great achievement by the Left Communists, of whom
Bukharin was the most prominent, who always viewed the abolition of money as the ultimate
aim of the Bolshevik government. However, they were ﬁnally and with much regret forced to
realise the utopian extent of this wish by the severe problems of settling intra-governmental
debts (Pipes, 1990, 688). This systemic collapse also had the problem of facilitating autarky
in the countryside, for the villagers had little need to trade with the cities, who had little
to oﬀer but worthless paper roubles. This generated a mass emigration to the countryside,
exacerbating the issue of underindustrialisation; even those workers who did not choose to
move spent many days shuttling between the countryside and city, struggling to survive on
the black market and generating an average absenteeism rate of 30% (Figes, 1996).
The response to this spiralling dependence on primitive market relations was to institute
War Communism, which eﬀectively banned all trading and introduced state rationing, as well
as conﬁscation of all peasant surplus. In place of trade, a centrally coordinated commodity
exchange (tovaroobmen) was organised that would provide peasants with supposedly valuable
material goods in exchange for food, a step that satisﬁed neither the peasantry (who preferred
the surety of the market price of grain) nor the central planners in the cities, who felt the
peasants were duping them (Hessler, 2004). We have seen in the previous section how
complex the relationship of the leading Bolsheviks was to the peasantry; War Communism
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cut this Gordian knot by casting the peasant as agents of reaction preventing the development
and emergence of the socialist economy. An army of 76,000 was assembled to ensure the
peasants complied with this order; their general levels of discipline and attention to task were
no higher than that of the Red Army recruits, further inﬂaming the hatred of the peasantry
for the Bolsheviks and leading to widespread revolts (Figes, 1996). Lenin's attempts to
portray these requisitions as a `loan' from the peasantry to the state did not help to assuage
peasant concerns that their goods were being traded for a song (Hessler, 2004, 74).
However, this was as nothing compared to the trouble that would result from the collec-
tivisation of land, instantiated by the Statute on Socialist Land Organisation in February
1919; by December 1920 there would be over 16,000 collective farms (Figes, 1996). The ris-
ing grievances would result in the Peasant Wars of 1921; by this point much of rural Russia
was experiencing famine to rival the worst days of tsarism41 and outbreaks of resistance to
the requisitions were widespread across the countryside, from the Don and Kuban to Omsk
and Tomsk, paralysing Soviet infrastructure for months at a time (Figes, 1996). Meanwhile
in the city, full-scale nationalisation of industry formed the other major component of War
Communism. The Bolshevik government had issued a decree in the days immediately follow-
ing the Revolution granting control of all factories to the workers, although the potential for
full-scale decentralisation of control of the means of production was limited by the creation
of the VSNKh four days after this decree (Malle, 1985, 47).
The progress of nationalisation of enterprises in the period after the Revolution bore a
strong similarity to the deportation of the Cossacks in the North Caucasus and the declara-
tion of sovereignty by various territories in that it progressed haphazardly and with a strong
impetus from below, rather than strict oversight from VSNKh (Malle, 1985)42. VSNKh
41Figes estimates that in Samara province alone 700,000 people perished by the end of the famine in 1922
(Figes, 1996, 776).
42The series of nationalisations of factories and industries by the Terek Sovnarkom in the North Caucasus
region in 1918 provides an excellent example of this (×åðäèæèåâ, 1971). We have seen in the ﬁrst paper
that Bolshevik control over this region was eﬀective in name only until the end of the Civil War, meaning
that these nationalisations were certainly not within the purview of central authorities.
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struggled to impose order on the extent of conﬁscation of enterprises and in April 1918 de-
creed that enterprises nationalised without its explicit approval would not be funded from
the public purse, a potentially crippling blow (prior to this decree VSNKh or Sovnarkom
had been responsible for under a third of nationalisations) (Malle, 1985). One of the coun-
tervailing forces to the widespread unemployment was the growth of the bureaucracy, which
positively ballooned under the Bolsheviks. Figes estimates that from 1917 to 1921 there was
a fourfold increase in the number of government workers, with the ﬁgure in 1921 standing
at 2.4m, twice the number of workers (Figes, 1996, 688).
Notwithstanding Bukharin's full-throated defence of War Communism, by early 1921 it
became extremely evident that this was a ruinous policy and needed urgent emendation.
The attempt to railroad the Russian state and economy into a socialist paradise by skip-
ping wholesale critical developmental steps was largely in ruins and there was widespread
acknowledgement of the need to shift course. The initial framework that the Bolsheviks
had tried to use was manifestly unsuited for the task, having been predicated on a set of
circumstances that was completely alien to the material situation in Russia in 1918. It had
also contributed to the economic devastation of the two wars, meaning that by 1922 37%
of peasant households lacked a draft animal of any kind (Fitzpatrick, 1994, 25), making an
increase in the productivity of many farms eﬀectively impossible without serious investment
and policy changes. The alternative was the New Economic Policy, which we turn to now.
The New Economic Policy was, in large sense, a recognition that the excesses of War
Communism were self-defeating and undermining what little legitimacy the November Rev-
olution enjoyed amongst the majority of the Russian population. Lenin justiﬁed this as a
return to the project of advancing Russia through the stages of economic development that
had been his concern throughout much of the period leading up to the November Revolution.
The problem was that many Bolshevik supporters saw this concession as a betrayal, leaving
Lenin and the senior Bolsheviks in the unenviable position of either satisfying their core
supporters or staunching the haemorrhaging of support by sacriﬁcing them. Perhaps not
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surprisingly, they chose the latter course, deciding that the revolution could not persist if it
continued to antagonise the peasantry (Ball, 1990). The emergence of the class of Nepmen,
those who were most well-positioned to proﬁt from the relaxed regulations governing pri-
vate enterprise, was not welcomed by the Bolsheviks and, as we shall see in the ﬁnal paper,
provided little-needed ammunition to further Stalin's drive to full-scale collectivisation.
As noted in our earlier discussion of Bukharin, he became one of the loudest defenders of
the New Economic Policy, representing a remarkable shift in ideological perspective. In his
ﬁrst major piece justifying the NEP, Bukharin notes that there was a direct contradiction
between the expropriation of agricultural surpluses under War Communism and the devel-
opment of agriculture, but this must now be corrected and in order to advance economic
development the priority must be on `nonproletarian, bourgeois, capitalist forms of econ-
omy' (Bukharin, 1982a, 104). This was, as Bukharin grudgingly admitted (Bukharin, 1982a,
107), a reversion to a form of state capitalism, where the state was playing the major invest-
ment role in attempting to develop industries and the countryside, eﬀectively forcing Russia
back to the developmental path outlined by Sergei Witte in the late nineteenth century and
also eﬀectively accepting Kautsky's criticism of the Russian Revolution for occurring in an
untimely fashion.
The initial step for NEP was to promote trade in goods between the state and the
peasantry in the spring of 1921, but the paucity of tangible material reserves in Bolshevik
hands entailed that private trading rapidly outweighed the planned restrictions and by the
end of the year steps were taken by Sovnarkom that would ultimately result in a near-
total legalisation of trade and the restoration of many of the hated practises of capitalism
(including inheritance) (Ball, 1990). Simultaneously, the Bolsheviks allowed the peasantry to
pay taxation in kind rather than in currency and tailored the amount to be paid depending
on productivity, which was one of the ﬁrst sympathetic steps taken towards the countryside
since the seizure of power43 (Ambartsumov, 1977). The State Bank was also reopened in
43Berbekov estimates that this reduced by a factor of three the burdens on the peasantry of Kabardino-
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November 1921 and, after an initial period of extremely limited activity due to insuﬃcient
reserves, was allowed to print paper money (chevronets) for commercial transactions in
October 1922 (Zaleski, 1971). These would ultimately replace the hopelessly inﬂated paper
rouble in 1924 with a conversion rate of one chevronets to 50 billion paper roubles (Zaleski,
1971).
The legalisation of private property had a dramatic eﬀect on the social structure in rural
locations, fortifying the kulaks, or independent farmers, whilst condemning the poorest, who
no longer had access to communal tools and were often forced to work as hired help rather
than tend their land. Ambartsumov estimates that by 1925 there were more than two million
farm labourers in the country (Ambartsumov, 1977, 210). Nevertheless, compared to the
deeply unpopular policy of forced collectivisation and requisition under War Communism,
this marked a dramatic shift in the relationship of the Bolsheviks to the countryside. While
the leading Bolsheviks retained the expectation that the countryside would ultimately be
replaced in importance by the `commanding heights' of heavy industry (Ball, 1990), there
was a recognition that the path to socialist development would be undergirded by increases
in agricultural productivity inculcated by capitalist impulses.
Thus, the NEP did deliver substantial improvements to the quality of life for citizens of
Soviet Russia, particularly the class of moderately to well-oﬀ farmers, with modernisation and
regularisation of farming ﬁnally eradicating some of the worst ineﬃciencies of the agricultural
economy and driving a secular increase in the harvest yields throughout the mid-1920s (Figes,
1996), although the serious crop failures in the North Caucasus in 1924 demonstrated that
the legacies of War Communism would take signiﬁcantly more time to unravel than was
ultimately allotted(Áåðáåêîâ, 1958). The problem was that by this point, the earlier actions
of the Bolsheviks had so alienated the village that `within the village, the Bolsheviks were
without real authority'; membership levels were paltry and the slow expansion of basic state
Balkaria AO (Áåðáåêîâ, 1958). However, the tax in kind would subsequently be replaced by a money tax
and given that there were no equivalent taxes on the urban worker, this continued to breed rural resentment
(Fitzpatrick, 1994).
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functions meant that many villagers had barely any routine interactions with Soviet power
(Figes, 1996, 791). Suspicion of the peasantry had never been eradicated among the leading
Bolsheviks and the failure to resolve this basic problem of order would be a crucial contributor
to the excesses of Stalinism that we shall examine in the next and ﬁnal paper. Summarising
the results of the Thirteenth Congress of the Bolsheviks in June 1924, Stalin would state
that private capital was exerting a decisive hold in retail trade (he estimated 80%) and that,
futhermore, `[r]ural credit was...entirely in the hands of the kulak and the usurer' (Stalin,
1953, 255). This discontent with the policy would escalate to its full scale abandonment in
subsequent years and replacement with collectivisation.
In comparison with War Communism, there is little doubt that the NEP marked a dra-
matic improvement. Rates of growth were impressive and even took the central Soviet
statistical agencies by surprise in the mid-1920s, with accelerations charted in three consec-
utive years from 1922 onwards (Davies, 1994, 136). The tensions with the countryside were
eased thanks to mollifying policies such as allowing for the payment of taxation in kind and
allowing for the sale of goods on the private market, ending the dangerous cycles of peasant
revolts that had represented a serious threat to the regime in 1920. The acknowledgement
by Lenin and Bukharin of the potentially promising role of capitalism in building socialism
chimed with the orthodox Marxist perspective of Kautsky and would have found support
from the Mensheviks in 1917, had the Bolsheviks demonstrated any interest in searching
(Ball, 1990). However, this was simply not enough to overcome the excesses of War Commu-
nism in the eyes of many residents of Russia and, moreover, the doctrinal cost of encouraging
capitalism would prove to be extremely high, as it provided Stalin with a platform to cast
out Bukharin and the others on the right as part of his return to collectivisation and coercive
methods. The basic point, as emphasised above, is that neither framework adopted by the
Bolsheviks for the development of their economic policies was ﬁt for purpose and simply
created serious problems that were impossible to resolve in the short period available.
Having considered the problematic role of frameworks for the Bolsheviks in crafting their
191
economic policies in the years after they assumed power, we can turn to a consideration of
the inﬂuence of neoliberalism on the post-Soviet economic reformers. We shall see that the
critiques of Keynesianism launched by the Chicago and Virginia schools created an ideational
schemata that was to prove of great utility for Yegor Gaidar and his team, although it was
modiﬁed in important ways by the reformers to take account of the speciﬁc situation in the
newly-independent Russian Federation.
3.4 Neoliberalism
Recent predictions concerning the demise of neoliberalism have, to invoke Oscar Wilde, been
greatly exaggerated44. The core doctrines of neoliberalism, which all revolve around the
perniciousness of government intervention and complete ineﬀectiveness of state action vis- a-
vis the economy, continue to prove attractive (or, in many cases, the least-worst option) to
global policymakers as they seek to avoid the signiﬁcant rise in borrowing costs associated
with failing to rein in public-sector spending. Much furious ink has been spilled analysing
and critiquing neoliberalism but often this shades into polemic that fails to advance our
understanding of the diﬀerent theoretical strands that have contributed to this ideology.
Thus, neoliberal reforms have been blamed for (among other things) increasing the death
rate45 in post-Soviet Russia and dramatic rises in inequality (Stuckler, King and McKee,
2009; Paley, 2001). While not wishing to diminish the importance of empirical analyses
or critical perspectives, the end result of this scholarship has been that we are left with
at best a partial appreciation of the origins of neoliberalism that ultimately impedes our
understanding of one of the dominant (at times hegemonic) perspectives of our age. Without
a clearer conceptualisation of the foundational theoretical contributions to neoliberalism we
cannot hope to chart how it has developed and risk signiﬁcant confusion given the plethora
44For a particularly cogent example of this, see the recent manuscript by Stephen Cohen and Bradford
DeLong in which they argue that the age of neoliberalism is ending, the foundational ideas shattered by the
recent ﬁnancial crisis (Cohen and DeLong, 2010).
45For a response critiquing the methodology and ﬁndings of Stuckler et al. see Earle and Gehlbach (2011).
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of recent anti-government movements that have emerged.
David Harvey represents one of the few clear exceptions to the above statement - his 2006
monograph represents a concise and compelling history of neoliberalism and we shall use it
here to set the stage before beginning our examination of the intellectual roots of the doctrine.
However, excellent as the book is, it focuses almost exclusively on the political aspects of
neoliberalism, deﬁning it as `a theory of political economic practices that proposes that
human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms
and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights,
free markets, and free trade' (Harvey, 2005, 2). Harvey identiﬁes the two foundational ideas
of neoliberalism as human dignity and individual freedom (Harvey, 2005) and he oﬀers a
compelling treatment of its political origins and features. But as Harvey himself recognises
in his deﬁnition, the economic component of neoliberalism is at least as important as the
political element. Moreover, this aspect has not received adequate scholarly attention thus
far, representing a serious lacuna in our understanding46.
Harvey argues that neoliberalism emerged as a coherent doctrine in the 1970s, with a core
belief that `human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial
freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong property rights,
free markets, and free trade' (Harvey, 2005, 2). The fundamental belief in the superiority of
markets over state interference has a long pedigree in classical economics47, but neoliberalism
represented a serious challenge to the politics of Keynesianism and any kind of government
interference, even in cases that seem to be tailored for state intervention such as recessionary
periods. As I argue below, the intellectual foundation for this attack was predicated on the
Chicago School's advocacy of monetarist policy and then latterly the Virginia School's more
46This is not a general trend, for there have been excellent books on the impact of economic ideas, the
work of Daniel Rodgers, Mark Blyth and Keith Darden being but three examples (Rodgers, 1998; Blyth,
2002; Darden, 2009).
47Although some `classical' economists are not the untrammelled advocates of free enterprise that con-
temporary discussion would have us believe. Adam Smith, in particular, had signiﬁcant concerns over
market-based solutions in some areas of life and did see governmental regulation as important.
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generalised arguments concerning the ineﬃciency of state action.
Neoliberalism is a doctrine that has been many things to many people, from a reforging
of Weber's iron cage that ensnares local populations in the straitjackets of the Washington
Consensus to a liberating doctrine that ﬁghts against the venal and decrepit hand of govern-
ment intervention. In seeking the explain the rise and global consolidation of neoliberalism,
Harvey suggests that the central aspect has been `a political project to...restore the power of
economic elites' and that the central ideas of neoliberalism, whenever they have conﬂicted
with this goal, are subordinated to this overarching project (Harvey, 2005, 19). Harvey does
brieﬂy note the economic roots of neoliberalism and its fundamental opposition to Keyne-
sianism, as well as remarking on the importance of the Chicago School, but the discussion is
peremptory and he is more concerned with the political history than an intellectual decon-
struction of the movement (Harvey, 2005, 20-22, 54). Thus, we are still left wondering about
the role economic theory plays in the growth of this particular ideology. Reading Harvey,
one could get the impression that the economic ideas were simply useful ballast, convenient
justiﬁcatory slogans for policies that had been designed long ago. This would be deeply
unfortunate for our purposes, since it would imply that it could have little inﬂuence over
Gaidar and his team, whereas I hope to show the exact opposite.
The following two subsections consider the two schools, describing their histories and
central contributions to economics. A full archaeological investigation of these schools that
adequately covered the nuances and intellectual strands is beyond the scope of this paper,
since the aim here is to link their contributions with the reforms enacted in Russia and to
demonstrate how the analytic research paradigms developed in both of them shaped and
reinforced the attitudes of the primary reformers. Instead what I oﬀer here is a rather broad
characterisation, shaped by a discussion of the work of those considered to be the central
instigators of the two schools.
194
3.4.1 The Chicago School
We begin our consideration of the economic inﬂuences undergirding neoliberalism by consid-
ering the Chicago School. We know from Gaidar's own testimony that he read the work of
Milton Friedman at an early age (Gaidar, 1997), and Friedman's basic arguments against ac-
tive governmental intervention in the economy formed a critical part of the anti-Keynesianism
that came to dominate both mainstream economics and international organisations in the
aftermath of the stagﬂation years of the 1970s. The central claim of the Chicago School for
our purposes centres on the ineﬀectiveness of governmental intervention in monetary policy,
since this provided intellectual justiﬁcation for removing the state from questions of price
adjustments and other forms of macroeconomic intervention and allowing the market to
have the dominant role in the post-Soviet environment. We shall see below that the Virginia
School played a critical supporting role in terms of providing the theoretical justiﬁcation for
privatisation.
While we do not have space to go into the speciﬁcs of Keynesian arguments here, the
basic postulate is that the government can manage the inﬂation/unemployment tradeoﬀ due
to its monopolistic control over the money supply. This was formalised in a deﬁning paper
by William Phillips from 1958 that gave birth to the `Phillips Curve' that expressed this
relationship (Phillips, 1958). This oﬀered formal and empirical support to John Maynard
Keynes' argument that governments can act in a countercyclical fashion to blunt the extremes
of the business cycle by increasing public spending to oﬀset the fall in private expenditure
during recessionary periods (Keynes, 1936). The work of Keynes and Phillips legitimised
government intervention in the economy as correcting for the worst excesses of self-interested
market behaviour and was the dominant macroeconomic school of thought until the ravages
of stagﬂation in the 1970s forced its defenders onto the back foot (Sherman, 1976).
This is not to say that Keynesianism lacked critics or was bereft of controversy. Friedrich
von Hayek published his The Road to Serfdom, a broadside against any governmental in-
tervention in the shadow of Russian and German totalitarianism. Hayek argued that an
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overweening state was a direct threat to individual liberty and an unstoppable force that
would become all-consuming and that the marginal beneﬁts hypothesised to accrue from
this were greatly outweighed by the social and political costs (Hayek, 1994). As we shall see
below, this type of criticism had more in common with the Virginia School's emphasis on
the venality of bureaucrats. However, the Chicago School through Milton Friedman would
oﬀer a more subtle perspective that identiﬁed one of that major theoretical problems with
Keynesianism and this would be formalised by Robert Lucas and Thomas Sargent. Before
turning to the speciﬁcs of this critique, we should say something about the origins of the
school from which this work emerged.
The Chicago School of economics emerged as a distinctive and cohesive approach to the
discipline in the 1930s, achieving its culmination in the 1950s. Price theory was a fundamen-
tal component of the education provided to students in the economics department48 and in
terms of speciﬁc intellectual contributions to economics, the Chicago school is most famous
for its strident opposition to Keynesianism and the belief the latter entailed with regard to
the possibility of countercyclical intervention by the state in the economy. Embedded in this
is a deep belief that the purpose of economics is to make contributions to policy debates:
economics has the characteristics of a science, true, but it is one that is speciﬁcally oriented
to practical debates (Emmett, 2009, 149). Emmett identiﬁes two mutually-reinforcing basic
methodological postulates of the Chicago school. The ﬁrst was its commitment to posi-
tivism49 and falsiﬁcationism, which we see most stridently expressed in Milton Friedman's
justly-famous 1953 chapter (Friedman, 1953). The second is the axiom `de gustibus non est
48`If there is anything that distinguishes Chicago economics from other schools of economic thought, it
is the Chicago tradition's assumption that all you need is price theory' (Emmett, 2009, 147-148). Emmett
notes the continuity in teaching of Marshallian price theory (Economics 301) from the 1920s to the present
day as reinforcing this.
49Don Patinkin has argued that although there was broad continuity between the Chicago School with
regard to the appropriate conduct of monetary policy (that the focus should be on consistent and stable
emission of money, rather than countercyclical attempts to stabilise the price level that could result in
inﬂationary pressure), the main diﬀerence was the the Chicagoans of the 1950s were interested in empirical
veriﬁcation of hypotheses, something which was not a concern of the earlier generation (Patinkin, 1981, Ch.
11).
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disputandum', developed most explicitly by Stigler and Becker twenty-ﬁve years later and
which placed the explanatory burden on changes in opportunity cost rather than changes
in taste. Emmett argues the latter is required to make the former eﬃcacious because oth-
erwise `a rejected hypothesis could always be rescued by the claim that tastes had changes'
(Emmett, 2009, 151).
Milton Friedman is the most famous scholar of the Chicago school and his work on the
theory of money and inﬂation continues to be highly inﬂuential. Friedman's early work on
the optimum quantity of money exposed a serious problem for Keynesians, since it exposed
the fact that in a subtle fashion it relies on individuals being `fooled' and mistaking a nominal
increase in the money supply for a real rise in incomes. Friedman, drawing on the adaptive
expectations theory of Arrow and Newlove (Arrow and Nerlove, 1958), pointed out that over
time governmental policy will lose eﬀectiveness because the individuals in a given polity will
adjust their expectations to take into account governmental action meaning that in the long
run the Phillips curve becomes vertical. This did not preclude the existence of eﬀective
short-term interventions, something recognised by Friedman: `there is always a temporary
trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and unemployment; there is no permanent trade-oﬀ' (Friedman,
1968, 11). While Friedman may have believed that stable monetary policy was socially
optimal, he lacked an axiomatic proof of this statement (Friedman, 1969). We can see
some evidence of this in the way that the late Soviet system operated, with management of
prices ultimately driving up inﬂation over the long-run and creating serious macroeconomic
imbalances and hoarding, even if in the short term it proved somewhat eﬀective in managing
social welfare. While this was a strong critique of the ultimate costs of intervention over
many periods, it did not provide the kind of theoretical ammunition required to argue for
a full-scale withdrawal of the state from the economy that was necessary for the Gaidar's
team in order to outﬂank its more moderate rivals.
For this step, a more radical formulation of the Chicago School's position was required.
This would be achieved in a series of seminal papers by Thomas Sargent and Robert Lucas
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(Sargent and Wallace, 1975; Lucas, 1973), drawing on a much stricter form of preference
updating named `rational expectations', which removed the lag present in the preceding form
of adaptive expectations (Muth, 1961). Simultaneous updating of individual preferences
allowed the authors to demonstrate in an axiomatic fashion that the Phillip's Curve is
vertical even in the short run. Therefore any intentional increase in the money supply
will simply generate inﬂation, without decreasing the unemployment rate. Because inﬂation
is costly, the conclusion of this research project was that governments should aim to keep
the money supply constant, as this minimises transaction costs for individuals in a given
society, thus supporting Friedman's earlier hypothesis with an axiomatic foundation. This
provided a critical supporting pillar for the neoliberal platform, which, as emphasised above,
was deeply suspicious of government intervention, prioritising market-based solutions over
state-led development. This was the step that was needed for Gaidar and his fellow reformers
to demonstrate the necessity of removing the state as far as possible from interference in the
economy and underlaid the basic tenets of price liberalisation and macroeconomic stability
that were at the core of one half of shock therapy.
However, there was another critical pillar in the development of neoliberalism - the idea
that government intervention was not simply useless but actively pernicious and a public
bad. This was provided by the Virginia school and provided the analytical support for the
programme of radical privatisation that Gaidar's team prioritised above all else in the early
years of the transition.
3.4.2 Virginia
The Virginia school's approach is best exempliﬁed by the work of a few leading scholars who
pioneered the public choice approach50 to political and economic questions. For the purposes
50The distinction between social and public choice, according to Buchanan, is that while both adopt a
model of individuals as homo economicus, social choice theory assumes the existence of a unique, socially-
optimal outcome and is thus linked to a maximising, allocationist perspective, whereas public choice adopts an
exchange-dominated perspective, shifting the emphasis from maximising social welfare functions to analysis
of alternative institutions and rules (Buchanan, 1992, 74). The distinction between political economy and
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of this paper I shall focus speciﬁcally on James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, two giants
in this ﬁeld 51.
Buchanan himself attended Chicago and took Frank Knight's course on price theory,
crediting this with transforming him from a libertarian socialist into a `zealous advocate of
the market order' (Buchanan, 1992, 5; Chap. V). However, he sees Knut Wicksell's work
on taxation as having the greatest intellectual inﬂuence in terms of providing him with the
tools to criticise the dominant system of public ﬁnancing that would be the genesis of the
public choice tradition52.
The essence of the Virginia school/public choice tradition is to analyse decisions from
the perspective of individuals as utility-maximising agents, an approach that is foundational
for the type of economic analysis known as game theory. Buchanan describes the writing
of The Calculus of Consent, one of the classics of public choice theory and coauthored with
Tullock in the following terms:
[T]here was no sense of discovery at any point in the book's construction, no
moment of excitement...Tullock and I considered ourselves to be applying rela-
tively simple economic analysis to the choice among alternative political decision
rules, with more or less predictable results. (Buchanan, 1992, 9)
Buchanan, in particular, eschewed technical economic language. His series of critiques of
Keynesian economics, most concisely expressed in Buchanan and Wagner (1977), looked not
at the internal economic problems of Keynesian theory that had so exercised the Chicago
public choice, again according to Buchanan, is that the former, inextricably tied to the classical approach,
emphasises the importance of the market, whereas the latter emphasises the failure of politics (Buchanan,
1992, 100).
51Buchanan's reﬂections on the Virginia School are condensed in a lively chapter in his brief sketch of
an autobiography (Buchanan, 1992, Chap. VII). He sees the focus on `rules' and the stochastic element
they introduce into individual decision-making as central to the tradition; he sees Tullock as introducing the
element of homo economicus that would be essential for policy analysis (Buchanan, 1992, 96-98). We are
here more concerned with the consequences of such an approach and how it links to neoliberalism.
52The opening and ﬁfth chapters of Buchanan (1992) run through Buchanan's intellectual development
and inﬂuences in far greater detail than I have scope to do here.
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school, but rather at the political ramiﬁcations of Keynesianism, which he and Wagner sum-
marised as being `the putative intellectual legitimacy provided to the natural and predictable
political biases toward deﬁcit spending, inﬂation, and the growth of government' (Buchanan,
1992, 24). His basic point was that politicians are good at spending and bad at raising rev-
enues, so the idea of deﬁcit spending in recessionary times is deeply ﬂawed because the
politicians will never instigate ﬁscal retrenchment in good times as this will be unpopular.
Interestingly, and unlike neoliberalism, Buchanan does not fault the vagaries of democracy
for what he sees as the unsustainable ﬁscal position, but rather Keynesian economic theory
(Buchanan and Wagner, 1977, 5).
Gordon Tullock, Buchanan's co-author on a number of pioneering works in the public
choice tradition, oﬀers us the second component of the Virginia School's critique of gov-
ernment intervention. This second aspect is essential for understanding the permeation of
economic analysis into all aspects of government action and it goes signiﬁcantly beyond the
technical disputes over the eﬃcacy of Keynesian intervention. Although he authored hun-
dreds of scholarly articles that touch on this topic, the basic point is well expressed in a
book written recently. The basic analytical point for Tullock is that public servants are not
materially diﬀerent from private individuals in terms of prioritising personal gain over public
good (Tullock, Seldon and Brady, 2000). This seems an innocuous assumption, but it entails
that allowing state oﬃcials discretion to craft policy opens a large and inviting window onto
corruption given the distorted incentive structure. Tullock argues that the primary justiﬁ-
cation for government action is to oﬀset negative externalities but that in a wide range of
cases, government action results in a new and more pervasive set of negative externalities
(Tullock, 2005).
The ultimate conclusion of this is that almost all forms of government intervention are
subject to the same suspicion and have the same pathology, namely the potential for si-
phoning of rents by public oﬃcials. Individual companies face the same dilemmas, but the
Virginia School's response is that the market acts to discipline companies that are too venal;
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there is no analogue to force governments to change track because functional governments
are the monopolists par excellence within the conﬁnes of a given territory.
We could delve into this issue in far greater depth but it is more helpful for us to sum-
marise the implications of the two schools for Gaidar and his reform team, which we do in
Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Chicago and Virginia critiques of Keynesianism and implications for Gaidar's
team
Critique of Keynesian-
ism
Implication for Gaidar
Chicago Government intervention
ineﬀective
Remove the state from the
economy as much as possi-
ble
School
Virginia Government intervention
damaging because taken
by venal bureaucrats and
impossible to scale back
during non-recessionary
periods
Privatise state-owned enter-
prises
This constitutes the basic ideational framework on which Gaidar implicitly relied to
convince Yeltsin of his reform programme and to help him negotiate the morass of pathologies
bedevilling the newly-independent Russian Federation when he was handed the keys to the
economics ministry. As we shall see below, the crucial diﬀerence between Gaidar's team
and the Bolsheviks was that the former had spent years thinking about how to implement
fundamental reforms to the Soviet system, meaning that they were in an excellent position
to tailor the framework to the empirical position in which they found Russia in 1991. While
there were reversions and the path of reform was far from smooth, there was no fundamental
reversion to a formerly rejected policy or reliance on outright coercion to achieve their goals.
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3.5 Russia and the New Reformers
We turn now to the empirical demonstration of the claim that the neoliberal framework was
essential in terms of helping Yegor Gaidar and his team of reformers navigate the systemic
uncertainty of the transition period following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Demonstrating
the connection between neoliberalism and the Russian reforms is harder than the equivalent
task for the Bolsheviks due to the weaker theoretical links between the post-Soviet reformers
and the preceding literature. We should not expect to ﬁnd the same tight links between the
writings of Friedman, Buchanan and Gaidar and we look in vain for this kind of evidence.
In its stead, what we ﬁnd is that the intellectual architecture of the preceding neoliberal
economists provided a tremendously useful framework and language that Gaidar could draw
on to persuade Yeltsin of the value and importance of radical reforms, in particular with
regard to removing property from state hands and the necessity of withdrawing the state
from price supports. The former policy reﬂects the insights of the Virginia school, whereas
the latter is more closely allied with the work of Friedman, Sargent and Lucas and the
ineﬀectiveness of state intervention in monetary and ﬁscal policy.
The pace and structuring of the market transition in the former communist countries
produced one of the most important and comprehensive debates in political science and
economics, representing a rare occasion where both sides at least pretended to listen to the
other. The proponents of shock therapy, or rapid reform, took the view that there was
a window of opportunity to enact these radical changes that would close and trap coun-
tries in a suboptimal equilibrium (Aslund, 2007), meaning that those who took initial bold
steps would see the best results. Subsequent work has found empirical support for this
perspective, though there are signiﬁcant problems of identiﬁcation for the proposed mech-
anism (Laroisiere, 2001). Anders Aslund, who served as part of the foreign advising team
in the years immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union, argues in a provocative
piece that the reason that economic reforms succeeded in creating a market-based economy
whereas political reforms failed in creating a democracy was down to the seizure by the new
202
reformers of the `brief window of opportunity' that lasted for around ﬁve months (Aslund,
2007, 6). Aslund is among the strongest defenders of shock therapy, which is perhaps unsur-
prising given his intimate involvement: `Mistakes were inevitable, but the biggest mistake
was to wait, because to wait meant to fail' (Aslund, 2007, 6). Aslund's basic idea seems
to rely on a tipping-point argument, such that once a suﬃcient number of radical reforms
are passed, the reversal costs become prohibitively high. The alternative perspective argued
strongly in favour of gradual reform, arguing that the logic behind rapid transformation was
ﬂawed and would exacerbate political and economic tensions (Stiglitz, 1998; Roland, 2002).
According to this view, a slower transition path would allow for the building of political
support for the reforms and allow for the inevitable pain to be smoothed over a number
of years, rather than concentrated at the outset. It is not the prerogative of this paper to
take sides in this debate, but as we shall see Gaidar was certainly aware of the concerns
of the gradualists and sympathetic to the immense cost his reform programme asked the
population to bear.
The economic situation of the late Soviet Union was dire, with huge budget and trade
deﬁcits, spiralling inﬂation, chronic shortages and systemic underutilisation of resources
(including widespread underemployment). Janos Kornai's extensive study catalogues the
litany of pathologies that bedevilled the ﬁnal few years of the Soviet Empire (Kornai, N.d.)
and there seems limited sense in rehashing his conclusions. However, there are two economic
pathologies that deserve particular mention since they bear directly on the nature of Gaidar's
reforms. The ﬁrst of these is the justly-famous `soft budget constraint'. This was a system of
state subsidisation that ensured that few Soviet enterprises would be driven out of business
on the basis of their lack of competitiveness. This exacerbated the technological disparity
between the Soviet Union and the West (Brown, 2009), but more importantly it fed into
the ballooning budget deﬁcit. In a sense, we can see this as a Soviet equivalent of the
governments of the 1960s attempting to negotiate the Philips Curve tradeoﬀ, tolerating high
levels of inﬂation in order to maintain low levels of unemployment. Gaidar's ending of this
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damaging tradeoﬀ had its roots in the Chicago workshops of the 1950s and 1960s.
The second serious problem was the growing scale of corruption by Soviet bureaucrats
and managers of enterprises. This was related to soft budget constraints in so far as these
generated insulation and space to engage in nefarious activities, but the extent of this in the
late-Soviet era was astonishing. Steven Solnick, in his work on this period, identiﬁes that the
rot had spread as far as the Komsomol and notes that while Gorbachev's reforms provided
much-needed openness, they were impotent regarding the crisis of accountability (Solnick,
1999). This generated the phenomenon of `spontaneous privatisation' when it became clear
that the Soviet Union was completely unable to enforce the state's property rights (Johnson,
Kroll and Eder, 1994); this basically amounted to widescale expropriation of assets by state
managers and was strangely similar to the early years of nationalisation under the Bolsheviks
before VSNKh began exercising control of the process. This behaviour of venal bureaucrats
mapped very well onto the Virginia School's predictions concerning the corruptibility of
public sector employees and was a powerful bulwark to the argument in favour of voucher
privatisation adopted by Gaidar and his team.
Unlike the situation at the collapse of the Russian Empire, where many of the leading
Bolsheviks were both abroad and working on abstract problems of Marxism unrelated to
the problems facing their home country, many trained Soviet economists were publishing
working drafts and circulating papers trying to address the speciﬁcs of the deep structural
problems of the Soviet Union. Most prominent among these was the 500-Day Plan, based on
a draft reform programme developed by Gregory Yavlinskii and authorised by the Shatalin
group that had been formed by Gorbachev in the attempt to forge a compromise with
a resurgent Yeltsin in August 1990 (Hewett, 1990). The logic behind this proposal was
to create a functional market economy in 500 days and central to the proposals was the
recognition of the importance for building popular support for the reforms. For this reason
many of the most painful decisions were deferred to later phases of the reform process (namely
price rationalisation and other central planks of macroeconomic stabilisation), while popular
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measures such as the sale of state-owned assets were given initial prominence (Hewett, 1990).
Yegor Gaidar, among others, supported the general outline of such a project, believing
that `achieving deep, but nonetheless staged, orderly reforms (äîáèòüñß ãëóáîêèõ, íî âñå
æå ïîñòåïåííûõ, óïîðßäî÷íûõ ðåôîðì)' was essential to prevent social dislocations and
economic pain for the Soviet population on the path to capitalism (Gaidar, 1997, 232).
In comparison with the subsequent radical reforms, the slow-moving plan for privatisation
was unremarkable, but it proved too controversial for the central authorities of the Soviet
Union (Colton, 2008, 188). Gorbachev reneged on his commitment to push through with the
500-Day Plan under pressure from Soviet hardliners (particularly Nikolai Ryzhkov (Brown,
2007)). However, the plan would continue to hold inﬂuence over large numbers of economists
who sought to advise Boris Yeltsin in the subsequent months and it was an important
inﬂection point for Gaidar and the team he would lead, who became convinced that the pace
of reform was too slow.
In the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the central government of the
newly-independent Russian Federation was forced to confront a daunting litany of problems.
In the economic sphere alone there were a number of critical tasks; the establishment of
a new currency, price liberalisation and privatisation were among the most pressing issues
facing the new government. McFaul notes that the budget deﬁcit in August 1991 constituted
twenty percent of GDP due to the inability of the late Soviets to reform the economy and
(in particular) rationalise prices (McFaul, 2001, 141). By the end of 1991, production would
be at just 79% of the level of 1990 and retail prices had more than tripled; meanwhile the
printing of the all-Union rouble by the other republics had caused a fall in value against the
dollar of 86% (Aron, 2000, 481). Such a situation was evidently untenable and required the
immediate attention of the new rulers of the country.
Boris Yeltsin was in many ways a good choice to lead the newly-independent Russian
Federation away from the economic mess of the late-Soviet era. He had a solid understanding
of many of the problems that bedevilled the Soviet system in virtue of his positions at
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Sverdlovsk and Moscow and as Colton notes, he `nibbled at the edges of what was admissible
in late Soviet conditions and presaged what he was to do in the reform era' (Colton, 2008, 94).
This included the development of soft incentives for his workforce to increase productivity and
a detailed understanding of the breakdown of the supply chain between various industries.
These characteristics would serve him well in terms of allowing him to identify just how
broken was the economic system he inherited and to give support to his new government as
they launched the reform programme that was designed to extract the Russian Federation
from its untenable position. However, as we have seen in the ﬁrst paper, Yeltsin was a
man who relied primarily on his instincts rather than developing coherent plans to solve
problems; Colton notes that he supported a `wacky' plan in 1990 that proposed using a
secondary currency to motivate workers (Colton, 2008, 188). His economic ﬁxes during
his managerial tenure in the Soviet Union were designed to solve speciﬁc problems, but
there is no sense that he developed a compelling and coherent alternative beyond a sense
that the problems were extraordinarily severe. Unlike the situation with regard to state-
and nation-building, in the realm of economics he was fortunate to be able to call on the
services of individuals who had thought deeply about the problems facing the Soviet Union,
witnessed the failure of the 500-Day Plan and, utilising their knowledge and understanding
of neoclassical economics, crafted a programme of shock therapy that aimed to place Russia
on an irreversible path to capitalism.
The most prominent of these economists, and the man who will accordingly play a central
role for our purposes, was Yegor Gaidar. Gaidar was a hereditary member of the Soviet elite,
the grandson of the writer Arkady Gaidar and son of the naval commander Timur Gaidar.
He enjoyed a more cosmopolitan upbringing than was possible for the vast majority of his
compatriots, spending time in Yugoslavia and having access to foreign economic works such as
Samuelson and Adam Smith (Gaidar, 1997). He completed his undergraduate studies in the
economics faculty at MGU and continued his study of Western economists including Ricardo,
Mill, Bohm-Bawerk, Jevons, Marshall, Pigou, Keynes, Schumpeter, Galbraith, Friedman
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and many others. He records in his memoirs that it was around this time that he became
disenchanted with the Soviet economic system, but also rejected the Yugoslav alternative as
producing unemployment and high inﬂation. As a result, he found himself at an `intellectual
dead-end [îêàçûâàþñü â èíòåëëåêòóàëüíîì òóïèêå]' (Gaidar, 1997, 195), and commenced
work at the All-Union Research Institute of System Research (VNICI) studying economic
reform and enjoying considerable intellectual freedom. As we have already noted, by 1986
Gaidar and a number of other young economists were meeting to discuss how to reform the
Soviet Union's increasingly moribund economy and became more open to radical market
reforms as the only real remedy (Gaidar, 1997, 213); he became convinced of the necessity
of ensuring an irrevocable break with the Soviet past following the coup attempt in 1991,
which demonstrated the lengths to which hardliners in the Soviet apparatus would go in
order to preserve the system (Gaidar, 1997, 255).
By the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was far from clear whom Yeltsin
would choose to spearhead his economic reforms. There were at least ﬁve `advising' teams
surrounding Yeltsin during this time, including the nucleus of the group who had designed
the 500-Day Plan (Yeltsin, 1994), but his chief advisor, Gennady Burbulis, impressed upon
Yeltsin the value of appointing an independent man to become Prime Minister, namely the
35-year old Yegor Gaidar (Colton, 2008, 224-225). Yeltsin, in his View from the Kremlin,
provides some valuable information concerning his selection of Gaidar as the leader of his
reform eﬀorts in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse. He says that he elected to go with
Gaidar because `[h]e would ﬁght for his own principles and ideas to the end, precisely because
they were his own, achieved through suﬀering' (Yeltsin, 1994, 125). He also talks of Gaidar's
ability to `infect people with his ideas' (Ibid.) and to explain complex concepts in simple
language; both hallmarks of the fact that Gaidar had a developed plan in place well before
the ultimate dissolution of the Soviet Union. Yeltsin vacillates in terms of his position
on how much he understood of the proposed programme of radical reform, and it is likely
that the more technical aspects escaped him, but Gaidar convinced him of the necessity of
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pushing ahead with a radical programme in order to make any reversion to the Soviet system
impossible.
The plan devised by Gaidar's team was undeniably bold. Gaidar planned for near-
immediate price liberalisation in order to eliminate the monetary overhang and deal with
the spiralling problem of inﬂation in one sharp shock but in a sharp divergence from the
standard transition model, he placed privatisation in front of other forms of macroeconomic
stabilisation and pushed a Privatisation Bill through in December 1991, one month after
taking oﬃce as Minister for the Economy and Vice Prime Minister (Shleifer and Treisman,
2000). The privatisation scheme was planned as a voucher programme, designed to place
property in private hands as quickly as possible and limit the corruption by existing managers
of state-owned property; while this was designed to grow popular support for the reforms
(Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, 1994), it was exhibited the inﬂuence of the Virginia School
in terms of removing as much property from state-controlled hands as quickly as possible.
The privatisation scheme was largely completed by 1994 and while the process was far from
smooth, with much of the valuable property ending up in the hands of employees (Shleifer and
Treisman, 2000, Ch. 2), there were relatively few alternatives given the appalling situation
of state-owned enterprises at the collapse of the Soviet Union and further delay was unlikely
to materially improve the situation.
There was initial widespread support for the rapid transition to market system, with
even Ruslan Khasbulatov, the obstreperous leader of the unreformed parliament, voicing his
support in the ﬁrst months after the collapse of the Soviet Union53, though this would not
last and he would prove instrumental in ousting Gaidar from his position as Acting Prime
Minister as soon as Yeltsin's decree powers elapsed in late 1992. The central problem was that
while there was widespread acknowledgement of the necessity for sacriﬁces, no one grasped
how deep the output fall would be or how severe the drop in living standards, meaning that
53In a pseudo-memoir published in 1993, he quotes Margaret Thatcher in an approving fashion as demon-
strating the dangers of an overly-invasive state (Khasbulatov, 1993).
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no political support was developed to facilitate the long-term commitment to the reform
process (McFaul, 2001). Indeed, one of the primary critiques of Gaidar and his team was
that they was uninterested or unconcerned with the political task of building support for
the reforms. However, this is not entirely accurate. Notwithstanding their commitment to
full-scale market reforms, the Gaidar team from the outset acknowledged the importance
of making some concessions to the political environment, deciding not to implement full
macroeconomic stabilisation as this would have generated signiﬁcant unemployment and
`they would have been thrown from oﬃce within months' (Layard, 1993, 16). Gaidar himself
acknowledges that he recognised from the outset that the social costs would be extremely
high; he recognised that the monetary overhang would inevitably lead to a loss of savings but
saw no genuine alternative to radical reforms in terms of making an irrevocable commitment
to market mechanisms and ensuring that a reversion to socialism was impossible (Gaidar,
1997, 269).
Justifying his dismissal of Gaidar, Yeltsin argues that `Gaidar never fully understood
what industry was all about...All of his knowledge was rather theoretical in nature, which
was potentially quite dangerous' (Yeltsin, 1994, 200). Given his knowledge of industry
during his time in Sverdlovsk and on the city council in Moscow, it is clear that for Yeltsin
this failure to comprehend the speciﬁcs of industrial reform was a major blot in Gaidar's
copybook and it was unsurprising when he replaced him with the more experienced hand
of Viktor Chernomyrdin, who shared with Yeltsin a deep understanding of the speciﬁcs of
Soviet industry and who had known Yeltsin since the early 1980s through work in the gas
sector (Colton, 2008, 84). However painful it was for Gaidar to be cast from oﬃce, he had
already placed the economy on a strongly reformist path and while there were slowdowns
and reversions under Chernomyrdin, the overall direction was not lost (Colton, 2008). This,
above all, speaks of the power of Gaidar's plan, informed by recent developments in neoliberal
economic theory. He had convinced Yeltsin of the programme, taken the most diﬃcult initial
steps and ensured full reverse was no longer possible. While debates over the extreme human
209
cost of shock therapy are ongoing and the programme remains controversial, there is little
doubt that Gaidar achieved something quite remarkable in such a limited time, thanks chieﬂy
to his possession of a clear and ﬂexible framework and the years he spent considering how
to reform the Soviet behemoth.
3.6 Conclusion
In describing the ﬁeld of economics, Thomas Carlyle famously suggested that it was a `dreary,
desolate and, indeed, quite abject and distressing [subject]; what we might call, by way of
eminence, the dismal science' (Carlyle, 1850, 530-1; emphasis Carlyle's). We have seen
in this paper that matters can become very dismal indeed, from the costly vacillations of
the Bolsheviks in their shift between the excesses of War Communism and the attempt
to restore Russia to the path of capitalist development to the dreadful foreknowledge of
Yegor Gaidar and his team that their programme would cause pain and immiseration to
countless numbers of their compatriots. Economic transformations of the magnitudes seen
in this paper inevitably generate tremendous social dislocation and resentment towards the
new government from all quarters. Like asking the proverbial Irishman for directions, the
lesson for most governments is `not to start from here', but in times of the total collapse of
authority, the new leaders may have little choice.
In this paper I have sought to build on the foundation we established previously concern-
ing the role and importance of ideational frameworks in minimising the cost of transition by
ensuring that a coherent and clear policy can be followed that avoids reversals and awkward
compromises to the greatest extent possible. We have introduced a second dimension to our
understanding of frameworks, namely the extent to which they are ﬂexible and adaptable
to actual conditions on the ground. This should not be confused with the ﬁrst dimension;
as we have seen, pragmatic frameworks are highly ﬂexible, but leave new governments open
to crafting a series of damaging compromises with no real understanding of how they are
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linked or what is the underlying logic behind them. Rather the point, which we illustrated
by comparing the Bolsheviks with the Gaidar-led post-Soviet economic reformers, is that
pre-existing frameworks tend not to map well onto the speciﬁc problems of a particular lo-
cale. For the Bolsheviks, who drew on decades of debates over the eventual and inevitable
collapse of capitalism, the focus of this framework was on the shift from advanced industrial
societies, meaning problems of rural integration and the overhaul of state-led development
were largely ignored, even they were the most pressing issues for post-revolutionary Rus-
sia. The very fact that the Bolsheviks largely subscribed to a framework that predicted the
extreme unlikelihood of genuine revolution in their country due to the dialectical nature of
natural laws meant that they had little incentive to consider these problems, exacerbating
an already severe situation. This was manifest in the work of Georgi Plekhanov, who started
his intellectual career with a deep appreciation of the speciﬁcs of the nature of the Russian
peasantry but swiftly changed his theoretical perspective to hew closer to orthodox Marxism,
relegating the peasantry to the role of historical bystanders. Lenin and Bukharin both touch
on the peasantry in their writings, but not with the depth or precision that would have been
necessary to articulate coherent policies in the aftermath of the November Revolution.
Gaidar's team had its own problems and nowhere here is it argued that the reforms were
an unsurpassed success. The refusal of the economic team to demonstrate any interest in the
murkier elements of politics along with their fatalistic attitude that the government would be
short-lived virtually guaranteed that their programme would be diluted and partially halted
in the subsequent years, and so it proved under the steady hand of Viktor Chernomyrdin.
Nevertheless, the remarkable speed with which the team was able to assemble a coherent
programme and convince Yeltsin of its merits (neither easy tasks) testiﬁes to both the time
they had spent thinking about how to transform the Soviet economy and the role of the
neoliberal economic framework in terms of providing the tools and policies to further their
desires. However, we have also seen that it was critical for the reformers to alter the standard
neoliberal reform package, pushing ahead with privatisation rather than macroeconomic
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stabilisation as the ﬁrst priority. Their primary goal was to make the return to a state-
directed economy unthinkable and, thanks to voucher privatisation and price liberalisation,
they basically achieved this in the year the team was in oﬃce, demonstrating and validating
the importance of understanding how to use a pre-existing framework and which are the
crucial modiﬁcations to apply it to local conditions.
One theme that is implicit in this discussion of the post-Soviet phase but has not been
examined in detail is the connection of democracy with radical economic reform. In the ﬁrst
paper we saw that contemporary democratic theory has struggled to articulate a language of
state- and nation-building that is not parasitic on problematic notions of equal citizenship,
as highlighted by the work of Will Kymlicka. We have seen in the empirical discussion of the
economic reforms that concerns over democratic legitimacy impeded reform eﬀorts, slowing
their progress and ultimately leading to the removal of Gaidar and his team. This created
an awkward halfway house with regard to the state of economic reforms and territory prime
for rent expropriation and the mushrooming of corruption.
While the reforms were costly, we can perhaps fruitfully compare the situation in Russia
with that in Chile twenty years prior. In that case, as in the Russian Federation, a group
of economists had been working for a few years articulating a vision of reform that would
overthrow the state-dominated economic planning of the existing regime. There, as in Russia,
the reformers were heavily inﬂuenced by neoliberal reforms and persuaded a powerful political
leader to implement their reforms over the objections of more moderate members of the
government (Constable and Valenzuela, 1991, 166). The critical diﬀerence was that these
reformers were given political protection to implement their schemes in light of the fact
that the overthrow of the preceding regime took place by military coup and installed a
general, Augusto Pinochet, with little patience for opposing views. The reforms had initially
similar eﬀects in terms of spiking unemployment and a rise in inequality (Paley, 2001), but
the general architecture has proved remarkably enduring and there have been few eﬀorts
to change the economic system in the aftermath of Pinochet's removal in 1990, and the
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subsequent governments have improved some of the mistakes made during the Pinochet
years by the advisors who were unwilling to alter their plans in the face of overwhelming
evidence of macroeconomic problems (Dominguez, 1998).
This suggests that there is a further tension between democracy and radical reforms,
in that deep-seated and unpopular measures that are sometimes necessary are hard to im-
plement and even harder to sustain given this form of governance. While there has been
fascinating recent work on states of emergencies as a kind of release valve for democracies
(Agemben, 2005), alongside an emerging criticism of liberal democratic thought that the
people are not always disposed to make the best choices on certain issues (Conly, 2013), it
is clear that we need a better response to justify why liberal democracies are an appropriate
choice during these periods of extraordinary crisis, or whether there should be limits on the
extent of popular choice to ensure reforms can be implemented. This all presupposes, of
course, that there is a coherent reform programme in place and it is to this question, rather
than the more fundamental concern just raised, that this particular paper is devoted.
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Chapter 4
Ideational Legacies and Authoritarian
Consolidation
Introduction
Jacques Mallet du Pan coined perhaps the most famous statement concerning the consolida-
tion of a (revolutionary) regime when, in characterising the bloody aftermath of the events
of 1789, he noted that `As with Saturn, the revolution devours its children' (Pan, 1793,
80). The desire to sweep away the original architects of the overthrow of the old order
is understandable; they have accrued precious authority and legitimacy in virture of their
deeds and this can prove highly problematic for the second generation, which is tasked with
the intimidating task of continuing the work of such illustrious predecessors. In particular,
these fathers (or mothers, in rare cases) of the revolution are capable of acting, often un-
knowingly, as brakes on subsequent attempts to develop the project in a diﬀerent direction
and their stature can be so great that it continues to inﬂuence proceedings long after they
have departed the arena. This was certainly the case with Vladimir Lenin, whose legacy
was still a powerful inﬂuence over Mikhail Gorbachev (Brown, 2007), but this example is
far from exceptional due to the cachet that attaches to leading such tumultuous events1.
The long shadow of such ﬁgures can augment the complexity of an already diﬃcult task,
for the process of consolidating these regimes is often no less demanding than marshalling
the initial impetus for the revolution. Indeed, exacerbated by the attenuation of the revolu-
tionary spirit and the unstable foundation prepared in the preceding years, it is an entirely
diﬀerent challenge and one that often carries even greater implications for social welfare as it
establishes patterns of behaviours and interactions that persist well beyond the evanescent
triumphs of the early days.
That being said, regime consolidation is, as the very term suggests, inherently less ex-
citing than revolution; more staid and planned, less emotional and exuberant and thus less
invigorating as a topic of study2. It typically involves the relinquishing of the idealised and
1The positive re-evaluation of Mao Zedong in the upswing of Chinese nationalism in the 1990s is another
compelling case (Zhao, 1997).
2Indeed, Jeﬀ Goodwin's recent book on revolutions and revolutionary movements has no space devoted
to a discussion of the consolidatory period (Goodwin, 2001).
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utopian hopes of the ﬁrst generation and the acceptance of patterns of habituation, although
there is undoubtedly comfort that arises from the realisation that all parties are willing to
accept the rules of the game and the possibility of dramatic overthrow and serious internal
conﬂict is now remote (Schedler, 2001). As we shall see in this paper, this by no means
entails that the consolidation period is peaceful and sedate; the connection between terror
and revolutionary consolidation has had a long legacy since du Pan's observation (Strauss,
2002), and enforcing ideological uniformity among the regime elite is frequently a violent ex-
ercise (Conquest, 1990). This is true even for those who assume control of regimes that are
more straightforwardly authoritarian than revolutionary, as is the case when Vladimir Putin
formally succeeded Boris Yeltsin in the Kremlin in 2000. Moreover, in comparison to the
process of regime overthrow, consolidation (especially in authoritarian states) has remained
poorly theorised and underexamined, with most scholarly accounts focusing either on the
unique dynamics of a limited number of countries or crafting overly generalised accounts
producing largely tautologous nostrums and thus failing to advance our understanding of
the actual processes and decisions in play. This is particularly the case with regard to the
impact of ideational legacies of the initial period, which are frequently ignored or downplayed
in favour of the more concrete processes of institutionalisation or charismatic domination by
leading ﬁgures. It is this general lacuna that the current paper is concerned with correcting,
picking up at the closing period of the ﬁrst two periods and demonstrating the tight links
between the tasks left unfulﬁlled and the subsequent attempts to tighten the grasp on power
of Joseph Stalin and Vladimir Putin.
Thus the empirical focus of this paper is on the rule of two men largely responsible
for consolidating the regimes that overthrew the crumbling Russian and Soviet Empires,
Stalin3 and Putin, respectively. Both men took control of regimes that had withstood serious
initial crises (the Russian Civil War and the Constitutional Crisis of 1993) but that were
3Stalin was undeniably important in the ﬁrst generation of revolutionaries but perhaps not in the same
rank as Lenin and Trotskii. We shall return to this point below.
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far from fully consolidated when they assumed power. As we have seen from the ﬁrst two
papers, the Bolsheviks had articulated a ﬂexible and compelling nationalities policy but their
prevarications in the realm of economics were threatening to cause signiﬁcant disruption to
their rule as a result of the switch between War Communism and the New Economic Policy.
Stalin would seize on this problem in the late 1920s and over the course of the following
ﬁve years completely shift the Bolshevik nationality policy away from the embracing of local
nationalities to favour centralisation. For the post-Soviets, the weakness of state-building
under Yeltsin, in particular with regard to the situation in the North Caucasus, was the
most pressing issue for Vladimir Putin and his ﬁrst actions as President were directed to
resolving this issue. In terms of economic reforms, the country had strayed somewhat from
the path of reform articulated by Yegor Gaidar and his team but the principal problems here
arguably also related to the weakness of the state and bureaucracy rather than to the direct
decisions taken in the early years following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Stalin and Putin
were thus presented with a serious challenge in terms of clear and undeniable weaknesses
in the regimes they inherited that required sustained attention from both and the ability
to overcome entrenched opposition to acheive their ultimate goals. However, the fact that
the previous rulers presented such a mixed inheritance also represented a great opportunity
to refashion the regimes under their command and the principal claim of this paper is that
they would use the unﬁnished tasks of the ﬁrst generation to directly inﬂuence progress in
the other sphere4.
The central claim of this paper therefore revolves around the implications of the legacies
of the ideational frameworks bequeathed by the early Bolsheviks and the Yeltsin admin-
istrations. We renew our interest in the spheres of state- and nation-building (repeating
our geographical concentration on the North Caucasus region) and the economy but in this
instance, in place of focusing on how and why certain frames helped the new governments
4There were obviously more than two spheres of interest for these men besides the economy and nation-
and state-building, but this paper will focus explicitly on these two to maintain analytical continuity with
the two earlier papers in the project.
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to navigate periods of uncertainty, we consider the implications of the failed halves of the
projects. The purpose of so doing is to demonstrate both the social welfare costs of leaving
critical tasks incomplete and also to show the opportunity this creates for a determined ruler
to capitalise on this uncertainty and redirect the nature of reforms. We can go further, in
fact, and argue that the very fact of leaving central planks of reform unﬁnished or failing
entirely generates the conditions for this kind of leader to emerge5, claiming changes are
necessary to avert the otherwise irreversible decline of the new state. This tactic was used
by both Putin and Stalin as they sidelined opposition and removed those who were unwilling
or unable to accede to the new ruling strategies, fundamentally remaking the political and
economic realities of their countries in the process.
This is not to say that either Putin or Stalin enjoyed unalloyed success in their endeavours
or that their policies were without huge social welfare cost. Stalin's drive to industrialisa-
tion, collectivisation and centralisation generated extraordinary costs to the peoples of the
Soviet Union, leading to famine and widespread repression of individuals for extremely minor
crimes. His policies inﬂamed the North Caucasus and antagonised many of the peoples who
had beneﬁted signiﬁcantly from the earlier policy implemented by Stalin as Commissar of Na-
tionalities; a policy he subsequently rejected wholesale. Putin's excesses were less egregious,
although his decision to launch the Second Chechen War in September 1999 caused signiﬁ-
cant immiseration to the peoples of the region, generating huge population displacement and
leading to a dramatic upsurge in the cycle of serious human-rights abuses. He forced the
republics to relinquish much of their power, revoking the bilateral deals that had been struck
with Yeltsin and installing a series of local leaders who paid obeisance to Moscow rather than
Nalchik or Magas, with dire results in many cases, stagnating the already dreadful economic
situation of the region. The intrusion of the state into many areas of the economy perhaps
put paid to the most nefarious corrupt practices that characterised the late Yeltsin period,
5Thus perhaps providing further theoretical underpinnings for Juan Linz's observation that totalitarian
regimes tend to generate strong leaders while underlining the fact that his distinction between authoritarian
and totalitarian regimes is not robust on this front (Linz, 2000).
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but also generated structural problems that slowed its growth and led to a huge over-reliance
on natural resources as a motor for continued expansion, bequeathing a troubling legacy that
the current government (again under the reins of Putin) has yet to resolve.
As with the initial two papers, a comprehensive weighing of the errors and excesses of the
policies pursued is beyond the scope of the current work. Rather our focus is on advancing
our understanding of the dynamics of consolidation and putting greater ballast behind the
limited explanations thus far advanced for this critical aspect of regime development. The
paper also provides a pleasing coda to the entire dissertation project; we have seen that
speciﬁc types of frameworks are extremely important for helping the leading ﬁgures of post-
imperial governments navigate the total uncertainty of the initial few years of governments,
but we see here that the tasks they leave uncompleted or unaddressed provide important
leverage for the second generation to recast the revolutionary settlement and greatly inﬂuence
the subsequent trajectory of the regime.
This paper proceeds in the following fashion. The following section reviews the relatively
brief literature on revolutionary regimes and consolidation, noting that for the most part
ideational factors are ignored in favour of more tangible and material outcomes. The third
section considers the implications of the preceding two papers for regime consolidation, noting
the importance of unﬁnished tasks for providing ideational leverage to second-generation
rulers. Next we turn to the justiﬁcation of the comparison between the Putin and Stalin
regimes before embarking on the empirical meat of the paper in virtue of engaging the
comparison just outlined. The ﬁnal section concludes.
4.1 Literature Review
Before engaging with the theoretical and empirical parts of this paper, we need to review the
literature on regime consolidation in order to appreciate the contribution made by the current
work. Because this literature is relatively limited, we shall consider both authoritarian and
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democratic consolidation, though our focus in this paper is evidently ﬁrmly on the former of
these given the cases under examination. Simplifying somewhat, we can note that the focus
of much of the literature on regime consolidation cleaves largely into two groups. On the
one hand we have extremely focused studies of particular cases, instructive about the unique
processes that generated the persistence of particular regimes but demonstrating marginal
interest in the generalisability of such processes. On the other, scholars who have worked
on this problem with the aim of generating theoretical insights have tended to devote their
attention to easily quantiﬁable institutional achievements that obscure as much as they
illuminate. Samuel Huntington's `two-turnover test' for new democracies, which suggests
that the new regime is consolidated once power has changed hands twice, is perhaps the most
well-known statement of this kind (Huntington, 1991), but it is by no means exceptional
in terms of focusing on an easily measurable institutional process. These are undeniably
important contributions to this nascent research paradigm, but such high-level work typically
ignores the pertinent observation that the nature of consolidation will be heavily conditioned
by what occurred during the transitional phase. This is even more important for those
regimes that are established in post-imperial environments, where the basic political and
economic foundations of the preceding regime are swept away with the preceding regime and
fundamental root-and-branch reform is required, as was the case for both Bolshevik Russian
and the post-Soviets. We should also note, as with the literature touching on the preceding
two papers areas' of interest, the general absence of ideational factors from the analysis,
which we shall touch on in more detail momentarily.
We begin with the literature on democratic consolidation. Democratic regimes follow
broadly the same trajectory of consolidation as they are (in the ideal) inherently rule-based,
relying on deﬁned periods for changes of power and formalising the distribution of resources
through established channels and with a strong reliance on a depoliticised bureaucracy. It
is perhaps unsurprising that one recent study has found that democracy is most likely to
be consolidated when there is a large degree of predictability and moderation on both sides,
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sharply limiting the incentives to overthrow the regime (Alexander, 2002). While neither of
the regimes under study can be classiﬁed as falling into this category of regime, notwith-
standing initial high hopes that the Russian Federation would develop in this direction (Fish,
1995), the work on democratic consolidation has made greater theoretical advances than the
work on authoritarian regimes, which remains at a relatively early stage of expostulation.
I suspect this is in part due to the factors alluded to in the opening sentence of this para-
graph, although the O'Donnell and Schmitter's work on `coup poker' represented a novel
development that has subsequently been the basis for fascinating studies by Acemoglu and
Robinson (O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006)6. We have already
seen in the introduction that Huntington's view of consolidation rested largely on institution-
alist achievements in terms of the ability to transfer power peacefully (Huntington, 1991).
Guiseppe di Palma deliberately sought to separate the consolidation of democracy from the
circumstances of its birth whilst advising against an overly schematic focus on institutional
achievements; ultimately he wanted to `debunk' the focus on consolidation as misguided
and unhelpful to understanding the progress of regimes (di Palma, 1990). Schmitter and
Santiso adopt a more moderate approach, noting that the temporal dimension of consoli-
dation is extremely complex both in terms of the Zeitgeist and the subjective management
by the central actors in terms of gauging the sequencing of reforms whilst also cautioning
scholars to be aware of the extent to which equiﬁnality is essential for understanding out-
comes (Schmitter and Santiso, 1998). Looking closer to Russia and with a more applied lens,
Milada Vachudova has argued that international pressure (speciﬁcally the conditionality of
European Union membership) was instrumental in ensuring the new democracies of Central
and Eastern Europe did not lurch back into authoritarianism (Vachudova, 2005). There are
many other works we could list, but the basic parameters of democratic consolidation have
been well established, though this does not mean they are necessarily easy to install.
6Work itself that built on the fundamental repression/toleration tradeoﬀ identiﬁed by Dahl many years
previously (Dahl, 1971).
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Recent years have seen great interest in the question of authoritarian persistence7, with
a number of important contributions published surveying the strategies and techniques de-
ployed by authoritarian rulers to maintain their (or their elite's) hold on power (Levitsky
and Way, 2010; Brownlee, 2007; Magaloni, 2006). This has built on the scholarship on demo-
cratic consolidation that ﬂourished in the early 1990s with the collapse of the Soviet Union
(Huntington, 1991; di Palma, 1990), although the classic studies long pre-date these works
(Fainsod, 1963; Zolberg, 1966; O'Donnell, 1973). With very few exceptions, this literature
has relied primarily on material and institutional variables to explain this process and has
largely ignored the importance of ideational factors in driving these outcomes. Even where
scholars have paid attention to non-material factors in contributing to the stabilisation of
regimes, the relevance of the ideational inheritance from the ﬁrst group who inaugurated
the regime change has barely featured in their analysis. This trend perhaps reﬂects justiﬁed
methodological circumspection concerning the necessity of holding the two processes distinct;
we see this most clearly articulated in Dankart Rustow's useful distinction between genetic
and functional processes (Rustow, 1970), with regime change falling into the former camp
and consolidation the latter.
The assumption of the quasi-modernisationist transitologists that in the aftermath of the
Cold War all regimes would arrive at democracy has proven to be extremely problematic
and stimulated a research programme devoted to understanding how authoritarian regimes
persist (Carothers, 2002). Until the recent work by Levitsky and Way (Levitsky and Way,
2010), the majority of work on authoritarian consolidation focused on a small cluster of
regimes, making generalisation diﬃcult and unwieldy. H. E. Chehabi and Juan Linz, in
their work on sultanistic regimes, identify a partial modernisation of the country combined
7Persistence and consolidation are two separate analytical processes, though they are quite clearly related
since it is hard to have a genuine case of the former without the latter. Consolidation is the process by which
a regime reiﬁes particular patterns of behaviour and distribution of resources, dramatically limiting (if not
entirely foreclosing) alternative proposals. Persistence should arguably be restricted to the study of the
continuation and evolution of these processes, but given the limited literature on this topic as a whole, we
shall sidestep this important distinction in this paper and defer to later scholars to make advances in this
area.
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with rural apathy as being major contributors to the persistence of this particular genus
of authoritarian regimes (Chehabi and Linz, 1998). Eva Bellin noted the importance of
natural-resource rents for stabilising the regimes of the Middle East and severing the link
between rulers and ruled (Bellin, 2004). Both Beatriz Magaloni, in her investigation of
the persistence of the PRI and Jason Brownlee in his more comparative work across four
regimes identify the central role that ruling parties can play in facilitating consolidation
(Magaloni, 2006; Brownlee, 2007). Examining Maoist China, Julia Strauss has argued that
a series of political campaigns designed to either marginalise or incorporate external groups
were central to the consolidation of the revolutionary regime, which relied on a complex
combination of paternalism and terror to bolster public support (Strauss, 2002). Levitsky and
Way conducted a remarkable review of thirty-ﬁve cases to understand the nature of `hybrid'
regimes, namely those with both autocratic and quasi-democratic features. This represents
a tremendous advance on previous scholarship but the explanatory burden falls on structural
and institutional factors combining the linkage with the West and the organisational power
of incumbent autocrats to explain the likelihood of authoritarian persistence (Levitsky and
Way, 2010). There is limited scope for ideational factors in explaining organisational strength
and thus we have a restricted understanding of how such regimes are able to build strong
parties of power and channel popular preferences to sideline opposition movements.
Having provided an overview of the work on consolidation, we can now move to consider
the implications of this current paper for our understanding of ideational frameworks, thus
relating this paper to the overall project.
4.2 Implications for Frameworks
As noted above, in the ﬁrst two papers we constructed a scheme for understanding how
and why a speciﬁc form of ideational framework contributes to the successful resolution
of problems of order in environments of post-imperial collapse. We found that the ideal
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ideational frameworks were both clear and ﬂexible, providing coherent policy advice and
yet capable of being adapted to reﬂect the empirical realities on the ground. We found
further that these kind of frameworks emerged from sustained debate between protagonists
but also required great familiarity with local conditions, something that the Gaidar team in
post-Soviet Russia exempliﬁed but that was also represented by the development of Soviet
nationality policy, which drew on the work of Otto Bauer and sought to modify this to make
it amenable to the situation facing the Bolsheviks in 1917. While possession of this kind
of framework was far from a guarantee of success, the alternatives were near-disastrous and
resulted in vacillatory policies involving signiﬁcant compromises that ultimately resulted in
huge social-welfare costs.
This paper's aim is rather diﬀerent from the ﬁrst two, although in scope it is complemen-
tary. Instead of looking to further reﬁne our understanding of the fundamental dynamics of
ideational frameworks, we shift to examining the implications of the successes and failures
in the two cases under study for the consolidation of regimes. The central ﬁnding of this
current paper is that determined second-generation leaders can utilise the unﬁnished parts of
the initial agendas to refashion even successful post-imperial policies. However, while these
failures can provide useful justiﬁcations for the changes to the governing structure, overcom-
ing these problems in a convincing fashion is far from trivial. We shall see that Stalin's drive
to collectivisation and industrialisation required alarming sacriﬁces on behalf of the Soviet
population, with horriﬁc famines and widespread reliance on coercion to implement these
policies (particularly in the North Caucasus). Meanwhile Putin was able to use the chaotic
situation in the North Caucasus to justify an extremely far-reaching recentralisation of power
that would directly impact the economic realm and justify his renationalisation of many key
industries, limiting the potential for alternatives to state-led investment and condemning
those regions not bequeathed with natural resources to stagnation and underemployment.
Returning to the current state of research on authoritarian consolidation, we have seen
in the literature review that one of the principal problems facing leaders of authoritarian
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and totalitarian states is to minimise intra-elite conﬂict, which is typically the gunpowder
that can blow such regimes apart. There are multiple strategies for managing this that
have been identiﬁed, from using ruling parties distributing patronage on a rotating basis
and lengthening time horizons, as with the PRI in Mexico (Magaloni, 2006), or building a
powerful organisational base to limit the emergence of powerful counterelites (Levitsky and
Way, 2010). Alternatively on the most reductionist level, reliance on terror and coercion can
eliminate alternative elites (Conquest, 1990), although this option is evidently extremely
expensive and presupposes in some sense the ability of the ruler to command an extensive
coercive apparatus, which seems rather to put the cart before the horse in terms of our
interest in regime consolidation. All of these strategies rely principally on material appeals
to the well-being of elites, utilising the distribution of resources, or the implicit or explicit
threat of force. While these are compelling and sadly undoubtedly eﬀective, they provide us
with a rather limited purview and given the evidence presented below seem to miss one of
the fundamental tools at the disposal of incoming authoritarian leaders.
This paper is speciﬁcally addressed to resolving this problem. Our ﬁnding here is that
the weaknesses of the initial regime can provide leaders with a compelling ideational basis
to minimise elite conﬂict and generate burgeoning support in critical constituencies, opening
space to sideline dangerous opponents. Putin went from a near-nonentity at the time of
his being named to the Prime-Ministership to comfortably winning the March Presidential
Elections a mere nine months later, largely as the result of his determination to crush the
Chechen resistance and willingness to impress on the Russian public the importance of
reinvigorating the central governing apparatus. This provided him with the political capital
to sideline obstreperous regional leaders and ultimately leech away the political power of the
leading oligarchs. Stalin sidelined Trotskii and Bukharin through careful demonstrations of
the fundamental problem with the New Economic Policy and its close links with the potential
for re-emergence of capitalism and was subsequently able to use this to purge local parties
who acted as scapegoats for their failures to meet extraordinarily demanding grain quotas.
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In both cases, the fact that Putin and Stalin identiﬁed serious weaknesses with the original
settlement and actively sought to correct these provided both leaders with critical legitimacy
that they were able to leverage to overwhelm opponents and remove the threat of intraelite
splits.
We see that the impact of `failed' frameworks is not simply that these create substantial
social welfare costs for the population as a result of the compromises and vacillations that
accompany them, as demonstrated in the ﬁrst two papers. This paper exposes a potentially
much more damaging impact of such situations, namely that they present leaders with strong
authoritarian or totalitarian tendencies with the basis on which to launch an attack on all
viable opposition, dramatically lessening the prospects for either an elite split or moderation
that could lead to democratisation. This theoretical insight needs greater development and
elucidation, but that will have to wait for a subsequent paper. For now, having outlined
the fundamental theory of this paper and examined the literature, we can now move to a
justiﬁcation for the case selection and then proceed to the empirical substance of the current
work.
4.3 Case Selection
As in the ﬁrst two papers, we maintain the same methodological approach for this ﬁnal paper,
although the time period has now shifted forward by a few years. We are thus engaged in
a diachronic comparison of the Stalin period from 1927-1935 with the Putin period of rule
from 2000-20088. The methodological gains from conducting this mode of comparison have
been explicated at length in the preceding two papers so we refer the interested reader to the
discussion contained therein. Instead, we focus our energies on demonstrating that this is a
8We shall not take into account the third of Putin's presidential terms, which began in May 2012, simply
because the trends are too fresh to permit sensible analysis. It does seem as though the system of Putinism
has been badly shaken given the rise of popular protests and sustained splits in the elite (the chief ideologist
of the system of managed democracy, Vladislav Surkov, was ﬁred on the 7th of May, supposedly at the
behest of hardliners (Îñèïîâ and Áàäàíèí, 8th May, 2013)) that have characterised his second period in
the Kremlin.
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justiﬁable comparison that allows us to consider the legacies and mistakes of the ideational
frameworks investigated in the preceding papers.
This paper has the narrowest focus of the three in terms of giving great prominence to
Joseph Stalin and Vladimir Putin as individual leaders who were instrumental in forging the
consolidation of the Soviet and post-Soviet regimes. We should stress that the regimes that
Stalin and Putin consolidated diﬀered markedly from those that came before, highlighting
the problem with this research programme that we discussed brieﬂy in the preceding section.
Putin arguably oﬀers the greatest contrast with what he inherited, moving away from the
somewhat `feckless pluralism' of the Yeltsin years to a structure that was, at best, compet-
itive authoritarian by the time of his switching to the Prime-Ministerial position in 2008
(Carothers, 2002; Levitsky and Way, 2010). His project of remaking and strengthening the
state pervaded all aspects of life in Russia, from the renationalisation of central enterprises
to stripping away the exceptions made for republics during Yeltsin's `parade of sovereignties'
(Treisman, 1997). Stalin's consolidation is more controversial, with continuing arguments as
to whether he was merely continuing the pattern established by Lenin during the early years
of Bolshevik rule or engaging in a radical shift to a markedly more totalitarian state (Service,
2005). While this debate is undeniably important for scholars of the Soviet Union, for our
purposes we can direct our attention to how Stalin used the serious economic problems facing
the Soviet Union to deﬁnitively crush the New Economic Policy and set the Soviet Union
on the path to industrialisation and centralised planning to a qualitatively greater extent
than had been seen in the years of War Communism. Stalin would use this to eliminate
any regional resistance and dropped the viliﬁcation of `Great Russian Chauvinism' that had
been at the heart of early Bolshevik nationalities policy (a policy that he was instrumental
in forging).
The relative narrowness of this paper's focus should not distract from the fact that its
thematic scope represents a combination and continuation of the work in the ﬁrst two papers.
To be more speciﬁc, we are interested in this paper in how Stalin and Putin's administrations
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developed policies in the realms of state- and nation-building and the economy. While we
shall evidently be unable to go into the same amount of detail given that we are covering
these two major policy areas for two diﬀerent administrations, our interest here is in how
they utilised the failures of the preceding regime to burnish their own credentials and remake
the central policies of their regimes anew. There is an undeniable problem in the sense that
Stalin was central to the design of nationalities policy for the early Bolsheviks while Putin
was totally uninvolved in the early years of Yeltsin's rule, but the rise to prominence of Stalin
in the period under study entails that the periods under study bear suﬃcient resemblance
to make the comparison sensible. Most critically for our purposes, both men confronted
regimes that had signiﬁcant weaknesses and utilised these weaknesses to strengthen their
position and undermine that of their chief rivals.
For our evidence, in the ﬁrst period we draw primarily on Stalin's Complete Works,
which are markedly less complete than Lenin's, ﬁnishing as they do in 1934 before the years
of true terror were unveiled. For Putin, we look at some of his central speeches and remarks,
although the fact that this is such recent history means that the secondary literature is
inevitably thinner and less substantive than for Stalin. There is, however, more than enough
(in my opinion) to tip the balance in favour of the argument advanced here. And without
further ado, we can now proceed to said evidence.
4.4 Stalinism
We have already spent some time in the ﬁrst paper looking at the work of Joseph Dzhughashvili,
or Stalin, in terms of his contribution to the Bolshevik nationalities policy of the Soviet Union.
For this paper, as he is one of the two central actors, it seems appropriate to spend a little
more time developing our knowledge of his life and thought. We shall see that while Stalin
began the period after the death of Lenin largely supporting the New Economic Policy and
upholding the nationalities policy developed in the early period of Bolshevik rule, the critical
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turning point occurred around 1927. At this juncture, he began to castigate the architects
and supporters of the New Economic Policy as eﬀectively supporting the re-emergence of
capitalism in the Soviet Union and openly declared war on the kulaks9. This policy was in
many respects remarkably similar to that of War Communism examined in the second paper
and had predictably and depressingly similar results, with spiralling levels of famine and
growing resistance to Bolshevik rule. This resistance, particularly in the North Caucasus
and Ukraine, provided the basis for Stalin to re-evaluate in a fundamental fashion the Soviet
nationalities policy and he began to castigate local nationalism as a cover for capitalism,
reneging on the programme of korenizatsiia that had seemed so promising in terms of gen-
erating local support, especially in the North Caucasus. By the end of the period of interest
for this paper, the countryside had largely been collectivised and local nationalists viliﬁed
and the roots of the subsequent terror that would grip the country from 1937-1938 were very
much evident.
Stalin, along with Adolf Hitler, is arguably one of the two most viliﬁed ﬁgures in the
twentieth century. Alan Bullock wrote an extensive biography comparing the lives of the
two men and tracing the roots of their actions to their turbulent youths (Bullock, 1992),
while Timothy Snyder's recent research has focused on estimating the precise number who
died under each man's rule (Snyder, 2010). Both Hitler and Stalin were instrumental in
developing the apogee of totalitarian rule and the terrifying costs associated with it. But
our interest in this paper focuses primarily on how Stalin managed to consolidate his power in
the Soviet Union, outmanoeuvring his rivals and crushing all forms of opposition in the Soviet
Union. To be more speciﬁc, we shall direct our scholarly attention on how the incomplete
situation in the Soviet Union in the years immediately after Lenin's death allowed Stalin to
centralise power. The principal argument of this section is that the weak situation in the
9The kulaks (kulak means `ﬁst' in Russian) were the class of independent peasants who owned their own
land and typically hired labour to help farm it. As we have already seen in the second paper, the attempt
to assign classes to the rural communities was inherently problematic and Fitzpatrick has demonstrated in
compelling fashion just how elastic the notion of `kulak' was, often relating more to Civil War allegiance
than objective economic circumstances (Fitzpatrick, 1994).
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economy provided Stalin with the leverage to dominate and reform all other aspects of Soviet
life, including the nationalities policy that had earlier been his most substantial contribution
to Bolshevik thought.
Stalin and Stalinism have not traditionally received a very sympathetic hearing from his-
torians and political scientists. The early biographers of Stalin seem largely to have agreed
with Lenin's characterisation of him as `too coarse (ñëèøêîì ãðóá)' to be a successful Gen-
eral Secretary, lacking the intellectual and cultural reﬁnement to be the leader of the Soviet
Union (Lenin, 1982, 346). Isaac Deutscher characterised him as a plodding intellect, devoid
of inspiration (Deutscher, 1966) and this was largely the view until the recent biography by
Robert Service strove to introduce a more complex picture (Service, 2005). This was not
helped by Stalin's continual eﬀorts to paint himself as a mere discipline of Lenin and im-
plementer of the latter's thoughts. Speaking about himself in the third person in December
1926, he claimed that `there can be no question of any theory of Stalin...[Stalin] only strove
to facilitate the complete triumph of Leninism in our Party' (Stalin, 1954i, 121).
Meanwhile Stalinism as a system was chieﬂy characterised in the political science and
historical literature as dependent primarily on coercion and terror to function (Fainsod, 1963;
Conquest, 1990), a school of thought which came to be known as the `T-school'10. Much
modern research continues to focus on the dynamics of terror, although the perspectives have
become more nuanced and there is a greater appreciation that the Stalinist system was more
complex than a single man defying the will of an entire people (Shearer, 2003). As the height
of the `Great Terror' (the `Ezhovshchina') took place in 1937-1938 we shall not focus on these
elements in this paper, although the roots are clearly discernible in Stalin's denunciations
against the wreckers and saboteurs whom he blames for the failure to attain the hopelessly
demanding targets. Nevertheless, Theda Skocpol is primarily correct when she identiﬁes the
continuing problems with the peasantry in the New Economic Policy as the main contributor
10This has been countered in historical research by Sheila Fitzpatrick and Stephen Kotkin, among others,
who have sought to investigate the extent to which Stalinist industrialisation and modernisation found high
levels of societal support and thus garnered legitimacy (Fitzpatrick, 1979; Kotkin, 1995).
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to the shift to Stalinist centralisation11, although this sidelines the importance of nationalist
elements (Skocpol, 1979). As we have seen in the second paper, while the New Economic
Policy proved somewhat ameliorative in terms of the peasant/Soviet relationship, it could
not undo the damage of War Communism and the Bolsheviks were unable to extend the
locus of their power to agricultural communities and was thus unable to induce the peasants
to participate in the nationalised economy.
We shall begin by looking back at some of Stalin's writings that precede our period of
interest, and then move largely chronologically through subsequent developments. Where
possible, we shall keep economic and nationality policy distinct, although by the 1930s
this distinction has altogether collapsed as Stalin blames local nationalism as providing a
cover for the wreckers and saboteurs who are ensuring the impossible requisition targets
cannot be met. We should also note at the outset that it was perhaps inevitable that
the North Caucasus would provide one of the primary locations (along with Ukraine) for
resistance to Stalin's policy of collectivisation. The ﬁrst paper demonstrated that the region
was a central battleground in the Civil War, with many local actors preferring to strike
out on an independent path rather than side with either the Reds or the Whites. The
Bolsheviks seemed to have carved a modus vivendi with many of the ethnicities by the end
of 1926, but this would be shattered by the policy of collectivisation, which forced the ﬁercely
independent farmers and communities to band together in gigantic common enterprises. The
North Caucasus, with its temperate climate and fertile soil, was one of the ﬁrst regions
to be subjected to this attempt to rationalise and industrialise agricultural production as
part of the general drive to increase the technological level of the Soviet Union. As with
War Communism, this generated huge levels of unrest, particularly among the Cossack
communities, leading to regular instances of terror and the ultimate abandonment of the
policy of korenizatsiia that had been the central component of Stalin's initial nationalities
11As Skocpol notes, `by 1927 the peasants were marketing so little grain [for the state] as to cause a crisis
situation' (Skocpol, 1979, 222).
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policy in the early Bolshevik period.
We see that by 1921, Stalin had solidiﬁed his opposition to Trotskii, suggesting that the
latter was conﬂating the needs of the working class as a whole with the needs of the army
and arguing that it was wholly inappropriate to use the coercive practices of the military on
the industrial proletariat (Stalin, 1953b, 7). Instead `conscious democracy' should be used
to persuade the proletariat of the wisdom of engaging in socialist methods of production in
order to avert postwar catastrophe, for coercion would only generate distrust of Soviet power
(Stalin, 1953b, 10). This represents Stalin's attempts to undermine Trotskii in the eyes of
Lenin, for Stalin recognised at the time that Trostkii was playing a far greater role in the
building of the Soviet Union and had, in virtue of his leadership of the army, considerably
greater prominence in the critical ﬁrst acts of the Revolution. Stalin would outline his ideal
understanding of the role of the Bolshevik Party in the Thirteenth Party Conference of
January 1924, arguing that it must be a `monolithic organisation hewed from a single block,
possessing a single will and in its work uniting all shades of thought into a single current of
practical activities'12 (Stalin, 1953e, 23).
However, barring his open attacks on Trotskii, Stalin in 1921 was largely an orthodox
party member committed to the nationalities policy we outlined in the ﬁrst paper. Thus he
argued that the Party's responsibility with regard to the non-Russian peoples was to develop
strong communist organisations to facilitate their economic progress `while refraining from
mechanically transplanting from central Russia economic measures that are suitable only for
a diﬀerent, higher stage of economic development' (Stalin, 1953a, 26). At the Tenth Congress
of the Bolshevik Party, speaking on the national question, he was also harshly critical of those
Bolsheviks who `sometimes deviate towards Russian dominant-nation chauvinism' (Stalin,
1953h, 40). He was also still ﬁrmly committed to the necessity of spreading revolution (Stalin,
1953c, 108), and defended the New Economic Policy, arguing that `releasing the productive
12This was an extremely fractious meeting at which Stalin launched direct and explicit attacks on both
Trotskii and Preobrazhenskii and took place days before the death of Vladimir Lenin.
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energy of the small producer...will...put him in a position...in which he will be compelled to
bring grist to the mill of the Soviet state' (Stalin, 1953d, 126).
By the Twelfth Congress of the Bolshevik Party in 1923, Stalin was already adopting a
harsher line towards the New Economic Policy and accusing it of undoing much of the good
of his nationalities policy, seeking to burnish his credentials as the primary successor to the
ailing Vladimir Lenin. In particular, he accused the NEP of fostering `not only Great-Russian
chauvinism - it also fosters local chauvinism' (Stalin, 1953f, 244). As yet this did not result
in a shift in the policy of educating the nationalities about Marxism in their native tongue
and the concern about the re-emergence of Great-Russian chauvinism was far more obvious
in these remarks, highlighting the new danger Stalin saw from the NEP that would develop
more fully over the course of the next four years. He continued his line of attack at the
Fourth Conference of the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks with Responsible Workers of
the National Republics and Regions in June of the same year, railing against the `nationalist
tendencies which are developing and gaining strength in connection with the N.E.P.' (Stalin,
1953g, 315), something he connected with the growth of the bourgeoisie and a direct threat to
the spread of Bolshevik power and saw as emblematic of the Rightist faction in the Bolshevik
party13.
In 1925 Stalin openly pressed the Bolsheviks to focus their energies on the peasantry and
the countryside because `our industry, which is the basis of socialism and the basis of our
regime, rests on the home market, the peasant market' (Stalin, 1954b, 29). Indeed, at this
time he was arguing that the remnants of War Communism were still in place and must be
eliminated in order to help develop the relationship between the peasantry and the proletariat
that he saw as central for the stabilisation of the Soviet state (Stalin, 1954h, 159), whilst also
suggesting that `[t]he vast masses of the peasantry must be organised in co-operatives...as a
means of drawing peasant economy into the general system of socialist construction' (Stalin,
13He accused the Leftist faction of being unwilling to yield to the demands of localities and thus threatening
Bolshevik power by alienating important constituencies, especially in the border regions.
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1954h, 159). 1926 marked what Stalin would call the second stage of NEP, namely the
shift from agriculture to industrialisation (with a particular focus on heavy industry), which
he tied to `ensuring the economic independence of our country' (Stalin, 1954c, 129). This
would set in motion the serious policies that would transform the Soviet Union, requiring as
it did a signiﬁcant increase in the level of external trade and a lowering of grain prices in
order to `reduce to a minimum the seepage of surpluses from accumulation into the pocket
of the private capitalist [i.e. the kulaks]' (Stalin, 1954c, 134). This would eﬀectively mark a
continuation of the battles with the peasantry that had ravaged the years of War Communism
and lead to further and extreme cases of famine. It would also deﬁnitively alter the Soviet
nationality policy and generate a rehabilitation of the `Great Russians', as we shall see below.
There is little doubt that the North Caucasus, in particular, was severely underindus-
trialised and primitive in terms of farming technology. The ﬁrst tractors appeared in the
Kabardino-Balkaria autonomous oblast in 1924, at a time when 51% of households reported
that they were horseless. By 1927 there were 80 tractors and other items of farming ma-
chinery in the region, though the source neglects to cite how many of the locals actually had
a sound working knowledge of such new technology (Áåðáåêîâ, 1958, 60). Electriﬁcation,
which had ﬁrst appeared in the AO in 1921, continued throughout the 1920s along with
the appearance of medium industry and factories (though as of 1927, industry would remain
only 8% of the region's economy) (Áåðáåêîâ, 1958). However, the lack of qualiﬁed specialists
and experience with large-scale projects entailed that many of these were seriously delayed,
hopelessly overbudget or dramatically below the projected production level. Stephen Kotkin
provides an extraordinary study of a later project in Magnetic Mountain (Kotkin, 1995),
but an equally demonstrative example was the attempt to build a huge maize industrial
combine in Beslan. This was recommended by the ﬁrst ﬁve-year plan and was intended to
provide tonnes of product for both the domestic and local market. However, as Cherdzhiev
notes, `[t]he construction was signiﬁcantly complexiﬁed by the absence of experience, [and]
the extreme shortage of qualiﬁed engineers and labour' (×åðäèæèåâ, 1971, 106). Foreign
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specialists were called in and attempted to use imported materials, but these often proved
a poor ﬁt and before the project was ﬁnished it was relocated to the other side of the town.
Such cases were all too common in the drive to industrialise the country in such a remarkably
short space of time and while Stalin and the Bolsheviks would often have cause to curse the
bourgeois `wreckers and saboteurs'14.
However, the time for the fundamental shift in nationalities policy was still some way
in the future. Terry Martin, undeniably the most important contributor to the debates
surrounding Soviet nationalities policy, states that as of April, 1926 Stalin defended the
policy of korenizatsiia and did not believe it exacerbated local nationalism. Indeed, he
states that `the policy [korenizatsiia] was identiﬁed with [Stalin] personally and he backed
it vigorously on numerous occasions' (Martin, 2001, 232). The basis for the concern over
this policy began, as Martin cogently demonstrates, with concerns in Ukraine but as we
shall see, Stalin needed the economic basis to ultimately overthrow the earlier conception of
nationality policy. Thus, by late 1927, Stalin had committed the Soviet Union to the policy
of collectivisation although he acknowledged that the Soviet Union was `not likely to reach
[the goal of full collectivisation] soon' (Stalin, 1954e, 231), since this required a substantial
level of capital investment that was beyond the Soviet Union at that time. Nevertheless,
grain requisitions in 1927 were far lower than projected, in large part because the state
price of grain was set at an aggressively low level, generating unsurprising reluctance on
the part of the peasantry to part with their produce (Fitzpatrick, 1994). At the Fifteenth
Party Congress in December 1927, Stalin argued that the slow rate of growth of agricultural
production relative to industrial production reﬂected the disorganised and underdeveloped
nature of the former industry and saw collectivisation as the solution. He remarked in his
report to the Central Committee that `The way out is...to go over to collective cultivation
of the land on the basis of a new and higher technique' (Stalin, 1954g, 312-313).
14The `Shakhty Aﬀair', which involved the show trial of 55 specialists involved in the Donbas mines in the
spring of 1928, was a potent warning of both the stakes and the administrative means by which the targets
would be met, if necessary (Fitzpatrick, 1974).
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By January of 1928 it was becoming clear that the country was in a desperate situa-
tion, with widespread shortages in the grain accounts totalling (by Stalin's own admission)
130,000,000 poods15 (Stalin, 1954k, 42). His proposed solution was forced requisition from
the kulaks and dramatic increases in the collectivisation of farms16, though the exact model
of collectivisation he was advancing was unclear at this stage and Fitzpatrick has suggested
that the large-scale collective farms he seemed to have in mind bore little resemblance to
the average kolkhoz in 1928, which was constituted by just twelve households (Fitzpatrick,
1994, 40). Nevertheless, this marked the eﬀective end of the New Economic Policy17, rep-
resenting the summation of trends we have observed over the preceding years and would
entail a signiﬁcant shift in the relation of the Bolshevik Party to the countryside; it is hardly
surprising that this coincided with the launch of the ﬁrst Five-Year Plan in 1929. In some
ways it was not dissimilar to the excesses of War Communism in terms of forced requisitions
from the peasantry and the predictably disastrous eﬀects of such a policy; as Fitzpatrick
notes, the initial step to collectivisation in the winter of 1929-1930 consisted largely in the
conﬁscation of livestock and claiming these were now the property of the kolkhoz. The
upshot was that `[a]s far as the peasants were concerned, collectivization was based on an
original act of robbery' (Fitzpatrick, 1994, 4), guaranteeing widespread peasant resistance
and the perception that forced membership of the kolkhoz was akin to a second serfdom.
The process was also not simple and there was wide recognition of the deﬁcits of many of
the collective farms; the Chief Okrug Section of the Collective Farms of Kuban reported in
March of 1928 that 75 of the 88 liquidated collective farms the previous year were closed
on the basis of their inability to fulﬁll the grain requisitions and that 85 of the 88 did
15A pood is roughly 16 kilos or 36 pounds.
16`[A]ll areas of our country, without exception, must be covered with collective farms (and state farms)
capable of replacing not only the kulaks, but the individual peasants as well, as suppliers of grain to the
state' (Stalin, 1954d, 9).
17Notwithstanding Stalin's protestations to the contrary, `[o]nly enemies of the Soviet regime can think of
abolishing NEP' (Stalin, 1954k, 50).
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not own a single tractor18 (Èç Äîêëàäà Çàâåäóþùåãî Îêðóæíîé Ñåêöèåé Êîëõîçîâ 2-
ìó Ïëåíóìó Êóáàíñêîãî Îêðóæêîìà ÂÊÏ(á) î Êîëõîçíîì Ñòðîèòåëüñòâå (14 ìàðòà
1928 ã.), 1981). Moreover the dramatic upsurge in the number of collective farms was plac-
ing great pressure on the North Caucasus krai administration, which called for emergency
measures to be taken in 1928 in order to conduct land surveys (çåìëåóñòðîåíèå) of all the
collective farms in the krai that had formed since April of that year (Èç Ïîñòàíîâëåíèß
3-ãî Ïëåíóìà Ñåâåðî-Êàâêàçñêîãî Êðàåâîãî Èñïîëíèòåëüíîãî Êîìèòåòà îá Óñèëåíèè
Ðóêîâîäñòâà Êîëõîçíûì Ñòðîèòåëüñòâîì (25 èþíß 1928 ã.), 1981). This was hardly
surprising given the extraordinary growth in the region; in Kuban okrug, for example,
the number of collectives had risen from 344 in 1926 to 1366 in October of 1928, a four-
fold increase in two years (Èç Îò÷åòíîãî Äîêëàäà Êóáàíñêîãî Îêðóæêîìà ÂÊÏ(á) 5-é
Îêðóæíîé Ïàðòèéíîé Êîíôåðåíöèè î Ðîñòå Êîëõîçîâ, Ïîâûøåíèè èõ Äîõîäíîñòè è
Ðàññëîåííèè Êðåñòüßíñêèõ Õîçßéñòâ (8 ßíâàðß 1929 ã.), 1981).
Having spent the preceding three years railing against Trotsky and the Left deviationists,
in October of 1928, Stalin made his ﬁrst explicit attack on the Right, which he characterises
as the renouncement of communism in favour of social democracy (Stalin, 1954j). This is
basically his undermining of those (such as Bukharin) who were attempting to defend the
New Economic Policy from the attacks launched on it by Stalin in the preceding year19;
Stalin characterises these people as eﬀectively advocating `an enormous strengthening of
the capitalist elements in our country' (Stalin, 1954j, 235). He clariﬁed this point in an
extremely long speech given in April of 1929, accusing Bukharin of mischaracterising the
New Economic Policy, focusing on freedom of trade but forgetting that `NEP is freedom for
private trade within certain limits...with the proviso that the role of the state as the regulator
18An appeal from the poor farmers (áåäíßêè) of the village of Derbent in Timashevskii raion to the Kolkhoz
Soviet illustrates the fact that this problem continued well into 1929; the farmers ask simultaneously to be
grouped into a collective farm and claim that unless they are sent tractors by the autumn of 1929, the
collective will be `unviable (íåæèçíåííûé)' (Ïîñòàíîâëåíèå Ñîáðàíèß Áåäíßêîâ Ïîñåëêà Äåðáåíòñêîãî
Òèìàøåâñêîãî Ðàéíà î Âñòóïëåíèè â Êîëõîç (5 èþëß 1929 ã.), 1981, 49).
19Bukharin is explicitly linked with Rightist deviation (along with Tomskii and Rykov) by Stalin in
January-February of 1929 (Stalin, 1954a).
246
of the market is guaranteed ' (Stalin, 1955f, 46; emphasis Stalin's). This attack on Bukharin
and the NEP reached its logical conclusion in December of 1929 when Stalin called for the
Bolsheviks to `eliminate [the kulaks] as a class, and to replace their output by the output of
the collective farms and state farms' (Stalin, 1955a, 175); he argues that full dekulakisation
is required for the success of the collective farms (Stalin, 1955a, 176).
This brings us to his famous article, Dizzy with Success, published in March 1930, where
Stalin notes the extraordinary overfulﬁllment of the quotas and that `the radical turn of the
countryside towards socialism may be considered as already achieved ' (Stalin, 1955b, 197;
emphasis Stalin's). He stresses that the Party members should not go overboard and in
particular that collective farms should not be created by force because a central part of
their success is their voluntary character and the Party must ensure not to alienate the
peasantry (Stalin, 1955b). Thus, for example, members of the administration in Kabardino-
Balkaria were acknowledged to have erred when they tried to enforce a complete (100%)
level of collectivisation in certain areas, violating the supposedly voluntary nature of the
policy (Áåðáåêîâ, 1958, 68). Along similar lines, the Kuban okrug and Adigeyan Oblast
committees were reprimanded by the North Caucasus krai administration for setting a target
of full collectivisation for the autumn of 1930, nine months ahead of the schedule set by the
krai. The krai highlighted that collectivisation in national oblasts (such as Adigeya) was
particularly complex due to the lower levels of preparedness of such areas, meaning that with
the exception of North Ossetia and Adigeya (which had already achieved greater than 50%
collectivisation), these oblasts were excluded from the summer 1931 target and focus on the
simple creation of kolkhozes, learning from the experience of the other okrugs and regions of
the krai (Àíäðååâ, 1981). The leaders of the Adigeyan oblast ignored the protestations of the
krai administrators and ﬁnished full collectivisation by the ﬁrst few days of 1931 (Ñîîáùåíèå
î Çàâåðøåíèè Ñïëîøíîé Êîëëåêòèâèçàöèè â Àäûãåéñêîé Àâòîíîìíîé Îáëàñòè (15
ßíâàðß 1931 ã.), 1981).
However, Stalin highlights that collectivisation in the North Caucasus is expected to be
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complete by the spring of 193120, making it one of the ﬁrst regions to achieve this dubious
honour (along with the Middle and Lower Volga regions) (Stalin, 1955d, 213). This was
largely achieved, since by this time around 73% of peasants in the region were living in
collective farms (Shimotomai, 1983)21, though not without serious resistance from the lo-
cal communities; Martin recounts that the Red Army was sent into Chechnya, Ingushetia,
Karachai-Cherkessia and Dagestan to put down resistance in 1930 alone, forcing the Soviet
government to temporarily suspend the process of collectivisation and dekulakisation but
also fuelling the concerns about the unreliability and disloyalty of the region (Martin, 2001,
294-295).
However, as late as March 1929 Stalin was still upholding his line on nationalities policy,
responding to criticism from various leading Bolsheviks (including Meshkov and Kovalchuk)
that the socialism in one country would in fact not lead to the process by which `national
languages...die away...nations will be merged, and in place of the national languages one
common language will emerge' (Stalin, 1954f, 357). This melting away of diﬀerences will
only take place once the global socialist victory has been secured, but Stalin sees this as
occurring many years hence and in the meantime the responsibility of the Party is to `sup-
port...the development and ﬂourishing of the national cultures of the peoples of our country'
(Stalin, 1954f, 369). The commitment to education and cultural advancement of local pop-
ulations was continuing at an impressive pace at this stage; the four years from 1925-1929
saw a ﬁvefold increase in the graduates from `likpunkty' (adult education centres designed to
`liquidate' illiteracy) in Kabardino-Balkaria. Meanwhile the number of elementary schools
would rise from 167 in 1927 to 250 by 1931, with the number of students over the corre-
sponding period rising from 10,890 to 32,000 (Áåðáåêîâ, 1958, 97-101). Moreover the ﬁrst
20In November of 1929, the North Caucasus krai administration declared itself in full agreement with
an earlier decision along the same lines by the Central Committee and directed all eﬀorts to ﬁnishing
collectivisation by the summer of 1931 (Èç Ïîñòàâëåíèß Áþðî Ñåâåðî-Êàâêàçñêîãî Êðàéêîìà ÂÊÏ(á) î
Ñïëîøíîé Êîëëåêòèâèçàöèè íà Ñåâåðíîì Êàâêàçå (27 Íîßáðß 1929 ã.), 1981).
21Kabardino-Balkaria would attain a level of 96% of peasant agriculture passing through the 146 collective
and 21 state farms (which controlled virtually all farmland in the region) by 1933 (Áåðáåêîâ, 1958).
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dedicated publishing house for the Balkar and Kabard tongues was opened in 1929. Martin
notes that it was precisely around this time that the problems with local nationalists in
Ukraine would convince Stalin that the danger of local nationalism was outweighing that
presented by Great-Russian Chauvinism (Martin, 2001, 240).
Thus, by the Seventeenth Party Congress, Stalin was explicitly warning that local na-
tionalism was a front for capitalism and terming nationalism the `adaptation of the inter-
nationalist policy of the working class to the nationalist policy of the bourgeoisie' (Stalin,
1955e, 368-369). At this stage, Stalin equates Great-Russian Chauvinism as on a par with
local nationalism in terms of the dangers for the Bolshevik project, completing the shift away
from the initial nationalities policy he had outlined in the early years after the November
Revolution and eﬀectively signalling to local cadres and members of the OGPU (forerunner
of the KGB) that local nationalists were no longer deserving of special protection.
Stalin reaﬃrmed these sentiments at the Sixteenth Party Congress of July 1930, warning
against the danger of `deviating to Great-Russian chauvinism' deploying the `national in
form and socialist in content' to explain the thinking behind this (Stalin, 1955c, 379-380).
By this point, however, the close link between local nationalists and the NEP was established
in the minds of leading Bolsheviks and a series of show trials of local nationalists had already
taken place, with the most prominent being that of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine
from March 9 to April 19, 1930 (Martin, 2001, 249ﬀ).
This would be eclipsed by the appalling famines that would dog the region in 1931-1932
(and the Ukraine as well), prompted by a failure to meet the hopelessly optimistic grain
quotas22 and a demand from Stalin to increase terror rather than relax the quotas to resolve
the problem (Martin, 2001, 296). Not content with railing against bourgeois `wreckers' as
the reason for problems with the implementation of the drive to industrialisation, Stalin
would turn his ire to the agricultural sector and the consistent underperformance relative to
22The levels in the North Caucasus were among the highest in the Soviet Union; in 1930 38% of grain
production was delivered to the state and in the kolkhoz sector this was an astonishing 63.4% in 1931
(Shimotomai, 1983), shortly preceding the famine of the following year that would provoke Stalin's ire.
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planned output, talking of the `section of the counter-revolutionaries...in the North Cauca-
sus...striv[ing] to create something in the nature of collective farms, using them as a legal
cover for their underground organisations' (Stalin, 1955g, 233). He would link this to the
`wreckers' who had long been accused of impacting industrial production since the Shakhty
aﬀair. The situation was indeed dire in 1932; by October in some districts of the North
Caucasus only 2-3% of the monthly plan had been achieved and the peasants were actively
slaughtering horses and destroying machinery in protest at the desperate situation (Shimo-
tomai, 1983, 44-45), which resulted in a continuation of the catastrophic situation in 1933.
This generated a response from the centre in terms of the so-called `Kuban Aﬀair'23, with
widespread purges of the party (over 40% of members were stripped of membership), total
bans on trading to alleviate the situation, mass arrests24 and even deportation of three entire
villages to the North (Shimotomai, 1983). This prompted a fundamental re-evaluation of
korenizatsiia (and speciﬁcally Ukrainisation) in Ukraine and the North Caucasus; the policy
was blamed for enabling kulaks and other malicious elements to erect counter-revolutionary
cells and even occupy high-level positions in the local administration. By 1933, all the pieces
were in place for the ultimate shift to the Great Terror and the associated full-scale depor-
tations of entire ethnicities that would devastate the North Caucasus during the years of the
Second World War.
We see from our overview of the Stalinist period that the critical turning point was the
yaer 1927, when Stalin openly called for attacks on the kulaks and encouraged the widespread
policy of collectivisation that would underwrite the Soviet industrialisation drive. The hope-
lessly optimistic requisition quotas were missed, generating claims of kulak interference and
`wrecking' that would ultimately be tied to local nationalism, marking the end of the genuine
push for korenizatsiia. The Kuban Aﬀair was the most notable but hardly the only case of
widespread resistance in the North Caucasus and the eventual deportation of four entire
23Kuban was, and remains, a predominantly Cossack region.
2416,000 peasants were arrested in Kuban by the OGPU during the 1932 campaign (Martin, 2001, 300).
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ethnicities from the region during the Second World War was a reﬂection of the irreparable
damage done to the relationship between the Soviet authorities and the peoples of the region
during this period. From Stalin's perspective, however, the failure of NEP provided him
with valuable ammunition to discredit Bukharin and the Right opposition; having already
dealt with the Left opposition and Trotskii this provided him with near-absolute power in
the Soviet Union from the mid-1930s onwards and the basis to launch the Great Terror.
4.5 Putinism
Having completed our overview of the Stalinist period, we can shift to our investigation of
Vladimir Putin and the system he unveiled during his ﬁrst two terms in oﬃce. The central
claim of this section is that Putin's principal focus was on correcting the weakness of the
post-Soviet state; from his perspective, all associated problems ﬂowed from the enervation
of the central structure of governance. Given what we learned in the ﬁrst paper concerning
the failure of Yeltsin and his team to articulate a coherent platform for state- and nation-
building, it should not be tremendously surprising that this was the centrepiece for Putin's
remaking of the post-Soviet system; his ﬁrst act was to declare a Second Chechen War and
he would then move rapidly to limit the powers of the regions, replacing local leaders with
whom he disagreed. This would ultimately conclude with a direct attack on the powers of
the various republics and a partial remaking of the economic reforms undertaken by Yegor
Gaidar, with the renationalisation of key industries in the hands of the state.
Unlike with Joseph Stalin, to this point in the project we have not had cause to mention
Vladimir Putin as his role in the Yeltsin period prior to the endgame was, at best, peripheral.
Richard Sakwa, in the closest work we have to an English-language biography of Putin,
notes the formative inﬂuence of his time in the KGB in East Germany during the twilight
years of the Soviet Union but despite holding important positions in government, he was
almost entirely unknown before his nomination to the Premiership by Yeltsin in August
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1999 (Sakwa, 2004). Tim Colton notes that the attraction for Yeltsin in naming Putin as
his successor-in-waiting was his militaristic demeanour and discipline, that Yeltsin believed
would help return Russia to the path of reform; Putin was also recommended by Yeltsin's
chief of staﬀ in the summer of 1998 (Colton and McFaul, 2004, 175). He was hardly unique
in that sense, since Yeltsin had run through a succession of former military men in the Prime
Minister's post and found them all wanting (Colton, 2008, 433). On his appointment, few
thought that Putin would be any diﬀerent from the previous men who had held the post,
but Putin's rise to power was astonishing, moving from polling two percent in August 1999
to comfortably winning over ﬁfty percent in the 2000 Presidential election and thus avoiding
a run-oﬀ (Colton and McFaul, 2004, 173).
It is certainly true that at the outset, Putin cast himself as a man focused on solving
Russia's many problems rather than the type of individual who enjoys abstract debates over
ideology. He excluded himself from the televised debates between candidates and shunned
campaigning25 (Colton and McFaul, 2004). In his Open Letter to the Russian Voters, which
was published in February 2000, Putin dismisses the importance of ideology, writing that `I
am convinced that the basic feature of the new century will be not the battle of ideologies,
but sharp competition for quality of life, national wealth and progress' (Ïóòèí, 25 February,
2000). However, even in this letter we can see that this isn't an entirely accurate portrayal
of his position, since he states that his starting point (îòïðàâíàß òî÷êà) for his programme
is to defend the state and he identiﬁes the loss of state will as the fundamental challenge
facing Russia at this time, leading to hesitations and the delaying of key decisions (Ïóòèí,
25 February, 2000). This was to be the hallmark of his presidency and the fulcrum around
which everything else revolved.
Chechnya was the basis on which Putin would begin his path to the presidency and his
remaking of the bargain between the local and federal level. Emil Pain has documented the
25He even claimed that his working schedule allotted no special time for campaigning, implying that he
was too busy running the country to concern himself with such trivialities (`Ñïåöèàëüíûõ ïðåäâûáîðíûõ
ìåðîïðèßòèé â ìîåì ðàáî÷åì ãðàôèêå íåò') (Ïóòèí, 25 February, 2000).
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remarkable shift in public preference for a military solution, with a doubling of support from
October, 1995 to November 1999 (20.4% to 53.1%) (Pain, 2005, 69), largely the result of
a propaganda campaign launched by Putin shortly after taking Prime-Ministerial oﬃce26.
The start of formal hostilities was in August of 1999 when Russian troops entered Dagestan
to repel Shamil Basaev and Amir ibn Al-Khattab (Evangelista, 2002), who were the leaders
of the Islamist insurgency in the region, although as Ilyas Akhmadov notes there had been
skirmishes in the region beginning in June of that year27 (Akhmadov and Lanskoy, 2010).
Aslan Maskhadov, the oﬃcial President of Chechnya, sought to distance himself from these
attacks but his position was too weak to allow him to arrest the ringleaders (Akhmadov and
Lanskoy, 2010, 161), which was Putin's eﬀective ultimatum to avoid further hostilities from
the Russian side. The Second Chechen War began in earnest on the 30th of September,
1999 following Maskhadov's failure to meet Putin's demands. The success of and support
for this action, which was authorised by Yeltsin but largely reﬂected Putin's desire to resolve
the situation in Chechnya, allowed Putin to consolidate his position and ultimately ease to
victory in the Presidential Election, as seen above.
Putin described Chechnya as having been `occupied by a criminal world and transformed
into its fortress' (Ïóòèí, 25 February, 2000), connecting his counterterrorist activities in
Chechnya with a general problem facing Russia society. Indeed, Pavel Baev has argued
that the counterterrorist eﬀorts in Chechnya were central to Putin's strategy for regime
consolidation, noting that Putin's decisions to centralise the Interior Ministry units of OMON
and SOBR were greatly facilitated by the conﬂict and served to curb the power of regional
governors (Baev, 2004). He argues that what was critical for Putin was to ensure that
for Chechnya to serve the purpose of justifying Putin's recentralisation of executive power,
26The series of apartment bombings in early September, 1999 were absolutely central for demonstrating
the threat from Chechnya and terrorism could not be conﬁned to the republic although, as Amy Knight has
detailed in a review of John Dunlop's book, there are worrying signs of FSB involvement in the bombings
themselves (Knight, 2012).
27Akhmadov was the Foreign Minister for the Republic of Ichkeria (the oﬃcial name for the Chechen
territory in the locality) at the time but there is little reason to doubt his account of the facts of events
surrounding the build-up to the Second Chechen War.
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it must be extended beyond the conﬁnes of a merely regional conﬂict, which is why the
counterterrorism angle is so vital. Putin himself in a press conference from the 18th of
June, 2001, stated that the initial withdrawal of all federal troops from Chechnya was a
`humiliation', that Chechnya soon became a base for the `criminal mastery (îñâîåíèå) of the
economy of Russia' and that the fundamental issue for the Russian government prior to the
outbreak of the Second Chechen War was not the independence of Chechnya, but whether
`Chechnya could be used as a foothold (ïëàöäàðì) for attacks on Russia' (Ïóòèí, 18 June,
2001a).
Putin's plan to remake the federal bargain was thus a central part of his governing plat-
form and as Petrov and Slider note, one of Putin's ﬁrst major policy initiatives in this
regard was to recentralise power and limit the autonomy of the regions through the creation
of seven federal districts in May 2000 (the North Caucasus would initially be included in
the Southern District but would gain its own federal district in 2010 by decree of Dmitry
Medvedev). The heads of these districts had speciﬁc responsibility for extirpating inconsis-
tencies between local and federal laws that were a major source of regional power (Petrov
and Slider, 2007). Although the simple fact of `correcting' laws was perhaps largely a formal
exercise, the fact that Putin signalled this as one of his principal policy priorities so early
in his ﬁrst term demonstrated to the regional leadership that the laissez-faire compromises
that had governed relations with the centre would no longer be the guiding principle. He
also removed the heads of the republic from their automatic seats in the Federation Council
(the second chamber of Russia's parliament), denying them the direct link to Moscow and
parliamentary immunity that many treasured.
However, Putin went further than simply limiting the powers of the heads of republics.
Chechnya was again the touchstone for action, and when Ruslan Aushev, the popular leader
of Ingushetia, publicly criticised Putin and the conduct of the Chechen War in December
2001, he was swiftly asked to resign and replaced by Murat Zyazikov, a former-KGB agent
with strong ties to Moscow. Zyazikov quickly developed a reputation for enriching himself
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and his circle in `sweeps' of local Ingush youth and was widely despised by the local pop-
ulation. This represented the start of Putin's policy in the region of overlooking egregious
behaviour in favour of absolute loyalty and would reach its apogee when Ramzan Kadyrov,
the son of the assassinated former mufti of Chechnya, Akhmad Kadyrov, was appointed ef-
fective head of the republic in November of 2005. Putin has basically deferred management
of the republic to Kadyrov, taking little interest in the means by which he enforces order
and eliminates `threats'. This has led one Russian expert to describe Kadyrov and Putin as
mutual `hostages [çàëîæíèêè]' (Ìàëàøåíêî, 2009, 34); Kadyrov is dependent on Putin for
subsidies, while Putin has entirely relinquished any interest in local Chechen matters follow-
ing the aftermath of the Beslan tragedy, where a group of Islamist ﬁghters took hundreds
of schoolchildren hostage in a desperate and futile attempt to wring concessions from the
federal authorities. The North Caucasus has subsequently been marked by a continuous and
low-level insurgency that is largely localised and seemed to be of little interest to Putin prior
to 2008 (Hahn, 2007).
If we consider the economy, as Aslund notes, at the beginning of his term Putin made
noises that he would continue on the path of economic reform surrendered by Yeltsin during
the last years of his presidency (Aslund, 2007). Admittedly he inherited a restarted reform
programme in the aftermath of the crushing default in 1998 under the Primakov government,
but the tax system was hopelessly byzantine and the regions remained in control of large
amounts of revenue, often hiding revenue from the incompetent and corrupt central tax
administrators. A major focus of reform was thus to reduce the number of taxes from over
200 at the end of 1999 to just 16 in 2004, vastly limiting the scope for regional variation
and dramatically simplifying the work for the tax collectors (Aslund, 2007, 216). Taxes were
also lowered signiﬁcantly; a personal ﬂat tax of 13% was introduced and the corporation tax
was reduced from 35% to 24% and almost all state revenue was drawn from four taxes that
Easter has called the `most lucrative and easiest to collect' (VAT, excise, proﬁts and user fees
on raw materials) (Easter, 2006, 41). In his ﬁrst `Direct Line' multihour televised interaction
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with the Russian people, Putin criticises local monopolies and argues that housing beneﬁts
should ﬂow directly from the central state to the people28 and also argues that the state is
too weak to uphold basic laws concerning the privatisation of land29, leading Putin to push
for the strengthening of the `power vertical'.
However, Putin's most famous contribution to the economy has undoubtedly been his
largely successful battle to tame the oligarchs, who largely ran rampant in the later years
of Yeltsin's rule following the extraordinary loans-for-shares deal that guaranteed Yeltsin's
second presidential victory (Colton, 2008). He began his presidency by running Boris Bere-
zovskii out of the country and relieving Vladimir Gusinskii of his NTV television station
but his most famous action was the dismemberment of YUKOS and the imprisonment of its
CEO Mikhail Khodorkovskii and his chief aide Platon Lebedev in 2003 following the former's
rather ill-advised attempt to venture into politics (though this probably had more to do with
lobbying over tax on oil than Khodorkovskii's support for doomed liberal candidates) (Six-
smith, 2010). Balzer has argued convincingly that Putin's drive to sideline Khodorkovskii
was motivated in large part by the desire to `use control of energy resources to build up
Russia's economy and to reassert its inﬂuence in the world', reﬂecting Putin's own thoughts
on the matter as expressed in the economic research he conducted30 and published in the
mid-1990s (Balzer, 2005, 212).
This story is justly famous and ongoing, but the central point for our purposes is that
the basis for the arrest of Khodorkovskii was charges of tax evasion and it would have been
extremely diﬃcult for Putin's administration to piece everything together without the funda-
mental strengthening of the state that had taken place beforehand. The state subsequently
eﬀectively nationalised YUKOS's assets through Rosneft, tying the Russian budget even
28`[Í]óæíî íà÷àòü ñ òîãî, äåíüãè, êîòîðûå è ñåãîäíß ãîñóäàðñòâî âûäåëßåò...øëè íå ïðåäïðèßòèßì-
ìîíîïîëèñòàì íà ìåñòà...à øëè íåïîñðåäñòâåííî ëþäßì' (Ïóòèí, 24 December, 2001b).
29`[Ãîñóäàðñòâî] íå â ñîñòîßíèè ïðîâîäèòü â æèçíü òå ðåøåíèß, êîòîðûå ôîðìàëüíî çàëîæåíû â
çàêîíå' (Ïóòèí, 25 February, 2000).
30Or paid someone to conduct; the Russian academic system is hardly free of scandal in this regard. But
the point stands that Putin was willing to put his name to the research, regardless of how extensive his
involvement was.
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more closely to the price of oil and saving signiﬁcant problems for future governments.
4.6 Conclusion
This ﬁnal paper in the dissertation has investigated the diﬃculties and opportunities pre-
sented to certain individuals who are in unusual positions to consolidate regimes that have
completely overthrown the old order. Seizing on the inadequacies of ﬁrst-generation govern-
ments in the economic and state-building sphere respectively, Stalin and Putin were able to
reforge the initial settlement and exert overweening inﬂuence on subsequent developments
in their particular country. The papers on state-building and economics demonstrated that
the absence of coherent, clear and ﬂexible frameworks can be devastating in the immediate
period of post-imperial overthrow. We have seen in the ﬁrst paper that the failure to ar-
ticulate a platform for nation- and state-building under Yeltsin generated huge problems in
the North Caucasus, leading to extraordinary levels of unemployment and conﬂict between
the ethnic republics that the central government proved unable to resolve in a satisfactory
manner. For the Bolsheviks, the state-building system was integral to building support in
the North Caucasus and limiting the threatened explosion of violence, but in the economic
realm the switching between the radical War Communism and the more moderate New Eco-
nomic Policy provoked widespread resentment and an impossible situation with regard to
the peasantry, who were of incalculable importance for the early Bolshevik economy.
This paper has looked at the long-term implications of these initial problems and found
them to be devastating. We have seen that from 1923 onwards, Stalin used the uncertainty
over economic policy to buttress his drive for centralisation in all aspects, from the collec-
tivisation of farms to a complete restructuring of the Bolshevik nationality policy. Putin was
able to use the chaos of Chechnya to launch his presidential bid, then expand the conﬂict to
make broad claims about the necessity of pursuing counterterrorism through strengthening
the state and limiting the power of regional bodies. Emasculating these local power brokers
257
facilitated his seizing control of key assets and his sidelining of the oligarchs with political
pretensions, eﬀectively negating all real alternatives to his rule. Thus we see that the impact
of failed frameworks has both short- and long-term implications for those states unfortu-
nate enough to experience them, providing further ballast to our claims that the energies
of the scholarly and policy communities would be well-spent on correcting the deﬁcits in
contemporary democratic theory that give rise to such problems.
The post-imperial environments facing the Soviets and post-Soviets were in many ways
so overwhelming that perhaps we should be more astonished by their successes than failures
given the complete absence of a foundation on which either regime could build. This is,
however, cold comfort and our challenge as scholars is surely to diagnose and seek to prevent
the worst excesses of Stalinism and Putinism that resulted from the problematic legacies they
inherited. This dissertation project has sought to illuminate the processes by which these
legacies were formed and developed and this ﬁnal paper has considered the implications of
this. The positive task, of understanding how to mitigate the outcome of such situations,
much be left for future research.
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